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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the characteristics and performance of non-traditional investment 
motives, with a secondary focus on small-employment subsidiaries. It also investigates how 
firms re-evaluate and change their organizational control after an industry-wide consumer 
confidence crisis.  
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) examines the characteristics and performance of subsidiaries according 
to different investment purposes, with a special emphasis on non-traditional investment 
motives. The key characteristics examined in Essay 1 include the size of an affiliate, the 
ownership mode, expatriate control, and performance. It finds that FDI with a support 
function differs substantially from a typical manufacturing facility. Meanwhile, there is a 
huge difference among sub-categories of major investment motives.  
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) examines the relationship between subsidiary size and survival. The 
main theoretical/conceptual lenses are the liability of smallness and orchestration theory. 
Using a large sample of Japanese FDI, we found that small subsidiaries have a higher exit 
rate than large ones. Further, this relationship is moderated by four factors: (1) serving as a 
center of importance; (2) vertical investment; (3) being in a human-capital-intensive industry; 
and (4) being located in a developed country.  
Essay 3 (Chapter 4) examines MNEs’ responses to an industry-wide consumer confidence 
crisis. This study draws on the theoretical lens of transaction cost economics (TCE) and 
institutional theory. This study finds that Japanese MNEs in the crisis sector undertook more 
entries, especially in the service segment. MNEs also undertook fewer exits in the crisis 
sector, especially in the manufacturing segment. Due to demand uncertainty induced by the 
crisis, MNEs lowered their ownership level to reduce their exposure to risk in the crisis 
sector, especially in the manufacturing segment. Moreover, majority owners were more 
likely to increase organizational control, compared with minority owners. Majority owners 
were also more likely to exit, compared with WOS or minority owners.  
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On the whole, this dissertation challenges our existing view of a “typical” subsidiary in a 
“typical” investment setting. It also reemphasizes the centrality of investment motives to firm 
internationalization research and recommends a routine inclusion of investment motives in 
IB research. 
 
 
 
Keywords 
Investment motives, size, mode, organization control, expatriate control, performance, 
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demand uncertainty, behavioral uncertainty, legitimacy, reputation. 
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Summary for Lay Audience 
This dissertation examines the characteristics and performance of non-traditional investment 
motives, with a secondary focus on small-employment subsidiaries. It also investigates how 
firms re-evaluate and change their organizational control after an industry-wide consumer 
confidence crisis.  
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) examines the characteristics and performance of subsidiaries according 
to different investment purposes, with a special emphasis on non-traditional investment 
motives. The key characteristics examined in Essay 1 include the size of an affiliate, the 
ownership mode, expatriate control, and performance. It finds that FDI with a support 
function differs substantially from a typical manufacturing facility. Meanwhile, there is a 
huge difference among sub-categories of major investment motives.  
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) examines the relationship between subsidiary size and survival. The 
main theoretical/conceptual lenses are the liability of smallness and orchestration theory. 
Using a large sample of Japanese FDI, we found that small subsidiaries have a higher exit 
rate than large ones. Further, this relationship is moderated by four factors: (1) serving as a 
center of importance; (2) vertical investment; (3) being in a human-capital-intensive industry; 
and (4) being located in a developed country.  
Essay 3 (Chapter 4) examines MNEs’ responses to an industry-wide consumer confidence 
crisis. This study draws on the theoretical lens of transaction cost economics (TCE) and 
institutional theory. This study finds that Japanese MNEs in the crisis sector undertook more 
entries, especially in the service segment. MNEs also undertook fewer exits in the crisis 
sector, especially in the manufacturing segment. Due to demand uncertainty induced by the 
crisis, MNEs lowered their ownership level to reduce their exposure to risk in the crisis 
sector, especially in the manufacturing segment. Moreover, majority owners were more 
likely to increase organizational control, compared with minority owners. Majority owners 
were also more likely to exit, compared with WOS or minority owners.  
On the whole, this dissertation challenges our existing view of a “typical” subsidiary in a 
“typical” investment setting. It also reemphasizes the centrality of investment motives to firm 
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internationalization research and recommends a routine inclusion of investment motives in 
IB research. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have different investment motives for their foreign 
direct investment (FDI) (Dunning, 1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). For example, one 
MNE may invest in Africa to access minerals and natural resources, while another MNE 
may invest in the United States to gain access to the local market, e.g., Toyota’s 
manufacturing investments in six U.S. states. After an MNE has gained some experience 
in FDI, it may opt to reconfigure its existing subsidiaries. This might occur by shifting 
manufacturing subsidiaries to developing countries while opening new R&D centers in 
developed countries. Recently, MNEs from emerging markets (EMNEs) have acquired 
technologically advanced firms for the purpose of strategic asset seeking, i.e., to augment 
their long-term competitive advantage (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 
2007; Luo & Tung, 2018; Meyer, 2015; Narula, 2012). The abovementioned firms are 
typically engaged in FDI for the purposes of resource seeking, market seeking, efficiency 
seeking, or strategic asset seeking, which are the four major investment motives in 
Dunning’s original typology.  
Hennart and Slangen (2015: 117) urged scholars “to start paying more attention to actual 
choices that were theoretically suboptimal, that is, choices deviating from a model’s 
theoretical prediction… especially their evolution over time vis-à-vis theoretically 
optimal choices.” This dissertation is a direct response to this call, as it examines the 
characteristics and performance of non-traditional investment motives and small-
employment subsidiaries. It also examines how firms changed their organizational 
arrangement after an industry-wide consumer confidence crisis.  
This dissertation systematically examines the role of investment motives in firm 
internationalization. The first two essays investigate the characteristics and performance 
of FDI according to different investment purposes, with particular attention given to non-
traditional investment motives such as management-supportive investment (i.e., 
controlling business in the area), trade-supportive investment (i.e., information gathering 
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and royalty collection), and finance-supportive investment (i.e., financing and currency 
hedging). The Toyo Keizai dataset (TK dataset), which covers Japanese overseas 
investment from 1991 to 2017, is used for our empirical analysis. In total, subsidiaries 
with the abovementioned non-traditional investment motives represent about 15% of all 
subsidiaries. In the TK dataset, 61,695 subsidiary-year observations (8,642 subsidiaries) 
belong to the category of non-traditional motives and these subsidiary-year observations 
report an average annual revenue of US$50 million. Collectively, these represent 
approximately US$3 trillion of investment. 
Following the theme of non-traditional FDI, the third essay investigates MNEs’ responses 
to an industry-wide crisis setting. The crisis management literature on FDI has focused on 
the determinants of survival or exit and has largely neglected those MNEs that continue 
to operate during a crisis. For exceptions, see Chung & Beamish, 2005; Chung, Lee, 
Beamish, Southam, & Nam, 2013; Zhou, Park, & Zhou, 2014. This study addresses the 
gap by theoretically drawing on transaction cost economics (TCE) and institutional 
theory (i.e., legitimacy and reputation) to systematically investigate the repertoire of 
strategies that MNEs can deploy during a crisis. It shows that there are even investment 
opportunities for MNEs to explore during an industry wide consumer confidence crisis, 
which constitutes the non-traditional element in this study. 
This chapter proceeds by introducing the motivation of the dissertation, providing an 
overview of three integrated essays, and suggesting intended contributions to the FDI 
literature. 
1.1 Motivation for Essays 1 and 2 of the Dissertation  
Most previous studies on investment motives have covered the four major motivations, 
i.e., market seeking, resource seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic asset seeking 
(Dunning, 1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). However, subsidiaries are heterogeneous 
due to their differences in investment motives (Beugelsdijk, Hennart, Slangen, & Smeets, 
2010). Because of the different strategic roles undertaken by subsidiaries, they have 
corresponding structural forms that affect their level of autonomy and performance 
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(Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995). As MNEs orchestrate the global process of value 
creation and capture, they tend to adopt a “portfolio of entry modalities” (Pitelis & Teece, 
2018: 535). In fact, due to structural, financial, and legal reasons, there are many types of 
subsidiaries that differ from the image of a typical subsidiary as a standalone 
manufacturing facility. For example, there are sometimes very large subsidiaries in terms 
of sales, but with few or no employees. Hence, there are sound theoretical and empirical 
reasons to investigate those subsidiaries established for non-traditional investment 
motives. 
Indeed, other investment motives do exist in Dunning’s (1993) original typology, such as 
in the case of escape, passive, and support investments. The latter include management-
supportive investments, trade-supportive investments, and finance-supportive 
investments (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2012). Non-traditional motives have been 
traditionally regarded as secondary and have received much less attention from scholars 
in their studies (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015). Nonetheless, a few non-traditional 
investment motives have received at least some scrutiny. For example, there have been 
studies about (i) regional management centers (e.g., Ambos, Schlegelmilch, Ambos, & 
Brenner 2009; Chakravarty, Hsieh, Schotter, & Beamish, 2017; Lasserre, 1996; Schotter, 
Stallkamp, & Pinkham, 2017; Verbeke & Asmussen, 2016) and (ii) escape investment 
(e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, & Un, 2015; Barnard & Luiz, 2018; Boisot & Meyer, 
2008; Fathallah, Branzei, & Schaan, 2018; Kobrak, Oesterle, & Röber, 2018; Li, Xia, 
Shapiro, & Lin, 2018; Shi, Sun, Yan, & Zhu, 2017; Weng & Peng, 2018; Witt & Lewin, 
2007). The main theoretical lens for studying escape investment is institutional arbitrage, 
i.e., to escape weak institutions in the home country for a better institutional environment 
in the host country (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, & Un, 2015; Witt & 
Lewin, 2007). Escape investment is not examined in this thesis. The main theoretical lens 
for regional management centers is the integration–responsiveness framework (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1989; Rugman & Verbeke, 2004; Verbeke & Asmussen, 2016). Partial overlap 
exists between regional management centers and subsidiaries with management-
supportive functions, which are examined in this thesis. 
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The focus of this thesis is on support investments, including management-supportive 
investments, trade-supportive investments, and finance-supportive investments. 
Subsidiaries established for these purposes are not self-contained profit centers. They 
incur costs, but the benefits accrue to the MNE as a whole (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
For example, management-supportive investments include those regional and branch 
offices that act as intermediaries between head offices and foreign subsidiaries. 
Subsidiaries with trade-supportive functions usually facilitate the import and export of 
goods and services. They also provide marketing and public-relations services for their 
parent companies, such as information gathering and royalty collection, which is the first 
step in setting up a market- or resource-seeking affiliate. 
Finance-supportive investments provide financing and currency-hedging services to the 
MNE. Special-purpose vehicles (SPVs) are one type of financing investment. They are 
“essentially robot firms that have no employees, make no substantive economic 
decisions, have no physical location, cannot go bankrupt” (Gorton & Souleles, 2007: 
550). SPVs are set up for the purpose of accessing low-cost financing, avoiding tax, and 
taking debt off the balance sheet for the parent firm (PwC, 2011). They are passive in 
business decision making and have no employees. Yet these SPVs serve important 
functions in the MNE global network. However, investment with finance-supportive 
functions has been routinely excluded from FDI studies (e.g., Blevins, Moschieri, 
Pinkham, & Ragozzino, 2016; Reuer & Ragozzino, 2008). 
Why has it been so difficult to empirically investigate non-traditional investment 
motivations? There are two primary reasons. The first is that many existing studies on 
investment motives have used aggregate-level data, e.g., at the country level (Brouthers, 
Gao, & McNicol, 2008) or industry level (Nachum & Zaheer, 2005), as a proxy for the 
four major investment motives. For example, Brouthers et al. (2008) used country-level 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) data. Market-seeking 
FDI was calculated using the average multilateral FDI flows in the industries of 
wholesaling, retailing, transportation, storage, communications, real estate, and financial 
services, while FDI in the industries of textiles, machinery and equipment manufacturing, 
and clothing was treated as labor-seeking FDI. Nachum and Zaheer (2005) used industry-
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level data under the assumption that the industry averages equate to a “representative” 
firm in the industry. In their study, local market-seeking efforts were measured using the 
cost of sales of affiliates as a share of total costs. However, it is difficult to find proxies 
for non-traditional motivations using aggregate-level data. The second reason it has been 
so difficult to empirically investigate non-traditional investment motivations is that for 
datasets like the TK dataset where detailed information on subsidiary motives is 
available, researchers have realized that small subsidiaries with fewer than 20 employees 
are qualitatively different from typical manufacturing facilities (Beamish & Inkpen, 
1998). As a result, subsidiaries with fewer than 20 employees have routinely been 
excluded from analysis. 
1.1.1 Motivation for Studying Small-Employment Subsidiaries 
Because none of the 160+ publications from Ivey faculty and Ph.D. candidates and 
graduates based on the TK dataset1 have focused on small-employment subsidiaries, we 
conducted a preliminary analysis of Japanese FDI with small-scale employment. An 
empirical analysis of the TK dataset (1991–2017 version) shows that there were 557,179 
subsidiary-year observations (56,193 subsidiaries), among which 406,282 observations 
(44,220 subsidiaries) reported information on the number of employees. Among them, 
150,823 subsidiary-year observations (37% of all subsidiary-year observations, involving 
24,466 subsidiaries) had fewer than 20 employees and 22,261 subsidiary-year 
observations (5.5% of all subsidiary-year observations, involving 5,790 subsidiaries) had 
zero employees. For example, (1) Toshiba Capital Asia was one such Japanese affiliate 
with 19 employees, yet it reported revenue of a whopping US$71.4 billion in 2013. It was 
a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) of its Japanese parent firm, Toshiba, and its main 
business was loans and credit cards. (2) Kumagai Australia Finance Ltd was another 
Japanese affiliate that was 100% owned by the Japanese parent firm. It also operated in 
the loan/credit card sector, had three employees, and reported revenue of US$15 billion 
 
1 P. W. Beamish, “Japanese Foreign Direct Investment Article Abstracts,” Ivey, 2019, accessed June 17, 
2019, https://www.ivey.uwo.ca/internationalbusiness/research/ivey-international-research-by-
themegeography/japanese-foreign-direct-investment-article-abstracts. 
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in 1992. (3) Visualant was a U.S. high-tech company that sold proprietary technology 
solutions for identification, authentication, and diagnosis. The company, whose Japanese 
parent owned 10.5%, had 10 employees and reported revenue of US$9.1 billion in 2015. 
(4) KG International Petroleum was a wholesale company with eight employees and it 
generated US$7.8 billion in 1998. (5) Marubeni Motor Service was another Japanese 
affiliate that operated in the loan/credit card sector. It had four employees and reported 
revenue of US$6.9 billion in 1999. In sum, these five affiliates had a total of 44 
employees, yet reported revenue of US$110.2 billion. 
There were also affiliates that reported zero employees. Here, a similar pattern existed. 
(1) Valepar S.A. was a Japanese affiliate with a turnover of US$48.3 billion in 2013 and 
its main business was financial services for mining. Japan’s Mitsui owned 18.2% of the 
shares. (2) Toyota Motor North America, an investment/management company, reported 
revenue of US$27.5 billion in 1998. It was an affiliate with no employees, and was a 
100% owned subsidiary of Toyota. (3) Dia Chemical Taiwan was a 100% owned 
Japanese subsidiary in the chemical wholesale industry and reported revenue of US$23 
billion in 2010. (4) Itochu Petroleum (a WOS) reported revenue of US$15.2 billion in 
2009, and was another Japanese affiliate in the wholesale trade sector. (5) Mitsui Oil 
Hong Kong was a 100% owned Japanese affiliate in the oil wholesale industry, and 
reported revenue of US$11.6 billion in 2012. In sum, all these affiliates reported zero 
employees, but were able to generate billions of dollars in revenue. Such unusual yet 
financially significant practices among MNE subsidiaries warrant further study. 
1.2 Motivation for Essay 3 of the Dissertation  
Essay 3 is motivated by empirical observations of an industry-wide consumer confidence 
crisis in the Chinese food industry in 2008. The melamine-contaminated baby formula 
scandal in 2008 was the major event that made Chinese consumers think twice before 
purchasing domestically produced food products. Besides melamine-contaminated milk 
products, there were also media reports about banned cooking oil (Wu & Chen, 2013) 
and pork contaminated with chemicals. In a survey conducted by the Chinese government 
in 2012, 41% of respondents reported that food safety was a “serious problem.” Food 
safety concerns, along with inequality and corruption, represented three top governance 
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concerns of the Chinese population (Yasuda, 2015). The baby formula crisis offers a 
natural experimental setting to study crisis responses by MNEs.  
Meanwhile, there is a research gap in the crisis management literature (Bondy, Pfarrer, 
Short, & Coombs, 2016) as it relates to international management (Hasse, 2016; Naidoo, 
2010; Zhao, Park, & Zhou, 2014). When facing potential risks or economic crises, MNEs 
adopt a “fight” or “flight” attitude. Most literature on crisis management and FDI has 
focused on the “flight” scenario and has investigated the determinants of survival (e.g., 
Chung & Beamish, 2015; Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013, 2017). There are only a few 
exceptions that examine how MNEs “fight” or adjust their operations to survive the crisis 
(e.g., Chung & Beamish, 2008; Chung et al., 2013; Naidoo, 2010; Zhao, Park, & Zhou, 
2014). This study addresses this research gap by investigating the repertoire of strategies 
that MNEs can deploy in a crisis.  
In addition, previous crisis management research in international business has mostly 
focused on regional or country-level crises (e.g. Chung et al., 2013; Dai, Eden, & 
Beamish, 2013, 2017) or MNE-firm-level crises (e.g. Zhao, Park, & Zhou, 2014). This 
study adds to the literature by focusing on an industry-level crisis.  
1.3 Dissertation Overview 
Essays 1 and 2 of this dissertation systematically examine the role of investment motives 
on firm internationalization. They do so via two integrated essays, with a focus on non-
traditional investment motives and small-employment subsidiaries. Following the theme 
of non-traditional FDI, Essay 3 examines MNEs’ responses to an industry-wide crisis.  
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) emphasizes the centrality of investment motives in international 
business (IB) studies by proposing a theoretical framework for the antecedents and 
consequences of investment motives (see Figure A). It integrates a) the theoretical 
argument that an MNE’s ownership advantages (O-advantages) interact with the location 
advantages (L-advantages) of host and home countries to jointly determine the type of 
investment motive(s) of an affiliate (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015; Narula, 2012; 
Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011) and b) a theoretical framework of the effects of 
8 
 
investment motives on subsidiary-level characteristics and performance (Benito, 2015). 
To achieve that goal, four hypotheses were developed. Unlike the existing literature on 
the OLI paradigm which uses the umbrella term of country specific advantages (CSAs), 
we differentiate between host country specific advantages (host CSAs) and home country 
specific advantages (home CSAs). 
Figure A: Theoretical framework for understanding investment motives 
 
Note: The primary source of the left circle is Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula (2015); Narula (2012); and Meyer et al. (2011); the primary 
source of the right circle is Benito (2015). 
The data analysis looks at the characteristics and performance of subsidiaries according 
to different investment purposes (Chakravarty, Hsieh, Schotter, & Beamish, 2017; 
Makino, Beamish, & Zhao, 2004), with a special emphasis on non-traditional investment 
motives. Although there exist different classification typologies of investment purposes 
(e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, & Un, 2015; Behrman, 1972; Hollander, 1970; Hymer, 
1976; Kacker, 1985; Porter, 1986; Dunning, 1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008), as a 
baseline, we adopt the typology proposed by Dunning (1993). In addition to the four 
main investment motives (Dunning, 1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008), this essay pays 
special attention to two other categories of investment purposes: support investments and 
passive investments. Essay 1 addresses two research questions: (1) What are the 
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determinants of investment motives? (2) How do subsidiaries with different investment 
purposes differ in their characteristics and performance?  
The key characteristics examined in Essay 1 include subsidiary-level characteristics such 
as the size of the affiliate (measured by the number of local employees), the ownership 
mode (wholly owned subsidiary, majority-owned subsidiary, equally owned subsidiary, 
and minority-owned subsidiary), expatriate control (expatriate number, expatriate 
percentage), and performance (measured by both revenue and subjective evaluation).  
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) examines the relationship between subsidiary size and survival. It 
addresses two research questions: (1) What is the main relationship between subsidiary 
size and survival? (2) How is the main effect moderated by the special roles of small-
employment subsidiaries? Examples of such roles include those serving as centers of 
importance and vertical investment.  
The main theoretical lens is the liability of smallness (Aldrich & Auster, 1986) and 
orchestration theory (Pitelis & Teece, 2018). The main statistical model is the Cox 
proportional hazards model. Using a sample of Japanese overseas FDI, we found that 
smaller subsidiaries have a higher exit rate than larger ones. Further, we also found that 
the liability of smallness is conditional upon the following four factors: (1) serving as a 
center of importance; (2) vertical investment; (3) being in a human-capital-intensive 
industry; and (4) being located in a developed country.  
Essay 3 (Chapter 4) examines MNEs’ responses to the food safety crisis in China in 
2008. It addresses the following four research questions: (1) Does the crisis trigger more 
foreign entries in the crisis sector? (2) Does the crisis trigger fewer foreign exits in the 
crisis sector? (3) What is the impact of demand uncertainty on MNEs’ subsidiary control 
in the crisis sector? (4) What is the effect of MNEs’ equity position (i.e., WOS, majority 
equity, minority equity) on subsidiary control in the crisis sector? The main theoretical 
lens is TCE (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Hennart, 1982) and institutional theory 
(i.e., legitimacy and reputation) (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Rao, 1994).  
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Using a large sample of Japanese MNEs in China with 79,528 subsidiary-year 
observations, our results show that the crisis triggered more foreign entries in the crisis 
sector, especially in the service segment. Meanwhile, the crisis also triggered fewer 
foreign exits, especially in the manufacturing segment. With regard to existing 
operations, MNEs lowered their equity control to reduce their exposure to risk. 
Moreover, MNEs of different equity positions (i.e., WOS, majority, and minority) were 
under varying levels of partner opportunism and reputational risk. As a result, majority 
owners were more likely to increase their ownership level to ensure quality control than 
minority owners. Majority owners were also more likely to disassociate from the 
reputational risk through divestment, compared with WOS and minority owners.   
1.4 Contributions 
This dissertation hopes to make various contributions to the literature by reemphasizing 
the centrality of investment motives to IB research and focusing on non-traditional FDI, 
including non-traditional investment motives, small-employment subsidiaries, and 
industry-level crises. Taken together, this dissertation challenges our existing view of a 
“typical” subsidiary in a “typical” FDI setting.  
Essay 1 reemphasizes the centrality of investment purposes to research on firm 
internationalization (Benito, 2015; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). It is the first empirical 
attempt to systematically test Dunning’s (1993) typology on investment motives, using 
the largest sample ever employed to date. Dunning’s original typology offered definitions 
and examples for each type of investment motive. This study suggests that Dunning’s 
typology does have predictive power for key characteristics (such as size, ownership 
control, and expatriate control) and performance outcomes. It extends Dunning’s 
typology by offering theoretical explanations to account for differences among FDI with 
divergent investment purposes. It also makes an empirical contribution by including all 
categories specified in Dunning’s (1993) typology, whereas most previous empirical 
studies examined only one or two investment purposes per study, sometimes in a 
piecemeal fashion. 
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Second, this study provides a nuanced picture of FDI in functions such as “financing and 
hedging,” “information gathering and royalty revenue,” and “building new business,” 
which have been neglected in most empirical analyses of investment motives (Cuervo-
Cazurra & Narula, 2015). These investment motives are not only important in a strategic 
sense, but also in investment dollars. FDI with these motives is substantially different 
from other types of FDI and collectively exemplifies the central theme of this 
dissertation—that there is huge heterogeneity (Birkinshaw & Hood, 2008) among 
subsidiaries. Hence, there is a need to disaggregate data and treat investments with 
different investment motives separately. We also argue that where data is available, 
investment motives should be routinely included in an IB analysis looking at foreign 
investment. 
Third, our results show that there is a huge difference among subcategories of major 
investment motives. For example, under the big umbrella of “market-seeking” FDI, there 
are four subcategories—that is, “local market access,” “tax breaks for investment,” 
“alliances with customers in Japan,” and “building new business.” The latter three 
subcategories are substantially different from the first subcategory in all four of the 
characteristics and performance measures tested in the present research. This suggests 
that future IB studies should consider investment motives at the subcategory level. 
Essay 2 makes at least two contributions to the literature. First, we quantify the liability 
of smallness by exploring the survival likelihood of small-employment subsidiaries. 
Second, we identify four contingency factors that enhance the survival chances of small-
employment subsidiaries. These are the special roles of i) centers of importance, (ii) 
vertical investment, (iii) being in a human-capital-intensive industry, and (iv) being 
located in a developed country. 
Essay 3 (Chapter 4) makes at least three contributions to the literature. First, it contributes 
to TCE and extends the theoretical argument about external uncertainty, especially 
demand uncertainty. Consistent with prior research on entry-mode choice (i.e., IJVs or 
WOSs) (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Sartor & Beamish, 2014) and post-entry-mode 
conversion (i.e., conversion from IJVs to WOSs) (e.g., Puck et al., 2009), it suggests that 
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MNEs reduced their equity control to cope with environmental uncertainty. It goes 
beyond prior research by extending the argument about external uncertainty and 
organizational control in a post-entry crisis empirical setting.  
In addition, we examined the relationship between behavioral uncertainty (i.e., partner 
opportunism) and organizational control by introducing the concepts of reputational risk 
and MNEs’ equity position. The results show that compared with WOS and minority 
owners, majority owners are at high levels of both operational and reputational risk. As a 
result, majority owners will either choose to a) increase their ownership level to exert 
more organizational control in order to ensure product quality or b) disassociate 
themselves from the IJV through divestment in order to avoid reputational damage to 
their global brand and operation. To our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates 
the strategic options of MNEs of different equity positions in coping with partner 
opportunism.  
Second, our study extends Kostova and Zaheer’s (1999) argument that the illegitimacy of 
local firms provides non-local firms with an initial level of legitimacy in entry and exit 
decisions. Integrating the country-of-origin literature, which highlights the trade-offs 
between symbolic value (Zhou & Hui, 2003) and perceived quality (Knight, Holdsworth, 
& Mather, 2007) in consumer decisions, we argue and show empirically that MNEs are 
more likely to enter and less likely to exit a market in an industry where local producers 
are facing a crisis.  
Third, we contribute to the crisis management literature (Bondy, Pfarrer, Short, & 
Coombs, 2016) as it relates to international management (Hasse, 2016; Naidoo, 2010; 
Zhao et al., 2014). When facing a political or economic crisis, many MNEs assume a 
“fight” or “flight” attitude. Most literature on crisis management and FDI has focused on 
the “flight” scenario and has explored the determinants of survival (e.g., Chung & 
Beamish, 2005; Chung et al., 2013; Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013, 2017). There have been 
few examples of how MNEs “fight” or adapt their operations to survive a crisis (e.g., 
Chung & Beamish, 2008; Chung et al., 2010; Naidoo, 2010; Zhao et al., 2014). Our 
research adds to the second line of literature by showing that MNEs have a repertoire of 
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strategies of entering, exiting, lowering or increasing their ownership level, or simply 
remaining unchanged, which depends on their equity position and industry segment.  
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Chapter 2  
2 The Characteristics and Performance of Foreign Direct 
Investment According to Investment Motives 
This chapter describes the characteristics and performance of FDI according to 
investment motives. Such a focus was driven by both theoretical and empirical reasons. 
At the theoretical level, investment motives are key to the understanding of MNE activity 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Mesquita, 2016; Nachum & Zaheer, 2005). Dunning and 
Lundan (2008) argued that “any theory of the MNE critically depends on the presumed 
motivation and intention of the enterprise involved” (p. 81). Investment motives are 
systematically associated with the central aspects of internationalization, because they 
help to identify location choices and evaluate performance outcomes (Benito, 2015). 
When an MNE with adequate capital in hand is contemplating internationalization, it may 
have multiple location choices in mind. If its investment motive is to seek raw material 
resources, it may choose resource-rich locations such as Africa. If the same company 
intends to seek market access, it may choose locations with high population density and 
potential for market growth.  
Moreover, the evaluation of performance outcome is contingent upon investment motives 
(Benito, 2015; Meyer, 2015; Verbeke & Brugman, 2009; Verbeke, Li, & Goerzen, 2009; 
Verbeke & Forootan, 2012). For example, a natural-resource-seeking subsidiary may be a 
cost center, which makes it irrelevant to judge its performance on profitability. In 
strategic-asset-seeking FDI, the improved capability of the parent firm, such as R&D 
output, is a better performance evaluation criterion than the short-term profitability of the 
focal subsidiary. 
However, the investment motives behind the internationalization of the firm have been 
largely assumed or taken for granted in IB literature (Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, & Un, 
2015). Most theories assume a market-seeking motive for firm internationalization 
(Benito, 2015). Take the incremental internationalization process model, or “the Uppsala 
school” (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), as an example. The implicit assumption is that firms 
seek market access in the host country. Yet the sequential entry model is more applicable 
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to market-seeking behavior, but less applicable to strategic-asset-seeking FDI (Benito, 
2015; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Thus, internationalization theories may be incomplete 
unless they take into consideration all major types of investment motives. 
At the empirical level, most research on firm internationalization has extensively studied 
the “who” (firm-specific advantages, or FSAs), “where” (location), “how” 
(internalization; sequential entry; incremental commitment; diversification), and “so 
what” (performance) parts of firm internationalization. However, little attention has been 
paid to the “why” or motivations behind a firm’s strategic decision to internationalize 
(Benito, 2015; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Although the centrality of investment motives 
in firm internationalization makes it relevant to study their direct or moderating effect 
(Benito, 2015), the role and nature of investment motives have only been “sporadically 
considered” in empirical research (Beamish & Lutpon, 2016). 
This chapter attempts to fill this research gap by systematically examining affiliate-level 
characteristics and performance according to investment motives. It uses the Kaigai 
Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran (Japanese Overseas Investment) dataset (Toyo Keizai, 2017) for 
subsidiary-level information. The TK dataset has 557,179 subsidiary-year observations 
(56,193 subsidiaries) and 194,171 observations reported with up to eight investment 
purposes. 
We intend to make three contributions. First, there are investment motivations that have 
received little or no attention in the vast majority of empirical IB studies, such as 
“financing and currency hedging” (J), “information gathering and royalty revenue” (K), 
and “building new business” (M). These investment motives are important not only in a 
strategic sense, but also in terms of investment dollars. For example, investments in 
“financing and currency hedging” (J) reported an annual revenue2 of US$62 million per 
subsidiary and collective annual revenue of US$126 billion. Second, investments with the 
purpose of “local market access” (F) accounted for about half of all investment (48.32%). 
 
2 Unless otherwise specified, revenue refers to average annual revenue. 
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Under the general large category of “market access,” there are other subcategories as 
well, such as “tax breaks for investment” (C), “alliances with Japanese customers” (I), 
and “building new business” (M). These subcategories have different characteristics 
compared with the subcategory of “local market access.” For example, those with the 
investment purpose of “local market access” reported average annual revenue of US$59 
million, but the average annual revenue recorded by other subcategories was much lower: 
US$28 million for “tax breaks for investment,” US$26 million for “alliances with 
customers in Japan,” and US$10 million for “building new business.” Third, investments 
of various investment purposes have very different characteristics, as will be explained 
below. Some particular types of investment such as “financing and currency hedging” 
and “information collection and royalty revenue” represent particular types of 
investments that are different from a standard subsidiary. Hence, it is misleading and 
inappropriate to aggregate data from all various investment purposes, as occurs in most 
IB research. Thus, we suggest that scholars should disaggregate analyses according to 
investment purposes and conduct more fine-grained analysis. 
This chapter starts with a review of the literature on the characteristics and performance 
of FDI according to investment motives. Then a theoretical framework for the 
antecedents and consequences of investment motives is proposed, which integrates two 
existing theoretical paradigms in the literature. In total, four hypotheses are developed. 
Of these, so far, Hypotheses 3 and 4 have been tested and are discussed in this essay. This 
is followed by discussion of the data source and preliminary data analysis, then 
presentation of results and discussion.  
2.1 Literature Review 
This section reviews the literature on the conceptual typology and empirical measurement 
of investment motives, and the effect of investment motives on subsidiary characteristics 
and performance. This literature review limited the scope of research to leading 
international business, management, and strategy journals. We identified eight core IB 
journals: Global Strategy Journal (GSJ), International Business Review (IBR), 
International Journal of Management Reviews (IJMR), Journal of International Business 
Studies (JIBS), Journal of International Management (JIM), Journal of World Business 
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(JWB), Multinational Business Review (MBR), and Management International Review 
(MIR) (Kim & Aguilera, 2016). We also searched 15 leading management/strategy 
journals: Academy of Management Annals (AMA), Academy of Management Journal 
(AMJ), Academy of Management Perspectives (AMP), Academy of Management Review 
(AMR), Asia Pacific Journal of Management (APJM), British Journal of Management 
(BJM), European Journal of Management (EJM), Harvard Business Review (HBV), 
Journal of Management (JOM), Journal of Management Studies (JMS), Long Range 
Planning (LRP), Management and Organization Review (MOR), Organization Studies 
(OS), Organization Science (OS), and Strategic Management Journal (SMJ) (Kim & 
Aguilera, 2016). The time window of the analysis was the 30 years from January 1988 to 
January 2018. 
 The following keywords were used to search for relevant articles published in the 
abovementioned journals: (1) “investment motive(s)”; (2) “investment purpose(s)”; (3) 
“investment motivation(s)”; (4) “seeking” AND “foreign investment”; (5) “seeker” AND 
“foreign investment”; (6) “types of FDI(s)”; and (7) “kinds of FDI(s).”   
After all the relevant articles had been identified, these articles were categorized 
according to the following three topics: (1) the theoretical development of the typology of 
investment motives of FDI; (2) the empirical measurement of the theoretical construct of 
investment motives; and (3) the characteristics and performance of subsidiaries according 
to investment motives.  
2.1.1 Theoretical Construct of Investment Motives 
This section traces the historical development of the concept of “investment motive,” its 
main typologies, the multiplicity of investment motives, and how investment motives 
change over time. 
2.1.1.1 Main Typology of Investment Motives 
MNEs internationalize for various reasons and scholars have proposed different 
classifications of motives (see Table 1). Building on the efforts of early work on 
investment motives, Dunning (1993) offered the most comprehensive typology on 
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investment motives. It considers four major investment motives (i.e., resource seeking, 
market seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic asset seeking) and three minor ones 
(i.e., support investment, escape investment, and passive investment). Later scholars 
added different dimensions to the typology, such as industry competitive pressure 
(Nachum & Zaheer, 2005), the host- and home-country conditions (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
Narula, & Un, 2015), the geopolitical influence of the home country (Moghaddam et al., 
2014), and instant reaction to opportunities (Luo & Tung, 2007, 2018). A suggested 
direction for future research is to add a time dimension to the typology, i.e., to 
differentiate investments for current revenue generation and cost cutting and those 
intended for future revenue generation (such as building new business and strategic asset 
seeking). 
Table 1: Main typologies of investment motives 
Dunning 
(1993) 
Nachum & 
Zaheer (2005) 
Luo & Tung 
(2007, 2018) 
Cuervo-Cazurra 
et al. (2015) 
Moghaddam et 
al. (2014) 
Market seeking Market seeking; 
export seeking 
 Sell more End customer 
market seeking 
Resource 
seeking 
 Asset seeking Buy better Natural resource 
seeking; 
efficiency 
seeking 
Efficiency 
seeking 
Efficiency 
seeking 
 Buy better and sell 
more 
Global value 
chain 
consolidation 
seeking 
Strategic asset 
seeking 
Knowledge 
seeking 
Asset seeking Upgrade Knowledge 
seeking 
Support 
investment 
  Buy better and sell 
more 
 
Escape 
investment 
  Escape  
Passive 
investment 
  Buy better and sell 
more 
 
 Competitive 
strategic 
motivation 
Opportunity 
seeking 
 Geopolitical 
influence 
seeking 
Hollander (1970) argued that the main driver for internationalization is for the pursuit of 
sales and he classified investment motives into commercial, non-commercial, and 
inadvertent. Hymer (1976) took a holistic approach to the value chain and proposed that 
MNEs internationalize for the purpose of either vertical integration or horizontal 
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expansion. Porter (1986) built on the idea of the value chain and classified FDI into two 
categories: upstream (raw materials) and downstream (distribution). In addition to the 
focus on the value chain, Kacker (1985) introduced the concept of external market forces 
and identified the pull factor of the host market (market growth) and the push factor of 
the home market (market saturation) for MNE internationalization. Dunning (1993) 
proposed the best-known classification of investment motives, which covers both the 
internal drive of the MNE (e.g., competence exploiting and competence augmentation) 
and the external factors of the host and home markets.  
Building on Behrman’s (1972) early taxonomy on motives behind FDI, Dunning (1993) 
proposed four main types of investment motives. (1) Natural resource seekers are 
interested in gaining access to physical resources and cheap labor. (2) Market seekers are 
motivated to protect their existing markets or explore new markets, especially when the 
host government imposes tariffs on imported products, e.g., a market seeker relocates its 
domestic production facility to a foreign location. Market seekers are also motivated to 
adapt their products to local needs, to have a tradeoff between transportation and 
production costs, and to follow the strategic moves of their customers and competitors in 
a foreign location. (3) Efficiency seekers appear at a later stage of firm 
internationalization when the MNE reconfigures its existing affiliate network to gain 
economies of scale and scope, and hence efficiency. Although the first three types of FDI 
are interested in exploiting an MNE’s existing competitive advantage, (4) the fourth type 
aims at exploring or augmenting an MNE’s firm-specific advantages by gaining access to 
technology, brands, a distribution network, managerial capability, and so on (Dunning, 
1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
In addition to the four main types of investment motives, Dunning (1993) also identified 
another three types of secondary investment motives: (1) escape investments, (2) support 
investments, and (3) passive investments. Escape investments are triggered by “restrictive 
legislation or macro-organizational policies by home governments” (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008: 74). For example, some U.S. MNEs in the biotechnology industry relocate their 
stem cell research to Europe, as it is not allowed in the United States. In empirical 
analysis, the push factors for outward FDI also include the high cost of conducting 
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domestic business compared to cross-national business (Boisot & Meyer, 2008). 
Meanwhile, institutional rigidity and inflexibilities are positively associated with outward 
FDI (OFDI) in developed countries (Witt & Lewin, 2007). Support investment covers 
trade-supportive investment (e.g., sales offices), finance- supportive investment (e.g., 
financial and hedging affiliates), and management-supportive investment (e.g., regional 
headquarters) (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015).  
Passive investment refers to those investments where the parent firm has “faith in the 
existing organisation and management of the company and is undertaken to earn profits 
or to gain capital appreciation” without “injecting new resources, management skills and 
institutional forms into the company” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 75). Most studies treat 
equity ownership level between 10% and 25% as portfolio investment (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008). According to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, 1999), 
20% was most commonly used as the cut-off. Here, the parent firm would not be deemed 
able to exert “significant influence” over its international joint venture (IJV) subsidiary if 
the equity level was below 20%. Based in part on this approach, Dhanaraj and Beamish 
(2004) rejected the common practice in IB research of treating equity investment between 
5% and 95% as IJVs. They investigated the relationship between foreign equity 
ownership level and subsidiary mortality and found that investments with less than 20% 
equity ownership had very high mortality rates and those with more than 80% equity 
ownership had a mortality rate similar to that of a wholly owned subsidiary. Their study 
provided empirical support for FASB’s standard of using 20% as the cut-off point. 
Dunning’s typology has been critiqued on the grounds that it fails to consider external 
factors (Nachum & Zaheer, 2005; Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, & Un, 2015) or differentiate 
between MNEs from developed countries and emerging markets (Moghaddam, Sethi, 
Weber, & Wu, 2014; Luo & Tung, 2007; Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008; Ramamuti, 
2012). Recent developments on the typology of investment motives retained Dunning’s 
original emphasis on MNEs’ internal drive to expand, while adding external factors such 
as competitive pressure in the industry (Nachum & Zaheer, 2005) and host- and home-
country effects (Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, & Un, 2015). Nachum and Zaheer (2005) 
classified investment motives into six categories, including market seeking, resource 
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seeking, export export seeking,3, efficiency seeking, knowledge seeking, and competitive 
strategic motivation. The first five categories can be found in Dunning’s (1993) original 
typology, while the last one constitutes an MNE’s oligopolistic reaction to industry 
competitors. Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, and Un (2015) combined Dunning’s (1993) 
concept of firm competence exploitation and augmentation with behavioral searches 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1947) for better host-country conditions and avoidance of 
poor home-country conditions. They divided investment motives into four categories: (1) 
sell more; (2) buy better; (3) upgrade; and (4) escape. “Sell more” refers to MNEs 
exploiting existing firm capabilities and better host-country conditions, which is similar 
to market seeking in Dunning’s (1993) typology. “Buy better” refers to an MNE’s access 
to better inputs for production, which exploits existing firm capabilities and resources 
while escaping poor home-country conditions. It is similar to natural resource seeking in 
Dunning’s (1993) typology. “Upgrade” refers to augmentation of a firm’s capabilities 
that can be accessed in host countries, which is similar to strategic asset seeking in 
Dunning’s (1993) typology. “Escape” refers to the exploration of better conditions in the 
host country, while avoiding the constraints imposed by the home country, which is 
similar to “escape investment” in Dunning’s (1993) typology. Although efficiency-
seeking, trade-supportive, finance-supportive, and passive investments are qualitatively 
different, they are all included under the category of “buy better” and “sell more” in 
Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, and Un’s (2015) typology.  
Moreover, efforts have been made to include the additional investment motives of 
EMNEs (Luo & Tung, 2007; Moghaddam, Sethi, Weber, & Wu, 2014). Luo and Tung 
(2007) collapsed the investment motives of EMNEs into two categories: (1) asset seeking 
and (2) opportunity seeking. Asset seeking covers resource seeking and strategic asset 
seeking. Opportunity seeking includes market seeking and focal EMNEs’ timely reaction 
to trade and investment polices by host and home countries. The latter form of investment 
 
3 “Export seeking” is defined as “locating production overseas in order to serve third country market and 
lower production and transportation cost” (Nachum & Zaheer, 2005: 750). It is one subtype of market 
seeking in Dunning’s typology. 
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motive is not path-dependent, or evolutionary (Luo & Tung, 2007), which is different 
from MNEs from developed countries. Moghaddam, Sethi, Weber, and Wu (2014) 
modified Dunning’s original typology of investment motives and proposed a new 
typology from the theoretical lens of the value chain: (1) end-customer market seeking; 
(2) natural resource seeking; (3) knowledge seeking; (4) efficiency seeking; (5) global 
value chain consolidation seeking; and (6) geopolitical influence seeking. A closer 
examination shows that end-customer-market seeking is similar to market seeking in 
Dunning’s typology. Natural resource seeking and efficiency seeking (low-cost labor 
seeking) are similar to resource seeking. Knowledge seeking is similar to strategic asset 
seeking. Global value chain consolidation seeking is similar to efficiency seeking. The 
only newly proposed type is geopolitical influence seeking, which explains FDI behavior 
of an MNE from an emerging economy following the home government’s political 
agenda. For example, SOEs from emerging economies may have both political and social 
motivations, in addition to profit maximization, when they seek outward FDI (Cuervo-
Cazzura, Inkpen, Musacchio, & Ramaswamy, 2014). 
2.1.1.2 Multiplicity of Investment Motives  
MNEs have mixed or multiple motives in their FDI (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015; 
Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Getachew & Beamish, 2017). For example, an EMNE may 
invest in an advanced economy due to both market-seeking and strategic-asset-seeking 
motives (Madhok & Keyhani, 2012). 
Drawing on Birkinshaw and Hood’s (1998) study on subsidiary heterogeneity and the 
possibility that a subsidiary has diverse investment purposes, Getachew and Beamish 
(2017) extended the concept of diversification from the MNE corporate level (i.e., 
product diversification) to the subsidiary level (i.e., investment purpose diversity), which 
is conducive to the learning and adaptation of a subsidiary in an adverse institutional 
environment. Investment purpose diversity also helps a subsidiary to reallocate resources 
and maintain flexibility, and hence survival.  
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2.1.1.3 Evolving Investment Motives 
In addition to multiplicity, investment motives also evolve or change over time. 
Secondary motives may gain prominence over time (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015). 
Qian and Delios (2008) empirically tested the idea of the changing motivation for FDI of 
Japanese banks that followed their clients in international expansion. They argued that as 
firms gained more experience in the host country, their propensity for following their 
clients would decrease as these firms accumulated more host-country experience. The 
rationale was that firms were likely to gain local market experience and change their 
motive from following their clients to local market seeking. However, the empirical 
results did not support their argument. They found that, as firms accumulate more 
experience in their host society, they are more likely to follow their clients in the host 
country to set up branch offices or subsidiaries. A three-way interaction was not included 
in the paper to test the hypothesis of changing motivations.  
2.1.2 Empirical Measurement of Investment Motives 
Previous research on investment purposes has used aggregate data to measure investment 
purposes, at the country level (Brouthers et al., 2008), industry level (Nachum & Zaheer, 
2005), and, on a few occasions, at the firm level or subsidiary level (Chakravarty, Hsieh, 
Schotter, & Beamish, 2017; Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Makino, Beamish, & Zhao, 
2004).  
Brouthers, Gao, and McNicol (2008) used country-level data in the Foreign Direct 
Investment Database collected by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development in their analysis. FDI motives were measured by industries. For example, 
industries such as wholesaling, retailing, transportation, storage, communications, real 
estate, and financial services were grouped under market-seeking FDI. Nachum and 
Zaheer (2005) used industry-level FDI data collected by the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis to measure investment motivations. For example, market seeking was 
operationalized by “the cost of sales of affiliates as a share of total costs” and resource 
seeking was measured by “local purchases by affiliates as a share of total costs.” When 
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aggregate data is used, it violates the assumption of “multidimensionality and 
heterogeneity of MNE activity” (Doz & Prahalad, 1991). 
Makino, Lau, and Yeh (2002), using survey data collected from MNEs in Taiwan, made 
the first effort to measure investment purposes at the subsidiary level. Drawing on 
Dunning (1993), they divided investment motives into three categories, i.e., market 
seeking, resource (labor) seeking, and strategic asset seeking. Respondents were asked to 
identify reasons for their FDI. Dummy variables were created for each motive (“1” when 
a respondent indicated the motive and “0” otherwise). Another study that measured 
investment motives at the subsidiary level was conducted by Makino, Chan, Isobe, and 
Beamish (2007). They used the Trend Survey of Overseas Business Activities by the 
Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which is an annual survey conducted 
on Japanese foreign affiliates across the world. The original dataset listed seven 
investment objectives for a subsidiary, including “the procurement of raw and natural 
resources, access to low-cost inputs, following customers, market expansion, the transfer 
of dividends and earned loyalty, hedging against exchange rate risk, and research and 
development” (p. 1121). These seven objectives were classified into four categories in the 
final analysis: resource/labor seeking, market seeking, capital seeking, and strategic asset 
seeking. 
Although information on investment motives has been included in subsequent surveys,4 
the most comprehensive listings of subsidiary-level investment purposes are those studies 
using the TK dataset (Chakravarty et al., 2017; Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Makino et 
al., 2004), which classified investment motives into 16 categories, specifically (1) access 
to natural resources, (2) access to a labor force, (3) invitation from the local government, 
(4) establishment of a production network, (5) establishment of a distribution network, 
(6) access to a local market, (7) import to a third-country, (8) import back to Japan, (9) 
follow the customers/the affiliated company; (10) hedging against exchange rate risks, 
 
4 Section 2.1.3 covers previous research on investment motives, where survey data on investment motives 
have been collected. 
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(11) information collection, (12) product development and planning, (13) entry into new 
business, (14) regional HQ, (15) measures again trade frictions, and (16) others. Makino 
et al. (2004) used the original coding in the dataset in their analysis of investment 
purposes and location choices, while Chakravarty et al. (2017) followed Dunning’s 
(1993) classification of investment motives and divided investment purposes into five 
categories based on the original coding, including market seeking, resource seeking, 
efficiency seeking, strategic asset seeking, and capital seeking. Getachew and Beamish 
(2017) went a step further to generate a new variable for investment purpose diversity.   
2.1.3 Previous Research on Investment Motives 
Subsidiaries (or FDI projects) are heterogeneous due to their differences in investment 
motives (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010). A key theme of this dissertation is that they have 
different characteristics (such as mode choice, expatriation policy, location choice, etc.) 
and performance (such as financial and non-financial performance, termination, etc.). 
They have access to different resources and are under varying levels of pressure both 
within their MNE network and in their interaction with host countries.  
With different investment motives, subsidiaries differ in their entry-mode choices (Cui & 
Jiang, 2009; Pan, 2017; Yu, Lee, & Han, 2015), staffing and expatriate policy (Paik & 
Ando, 2011), location choice (Galan, Gonzalez-Benito, & Zuniga-Vincente, 2007; 
Goerzen, Asmussen, & Nielsen, 2013; Lei & Chen, 2011; Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002; 
Makino et al., 2004), performance (Hansen & Gwozdz, 2015; Luo & Bu, 2017; Yang, 
Yang, & Doyle, 2013), and termination (Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Makino et al., 
2007). This section covers the following five topics: (1) entry-mode choice; (2) staffing 
and expatriate policy; (3) location choice; (4) performance; and (5) termination. While all 
these topics have been previously covered in the literature, special attention is paid to 
how they differ according to investment motives. 
2.1.3.1 Entry-Mode Choices  
The literature on investment motives and entry-mode choices has covered market-seeking 
behavior (Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997; Gil, Nakos, Brouthers, & Brouthers, 2006; Yu et al., 
2015), resource-seeking behavior (Gil et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2015), following-the-client 
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behavior (Erramilli & Rao, 1990; Gil et al., 2006), and strategic-asset-seeking behavior 
(Cui & Jiang, 2009). Moreover, the institutional environment of host countries has been 
used as a moderator in some analyses (Yu et al., 2016; Pan, 2017). In our review, entry-
mode choice is limited to the decision of establishing a WOS or an IJV.   
First, the relationship between the investment motive of market seeking and entry-mode 
choice is not conclusive in the existing literature. One school of thought draws from the 
transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007) and argues 
that MNEs try to protect their own firm-specific assets or advantages such as proprietary 
technology and brands. Thus, they would prefer WOSs over IJVs due to concerns of 
possible opportunistic behavior by JV partners, especially leakage of know-how 
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). Another school argues that MNEs would prefer IJVs over 
WOSs in order to have access to a local partner’s complementary assets (Beamish & 
Banks, 1987) or to provide an incentive to a local partner through shared ownership (Yu 
et al., 2015).  
Empirical results have found evidence for all three options, i.e., preference for WOSs, 
preference or IJVs, or no preference. Drawing from the survey results of 108 informants 
from Fortune 500 firms, Aulakh and Kotabe (1997) found that market-seeking intention 
had no effect on the choice between a WOS or an IJV. One critique of this research is 
that the location of their FDI was not disclosed in the study. Gil et al. (2006) found that 
MNEs prefer to establish a WOS affiliate when pursuing a market-seeking strategy in 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries when there are few local partners in their 
industry. However, in a recent study by Yu et al. (2015), it was found that market-seeking 
MNEs prefer to establish an IJV in Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and 
Malaysia because MNEs rely on local partners to establish local distribution channels. 
The effect was even stronger in host societies with better market governance or more 
favorable institutional environments as measured by political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, the control of corruption, etc. One 
possible explanation is that MNEs are less worried about the local partner’s opportunistic 
behavior in a favorable host institutional environment and are willing to provide more of 
an incentive to a local partner to exert efforts in seeking customers. 
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Second, MNEs engaged in resource-seeking FDI are likely to adopt an IJV as an entry 
mode over a WOS (Gil et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2015). Although resource-seeking FDI is 
usually vertically integrated, MNEs engaged in resource-seeking FDI export their output 
to other affiliates within their MNE network, which requires more coordination among 
different affiliates and tighter control of the focal subsidiary (Kim & Hwang, 1992). 
Following this logic, a WOS would be preferred over an IJV in resource-seeking FDI. 
However, empirical research results show the opposite, in the context of both CEE 
countries and Southeast Asian countries (Gil et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2015). Because these 
host countries have less developed market governance structures, MNEs prefer to use an 
IJV in order to provide incentives to local partners to navigate the local business 
environment and find the right suppliers and resources (Yu et al., 2015). Moreover, under 
more favorable host-country institutional environments, MNEs’ preference for an IJV 
over a WOS is weakened because the relative importance of local partners is diminished 
and there is less need to provide an incentive to local partners.  
In addition to resource-seeking FDI, following the client is another category that has been 
studied. Many service firms have expanded internationally to provide service to their 
existing customers, which is qualitatively different from manufacturing FDI seeking local 
market access (Erramilli & Rao, 1990). From a survey of 175 U.S. service firms 
undertaking international expansion, Erramilli and Rao (1990) found that subsidiaries 
with the investment purpose of following the client preferred to have a higher ownership 
level in their affiliates compared with market-seeking subsidiaries, because local 
knowledge was not highly valued in following-the-client FDI. 
Finally, as EMNEs are engaged in FDI for the purpose of strategic asset seeking, they 
usually prefer a WOS over an IJV (Cui & Jiang, 2009) because strategic assets such as 
technology, brands, and distribution channels cannot be fully accessed through an IJV 
(Rui & Yip, 2008). From a survey of 138 Chinese firms, Cui and Jiang (2009) found that 
firms with a strategic-asset-seeking motivation were 2.66 times more likely to use a WOS 
as the entry mode compared with firms that were not strategic asset seeking. 
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In sum, most existing research on the relationship between investment motives and entry-
mode choice (including ownership level) covers market-seeking, resource-seeking, 
following-the-client, and strategic-asset-seeking FDI. Little is known about the mode of 
choice for FDI with such investment motives as efficiency seeking and those with 
support functions.  
2.1.3.2 Staffing and Expatriate Policy 
Expatriates have two primary functions: control and knowledge management (Delios & 
Bjorkman, 2000). In addition, expatriates also fulfill the role of being an ambassador, i.e., 
managing multiple stakeholders at home and in host societies (Peng & Meyer, 2016). 
First, when there is a strong need for the MNE headquarters to control its subsidiaries, 
MNEs will send expats to the affiliate to align the operations. Meanwhile, if there is a 
greater risk involved in the operations of subsidiaries, MNEs will send more expats as 
well. For example, when there is a greater institutional distance between the host and 
home countries, the need for control is stronger in an unfamiliar environment. As a result, 
more expats will be sent to subsidiaries (Gaur, Delios, & Singh, 2007). Second, expats 
also fulfill the role of knowledge transfer, i.e., they transfer knowledge and practices 
from the MNE headquarters to the affiliate. For example, in the service industry, when 
close contact with end customers and high levels of professional skills are needed, expats 
are preferred over local staff (Bouquet, Hebert, & Delios, 2004). When an MNE is 
engaged in strategic-asset-seeking or knowledge-seeking FDI, expatriates are sent to 
subsidiaries for reverse knowledge transfer (Delios & Bjorkman, 2000). Third, in 
addition to the roles played by expats, the availability of experienced expats and 
remuneration policies for expats also have an impact on expat policy (Widmier, 
Brouthers, & Beamish, 2008). For example, MNEs with more global FDI experience are 
staffed with more experienced expats and are more likely to send expats abroad than less 
experienced MNEs. However, as an MNE gains more host-country experience, its need 
for expats diminishes, as local managers make good business sense and the increased 
input from local managers improves profitability (Beamish & Inkpen, 1998). 
With regard to the relationship between investment purpose and expat policy, only one 
study (Paik & Ando, 2011) has been identified that investigated this relationship. They 
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analyzed a cross-sectional TK dataset in 2008 to investigate the relationship between 
investment motives and the use of expats as measured by the ratio of expats to local 
employees. The investment motives were classified into two categories: (1) global 
integration and (2) local market seeking. If affiliates are self-contained profit centers, 
their objectives might differ from those of MNEs (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). It was 
hypothesized that affiliates with a global integration mandate would be more likely to use 
expats because expats were sent to strictly follow the orders of the headquarters so as to 
align the interests of the headquarters and the affiliates. Nonetheless, it was affiliates with 
a global integration motive that had a lower proportion of expats. One possible 
explanation is that these were mature MNEs with a lot of international experience and 
they had trained local managers who were as good as expats in interest alignment. The 
proportion of expats in foreign affiliates was even lower when the parent MNEs 
accumulated more international experience. The rationale was that as MNEs had more 
experience in international operations, they would have more experience in international 
coordination and rely less on expats to carry out global integration.  
However, in local-market-seeking affiliates, MNEs tend to staff less with expats, as local 
managers have more knowledge of the local market and have better access to local 
resources compared with expats. That line of logic gained empirical support by Paik and 
Ando. As an MNE accumulates more experience in the host country, it will be even less 
likely to send expats to the affiliates as they gain more confidence in monitoring the 
behavior of local managers, and in handling the internal and external uncertainty in the 
local environment. 
Paik and Ando (2011) contribute to our understanding of the impact of investment 
purposes on expatriate staffing policies. Nonetheless, their research has several 
limitations. First, it collapsed investment purposes into two categories: global integration 
and local market seeking. In fact, there are other motives for affiliates. Second, only 
cross-sectional data in 2008 was used in their analysis, which helps to explain their 
contradictory finding versus the original hypothesis. A larger dataset with a longer 
timeframe might be able to alleviate this problem. 
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2.1.3.3 Location Choice 
Location is a key decision for an MNE to make when contemplating international 
expansion. There is a huge literature on location choice in international business (e.g., 
Beugelsdijk & Mudambi, 2013; Dunning, 1998). This section is limited to the literature 
and empirical studies that directly link investment motives and location choice. The 
investment motives of an MNE have a direct impact on its location choice. Most existing 
literature linking investment motives and location choice has treated location choice as a 
dichotomous variable, e.g., developed countries versus less developed countries (Makino 
et al., 2002; Makino et al., 2004), European Union versus Latin America (Galan et al., 
2007), developed regions versus less developed regions, e.g., China versus Vietnam, and 
East China versus South China (Lei & Chen, 2011). The main theoretical lens is asset 
exploitation and asset seeking. Asset-exploitating FDI is defined as “the transfer of a 
firm’s proprietary assets across borders,” while asset-seeking FDI is defined as “a means 
to acquire strategic assets (i.e., technology, marketing and management expertise) 
available in a host country” (Makino et al., 2002: 404).  
In empirical research, strategic-asset-seeking FDI is classified as asset seeking, while 
market-seeking FDI is classified as asset exploitation. First, as strategic assets are more 
likely to be located in developed countries or regions, asset-seeking FDI is more likely to 
be located in developed countries than in less developed countries. Empirical results 
show consistent support (Lei & Chen, 2011; Makino et al., 2002; Makino et al., 2004; 
Galan et al., 2007). Second, resource-seeking FDI is mainly interested in acquiring 
resources such as labor and natural resources in a host country at a lower real cost than 
the cost in the home country (Dunning, 1993). As it is easier to obtain low-cost resources 
in less developed countries than in developed countries, it was hypothesized that 
resource-seeking FDI is more likely to be found in less developed countries than in 
developed countries (e.g., Makino et al., 2002; Makino et al., 2004; Galan et al., 2007). 
However, empirical analysis showed conflicting results. The hypothesis was supported in 
the context of Taiwanese and Japanese MNEs’ overseas investment (e.g., Makino et al., 
2002; Makino et al., 2004), but was negatively related to Spanish MNEs’ investment in 
Latin America versus the European Union (Galan et al., 2007). One possible explanation 
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is that Latin American countries had poor transportation infrastructure despite richness in 
natural resources. As a result, Spanish MNEs had to incur a high cost for transportation 
and logistics expenses, which offset the cost savings in natural resources. Another 
commonly used asset-exploitation motive is market seeking. It was argued that developed 
countries have a higher market potential than less developed countries. As a result, 
market-seeking FDI is more likely to be located in developed countries than less 
developed countries (Makino et al., 2002). This line of reasoning has had mixed 
empirical results. Makino et al. (2004) found that market-seeking motivation was the 
highest ranked motivation in both developed (66.8%) and less developed countries 
(62.6%). One possible explanation for the popularity of market-seeking FDI in both 
developed and less developed countries is that MNEs can use a differentiation strategy in 
developed countries and use a cost-reduction strategy in less developed ones (Makino et 
al., 2002). Nonetheless, Galan et al. (2007) found that market seeking was irrelevant in 
Spanish MNEs’ choice of the European Union over Latin America. 
Another location decision is global cities versus non-global cities (Goerzen, Asmussen, & 
Nielsen, 2013). Global cities are characterized by “a high degree of interconnectedness to 
local and global markets; a cosmopolitan environment; and high levels of advanced 
producer services” (Goerzen et al., 2013: 430). An MNE’s decision to locate a subsidiary 
in a global city versus a non-global city has been analyzed through the theoretical lens of 
“competence-exploiting” versus “competence-creating” (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005, 
2011). “Competence-exploiting” units are “demand driven with a focus on market 
servicing,” while “competence-creating” units are “supply driven with a focus on 
enhancing production and research and development competencies” (Goerzen et al., 
2013: 433). According to this definition, market-seeking FDI is classified as competence-
exploiting, while strategic asset seeking, resource seeking, and efficiency seeking are 
classified as competence-creating. It was hypothesized that market-seeking FDI is more 
likely to be located in global cities because there is a liability-of-foreignness-reducing 
effect of global cities due to their cosmopolitan culture. Meanwhile, MNEs are more 
likely to locate production and R&D facilities in non-global cities than global cities due 
to the cost of place and concern over technology spillover to competitors. Using a cross-
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sectional TK dataset in 2001, this hypothesis received empirical support (Goerzen et al., 
2013). 
Moreover, investment motives have been used as moderators in at least two location-
choice studies (e.g., Jiang, Holburn, & Beamish, 2018; Schotter & Beamish, 2013). Jiang 
et al. (2018) found that horizontal investment motives (such as market-seeking FDI) have 
a negative moderating effect on repeated entry in a host country due to internal 
competition and a possible cannibalization effect, while vertical investment motives 
(such as resource-seeking FDI) have a positive moderating effect because these 
subsidiaries provide complementary assets to each other. Schotter and Beamish (2013) 
analyzed how a manager’s personal perception of a country, i.e., the hassle factor, leads 
to location shunning in an MNE’s decision making. They found that the hassle factor 
negatively moderates the relationship between a country’s FDI potential and an MNE’s 
FDI intensity. However, the moderated relationship is weaker if the investment motive is 
natural resource seeking, as natural resources are location-immobile. 
2.1.3.4 Performance 
Performance is a multidimensional measure that covers both subjective and objective 
measures including accounting data, financial market reaction, reputation or perception of 
growth, sales, profitability, survival, etc. (Richard et al., 2009). The performance 
outcome for FDI is contingent upon its investment motivations (Benito, 2015; Verbeke & 
Brugman, 2009; Verbeke, Li, & Goerzen, 2009; Verbeke & Forootan, 2012). Parent 
MNEs will assign different roles to affiliates, and resource transfer between the parent 
firm and affiliates will vary due to differences in investment motives, which is critical for 
subsidiary performance (Verbeke et al., 2009). Meanwhile, different types of FDI have 
corresponding performance objectives and time horizons to realize those objectives. For 
example, value-chain cost saving will be the main objective for vertical FDI, while 
revenue generation will be the main concern for horizontal FDI (Verbeke et al., 2009). In 
strategic-asset-seeking FDI, parent firms have a long horizon to achieve the goal of 
realizing their objective, which is not instantly achievable (Yang, Yang, & Doyle, 2013). 
As a result, it is insufficient to measure performance without taking into consideration the 
investment motives. However, most empirical research studies on performance have not 
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included investment motives in their analyses, with a few exceptions (e.g., Hansen & 
Gwozdz, 2015; Luo & Bu, 2017; Yang et al., 2013). 
In empirical research, both parent MNE firm performance and subsidiary performance 
have been measured. MNE performance has been subjectively assessed by such measures 
as international marketing performance according to a 7-point Likert scale (Luo & Bu, 
2017). It has also been objectively measured by stock market reaction to parent firms 
engaged in FDI, such as cumulative abnormal returns (Yang et al., 2013). With regard to 
subsidiary performance, multiple measures have been used, including financial (internal 
rate of return, or IRR), operational (premature stop of operations, or PSO), and 
organizational (manager’s subjective assessment of subsidiary performance, or MP) 
measures (Hansen & Gwozdz, 2015). The use of multiple measures of subsidiary 
performance will overcome the pitfall of using sales and profit as an indicator of 
performance because, in non-market-seeking FDI, subsidiaries might have the mandate of 
being a low-cost production base, which helps the parent MNE to integrate its global 
value chain and achieve transfer pricing and profitability (Luo, 2003).  
With regard to the main effect of investment motives on subsidiary performance 
outcome, efficiency-seeking FDI has a better survival outcome compared to FDI with 
other motivations including local market seeking and resource (labor) seeking (Hansen & 
Gwozdz, 2015). It has been argued that an efficiency-seeking subsidiary is a key part of 
the value chain and that the parent MNE is more likely to provide additional resources to 
prevent it from exiting in times of crisis compared with subsidiaries founded on the basis 
of other investment motives. However, there is no difference among subsidiaries with 
different investment motives when a financial measure (IRR) or managerial assessment 
of subsidiary performance is used. Nonetheless, only four types of subsidiaries are 
included in the analysis: local market seeking, efficiency seeking, resource seeking, and 
other (Hansen & Gwozdz, 2015). 
Moreover, strategic-asset-seeking FDI has been tested as a moderator of the relationship 
between foreign investment and performance outcome for parent MNEs. When a 
subjective MNE performance measure is used, strategic asset seeking has a positive 
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moderating effect on the relationship between foreign investment and MNE performance 
outcome because strategic-asset-seeking FDI is intended to improve the resource 
portfolio, which will help the parent MNE’s performance in the long run (Luo & Bu, 
2017). Using surveys of Chinese executives of MNEs engaged in FDI between 2009 and 
2012, Luo and Bu (2017) found that a strategic-asset-seeking motivation enhanced the 
positive impact of foreign investment on international customer breadth for the parent 
MNE. Nonetheless, when short-term stock-market reaction was used as a measure of 
MNE performance, strategic-asset-seeking motivation negatively moderated the 
relationship between foreign investment projects and MNE performance. Using a sample 
of 121 FDI projects initiated by 102 Chinese listed companies between 2001 and 2009, 
Yang et al. (2013) found that strategic-asset FDI project announcements produced lower 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for Chinese listed companies than traditional FDI 
projects. It has been argued that most Chinese MNEs engaged in strategic-asset-seeking 
FDI have a low absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) or recombination 
capability (Rugman, 2010) to combine acquired strategic assets (such as technology, 
brand, and reputation) with existing firm resources to create value for the parent MNE in 
the short run. This helps explain the short-term negative stock-market reaction to 
strategic-asset-seeking FDI. 
2.1.3.5 Termination 
In terms of the relationship between initial investment motives and the termination of 
affiliates, Makino et al. (2007) investigated the impact of initial investment motives on 
intended terminations and unintended terminations. Here, termination is defined as 
complete termination, i.e., the affiliate is closed, not a mode change or product strategy 
change. Investment purposes are classified in four categories: resource/labor seeking, 
market seeking, capital seeking, and strategic asset seeking. It was found that there was a 
much higher termination rate (close to 30%) for affiliates with the purpose of strategic 
asset seeking compared to affiliates in any of the other three categories (around 7%) in 
IJVs. It was argued that once an MNE acquired such strategic assets as proprietary 
technology and management know-how, the affiliates were likely to be terminated 
because local partners could not provide more value or resources to the MNE. However, 
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in the case of resource/labor/market/capital-seeking IJVs, resources, labor, or capital 
provided by local partners were continuously valued. As a result, MNEs did not terminate 
those IJVs. Survey results of Japanese overseas affiliates between 1996 and 2001 
provided empirical support. Mode choice, i.e., IJV versus WOS, moderated the 
relationship between initial investment motives and intended termination. For strategic-
asset-seeking investments, the termination rate of WOSs (3.2%) during the study period 
was much lower than that of IJVs (28.6%), because once an MNE has finished acquiring 
strategic assets, it will exit the IJV, as it will not be able to provide further value or 
resources to the MNE. 
Getachew and Beamish (2017) paid special attention to the host-country context and 
investigated how the relationship between host-country institutional environment and 
subsidiary exit is moderated by investment motives. Slangen and Beugelsdijk (2010) 
argued that horizontal FDI, such as market-seeking FDI, operates more independently 
from its parent and sister affiliates and is more embedded in the host environment. 
Vertical FDI is more tightly integrated with the global MNE network and has less 
autonomy than horizontal FDI. Following this line of logic, Getachew and Beamish 
(2017) operationalized horizontal FDI as market-seeking FDI. Using a matched sample of 
FDI in African and OECD countries, they found no relationship between market-seeking 
orientation and exit. FDI in Africa, a region characterized by high institutional voids and 
institutional instability, had a higher subsidiary exit rate that FDI in OECD countries. The 
relationship between entry to Africa and exit was weakened by market-seeking 
orientation, because horizontal FDI is more embedded in the host environment and 
operates rather independently. As a result, the parent firm had a higher tolerance for 
horizontal FDI to stay in host countries with institutional voids and instability compared 
with vertical FDI. Moreover, investment purpose diversity also weakened the relationship 
between entry to Africa and subsidiary exit, because affiliates with diverse investment 
purposes could explore and learn more about the local environment with more flexibility 
in a host environment with institutional voids, thus mitigating the hazards of doing 
business in adverse host societies. However, investment purpose diversity did not have a 
direct impact on subsidiary exit. 
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In sum, two types of categorization exist in the previous literature regarding investment 
purpose and exit, i.e., asset exploitation versus asset augmentation (Makino et al., 2007) 
and horizontal versus vertical FDI (Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 
2010). The relationship between investment purpose and exit is not conclusive.  
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework of this chapter (see Figure A) is rooted in the OLI paradigm 
(Dunning, 1988; Dunning 1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008), where the interaction of an 
MNE’s ownership advantages (O-advantages) with the location advantages (L-
advantages) of host and home countries jointly determines the investment motive(s) of an 
affiliate (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015; Narula, 2012; Meyer et al., 2011). Unlike the 
existing literature on the OLI paradigm which uses the umbrella term of country specific 
advantages (CSAs), we differentiate between host country specific advantages (host 
CSAs) and home country specific advantages (home CSAs). Once an MNE decides on 
the strategic investment motives for an affiliate, the central aspects of its 
internationalization such as mode choice (WOS versus IJV), expatriate deployment, and 
size are differentiated in a systematic manner (Benito, 2015). Meanwhile, internalization 
theory (e.g., Caves, 1971; Buckley & Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982) has 
been used to explain the mode choice between WOS and IJV. The particular market 
failures identified in our analysis are asset specificity and information asymmetry. 
Moreover, the theory of investment development path (Narula & Dunning, 2000) has 
been applied to discuss host-country conditions. Four hypotheses have been developed to 
further explain this model. 
2.2.1 Ownership Advantages and Investment Motives 
Ownership advantages (O-advantages) are transferrable firm-specific assets that are 
capable of generating economic rent and creating a competitive advantage for the focal 
MNE in foreign direct investments (Narula, 2010). There are two types of O-advantages: 
asset-type (Oi) and transaction-type (Ot) (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Asset-type 
ownership advantages include management know-how, proprietary knowledge, the 
knowledge to manage multi-location businesses, etc. Transaction-type ownership 
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advantages derive from the ability of the firm to organize efficient internal hierarchies 
and utilize external markets. Examples include operational manuals and codes of 
conduct. 
When MNEs are engaged in FDI, the availability of investment motives is bounded or 
constrained by their existing ownership advantages or firm-specific advantages.5 An 
MNE’s proprietary knowledge, marketing capabilities, capital, and years of international 
experience will be used to illustrate this point.  
First, if an MNE possesses superior proprietary technology and marketing capabilities, it 
has the options of market-seeking and natural-resource-seeking FDI, among others. Due 
to the transferability of proprietary knowledge and marketing capabilities, an MNE can 
position itself either as a differentiator or a cost-leader in the host market and can derive 
superior economic rent from those capabilities. In the case of natural resource seeking, 
especially in the oil and mining industries, an MNE’s possession of extractive technology 
is necessary for it to be involved in natural-resource-seeking FDI.  
Second, an MNE that possesses substantial capital may be engaged in natural-resource-
seeking, market-seeking, or strategic-asset-seeking FDI. It may go to a low-labor-cost 
country to set up factories to lower its production costs, while at the same time seeking 
access to local markets. It may also enter an extractive business where a huge investment 
is required upfront. In terms of strategic-asset-seeking FDI, MNEs from emerging 
economies that are technological laggards, and yet possess significant capital, are likely 
to conduct FDI to acquire strategic assets such as management know-how, proprietary 
technology, and distribution networks (Luo & Tung, 2007, 2018). 
Third, an MNE’s FDI experience may also affect its motives. An MNE with limited 
experience in FDI is more likely to have supportive investment motives, such as 
information collection, at the early stage of internationalization, which will help it to 
further develop its footprint in the host country. As an MNE accumulates more 
 
5 In this chapter, ownership advantages and firm-specific advantages are used interchangeably. 
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experience in FDI, it may have multiple production locations, R&D centers, or 
distribution centers. To achieve economies of scale and scope, it may seek efficiency-
seeking FDI by rationalizing its production and distribution network. It may also 
establish subsidiaries for such support functions as regional management centers to 
achieve a better result in global integration and local responsiveness (Chakravarty et al., 
2017; Schotter, 2017). Hence, we provide the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a relationship between an MNE’s ownership advantages 
and the investment motives of its overseas affiliates. 
2.2.2 Location Advantages and Investment Motives 
In this section, we distinguish between two types of location-specific advantages, i.e., 
host-country-specific advantages and home-country-specific (dis)advantages. Host-
country advantages have a direct impact on the investment motives of MNEs. Home-
country advantages have a mediating effect on investment motives through ownership 
advantages. Meanwhile, home-country advantages also have a direct effect on investment 
motives while interacting with host-country advantages to influence investment motives. 
2.2.2.1 Host-Country-Specific Advantages and Investment Motives 
Due to the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) for MNEs conducting business abroad, 
foreign locations must be able to offer advantages and attract MNEs to do business 
(Buckley & Hashai, 2004; Dunning, 1998). There are four types of locational advantages: 
markets, natural resources, agglomeration, and institutions (Dunning, 1993; Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008; Narula & Santangelo, 2012; Peng & Meyer, 2016). Market advantages 
refer to the population density and purchasing power of the local population. Natural 
resource advantages refer to the natural endowment in a location, including natural 
resources, low-cost labor, human capital, and infrastructure. Agglomeration advantages 
refer to the clusters of related businesses or the collocation of businesses (Narula & 
Santangelo, 2012) with the advantage of knowledge spillover, a skilled labor force within 
the region, and a pool of specialized buyers and suppliers (Kalnins & Chung, 2004; 
Nachum, 2000). Institutions advantages refer to the institutional environment, such as 
culture, norms, legal and financial infrastructure, regulations and policy, and so on 
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(Narula & Santangelo, 2012). Locational advantages are in principle public goods, but 
this is not always the case. For example, while universities and research facilities are 
publicly available, certain locational advantages are internalized as firm-specific assets 
and are not publicly available. That is why local embeddedness matters to foreign 
investors who wish to have full access to the resource advantages of a particular location 
(Meyer et al., 2011). 
In the process of internationalization, an MNE attempts to utilize its ownership 
advantages in conjunction with location-specific assets (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 
2015). The possible options for investment motives are contingent upon the availability 
of certain types of locational advantages that MNEs have in mind during the 
internationalization process. Meanwhile, the investment development path theory predicts 
that the developmental stage of a host country also attracts specific types of investment 
(Narula & Dunning, 2000). For example, for countries at an early stage of development, 
inward FDI outnumbers outward FDI and they mainly attract natural-resource-seeking 
and market-seeking FDI. When host countries are at a higher level of development, 
outward FDI exceeds inward FDI and they mainly attract strategic-asset-seeking FDI and, 
to a lesser extent, market-seeking or resource-seeking FDI. As countries can progress 
from one stage to another, it is difficult to put them into a specific category and predict 
their inward FDI. As a result, the following discussion will focus on the specific 
locational advantages of host countries and their predictive power for specific 
investments. 
First, for market-seeking investments, population size and the purchasing power of a 
location are the main factors for consideration (Benito, 2015). Due to the costs and risks 
involved in FDI, proximity also matters, especially for firms at an early stage of 
internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). The tax incentives of the local 
government also provide incentives for market-seeking FDI. 
Second, natural-resource-seeking FDI is constrained by the location of available 
resources. For example, if an MNE is interested in oil exploration, there are only a 
limited amount of oil fields in the world to choose from. Meanwhile, due to the cost of 
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transporting resources, local transportation infrastructure is also a factor for consideration 
(Galan et al., 2007). If the motive is to access local labor, then the cost of local labor and 
the amount of cheap labor available are the main factors for consideration. 
Third, with regard to efficiency-seeking FDI, the cost of labor matters for those MNEs 
that seek to rationalize their production network. Because long distances will lead to 
higher transportation costs and management costs, proximity among affiliates is also a 
factor for consideration for efficiency-seeking FDI (Benito, 2015). 
Fourth, for strategic-asset-seeking FDI, as developed countries are more likely to have 
such strategic assets as proprietary knowledge, global distribution networks, and 
management know-how, an MNE is more likely to choose developed countries over 
developing countries (Makino et al., 2004). Within developed countries, industrial 
clusters are likely to be chosen over non-clustered areas due to consideration over 
knowledge spillover and connections with suppliers and distributors (Narula & 
Santangelo, 2012. Hence, we present the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a relationship between an MNE’s host-country location 
advantages and the investment motives of its overseas affiliates. 
2.2.2.2 Home-Country Advantages, and Ownership Advantages 
The home-country location advantage (L) determines the initial ownership advantage of 
domestic firms (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018; Hobdari et al., 2017; Narula, 2012). To be 
specific, the L advantage determines the amount and type of initial O advantage or 
resource munificence of domestic firms. For illustration purposes, there are three types of 
countries: low-income developing countries (LDCs), emerging economies, and advanced, 
developed countries. LDCs are characterized by institutional voids and poor legal and 
market infrastructure, and firms from these countries are endowed with little initial O 
advantages to be able to engage in any significant economic activity, including firm 
internationalization. Due to limited inward FDI and little linkage with the global 
economy, there is little chance for these firms to augment their O advantages by learning 
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from MNEs from other countries. As a result, there are few firms with O advantages 
except in the extractive industry. 
Second, for those firms from emerging economies, the initial O advantage is still a 
function of the L assets. However, due to its connection with the global economy and 
being part of the global value chain—plus the collocation advantage (Narula & 
Santangelo, 2012) resulting from the substantial inward FDI in those countries—these 
firms are able to augment their O advantages through knowledge transfer from MNEs 
from advanced economies. As a result, the O advantage of domestic firms from emerging 
economies goes beyond the L advantage of the home countries by having more breadth. 
However, these firms lack resources in term of technology, finances, and human capital 
(Awate et al., 2012). Compared with developed-country MNEs, they are technology 
laggards, face financial constraints, and lack highly qualified management personal in 
firm internationalization. Nonetheless, due to their capability to deal with imperfect 
institutions at home, they might be able to develop capabilities that will help them to 
operate in other emerging economies through institutional learning (Cuervo-Cazurra et 
al., 2018). 
Third, for firms from advanced economies, they are endowed with better institutional and 
market infrastructure. Most of them are knowledge-intensive firms and deeply embedded 
within the global value chain. These firms have better organizational skills to achieve 
knowledge transfer. In other words, there are more L advantages for domestic firms to 
internalize in advanced economies and they have better organizational skills to internalize 
those L advantages. 
In summary, the more advanced the home country is, the more the L advantage for an 
MNE to internalize as an O advantage (Narula, 2012). Hence, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2b: The more advanced the home country, the greater the initial O 
advantage possessed by an MNE from that country. 
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2.2.2.3 Impact of Home-Country (Dis)advantages on Investment 
Motives 
Most literature on the impact of home-country (dis)advantages on firm 
internationalization treats it as a push factor for outward FDI. First, if the population size 
is small in the home country, then there is a limited domestic market, which may act as a 
push factor for firms to internationalize. MNEs from Scandinavian countries fall into this 
category. Second, when the home country is going through rapid industrialization, it may 
need resources for industrial input. For example, investments of MNEs from China and 
India in Africa may seek resources to satisfy the needs of domestic industrial 
development. Third, when there is a competitive domestic market with both domestic and 
foreign players, MNEs may seek strategic-asset-seeking investment abroad to augment 
their capabilities (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018). 
Fourth, the vast majority of literature on home-country conditions and investment 
motives focuses on escape investment (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015; Barnard & Luiz, 
2018; Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Fathallah et al., 2018; Kobrak et al., 2018; Shi et al., 2017; 
Witt & Lewin, 2007). MNEs may conduct escape investment to “avoid the poor 
conditions of the home country” (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015: 32), that is, problematic 
conditions that would add costs to firm operations. For example, because the cost of 
doing business domestically exceeded the cost of doing business internationally and there 
was better protection of intellectual property rights in Western countries than in domestic 
markets, Chinese firms chose OFDI to escape “weak institutions” in their home country 
(Boisot & Meyer, 2008). When different dimensions of institutions are not progressing at 
the same time, internal frictions and conflicts arise. This results in institutional fragility, 
which also acts as a push factor for OFDI (Shi et al., 2017). 
In developed countries, it is not “weak institutions” per se, but the “ossification of 
institutions,” such as taxes and high social contribution, which may act as a push factor 
for MNEs to invest abroad (Witt & Lewin, 2007). In their study, Witt and Lewin (2007) 
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found a positive association between Societal Coordination Index (SCI)6 score and 
outward FDI. Nonetheless, a later study (Kobrak et al., 2018) showed that SCI score was 
not only positively related to outward FDI, but also positively related to inward FDI. This 
means that a stable and elaborated institutional environment not only promotes outward 
investment, but also attracts inward investment. High labor costs in the home country 
have been found to have a similar effect on OFDI in the IT industry (Weng & Peng, 
2018). Moreover, there is a time dimension to escape FDI. For example, Barnard and 
Luiz (2018) argued that there was a cumulative process of institutional misalignment and 
contestation in South Africa’s OFDI that spanned from 1956 to 2012. Escape FDI could 
also occur in less than a decade in hyper-turbulent home contexts such as Lebanon, where 
wars forced domestic firms to invest abroad (Fathallah et al., 2018). Hence, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2c: There is a relationship between home-country (dis)advantages 
and the investment motives of MNEs. 
2.2.2.4 Joint Impact of Home- and Host-Country (Dis)advantages 
on Investment Motives 
The literature on the joint effects of home and host countries on firm internationalization 
mainly draws from the theoretical lens of “institutional arbitrage” (Mingo, Junkunc, & 
Morales, 2018). Early literature on home–host country differences focused on 
institutional differences between the home and host countries, such as the cultural 
distance between host and home countries (Kogut & Singh, 1988), the difference between 
the regulatory institutions between home and host countries (Henisz & Delios, 2000), and 
so on. It has been argued that the larger the distance, the more difficult it is for MNEs to 
operate and to transfer knowledge and skills from the home to host countries (Kostova, 
1999). Thus, the larger the institutional distance between the host and home countries, the 
less likely that an MNE will invest in the host country and the more difficult it will be for 
an MNE if it chooses to operate in that host country.  
 
6 The SCI score measures the importance of coordination in an economy. 
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Nonetheless, recent studies found that the relationship between institutional distance 
between home and host countries and the likelihood of firm internationalization can also 
be curvilinear. Using private equity (PE) investments in Latin America between 1996 and 
2011, Mingo et al. (2018) found that a strong institutional environment in the host 
country attracted PE projects from PE firms of home countries with both strong and weak 
institutions. Meanwhile, weak institutional environments in the host countries deterred 
PE projects from PE firms from both strong and weak institutional environments. 
Moreover, different actors from the same home country may react differently to the same 
institutional distance between home and host countries. For example, Chinese SOEs face 
greater legitimacy challenges investing abroad than private Chinese MNEs do (Li et al., 
2018). As a result, SOEs are less likely to conduct OFDI compared with private firms. 
We propose that home- and host-country (dis)advantages have a joint impact on 
investment motives. When a firm contemplates what type of FDI to engage in, it 
simultaneously considers home- and host-country (dis)advantages. For example, Cuervo-
Cazurra, Narula, and Un (2015) argued that MNEs simultaneously seek favorable host-
country conditions and avoid poor home-country conditions in firm internalization. By 
collapsing investment motives into four categories—“sell more” (i.e., market seeking), 
“buy better” (i.e., natural resource seeking), “upgrade” (i.e., strategic asset seeking), and 
“escape” (i.e., escape investment)—they argued that firms would be motivated to “sell 
more” and “upgrade” to obtain better host-country conditions. It was also argued that 
MNEs would be motivated to “buy better” and “escape” to avoid poor home-country 
conditions. Moreover, firms could also be motivated to simultaneously “buy better” and 
“sell more” (such as efficiency seeking). Hence, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2d: There is a relationship between the institutional arbitrage of host 
versus home countries and the investment motives of MNEs. 
2.2.3 Investment Motives and Mode Choices 
The choice of operation mode is a central aspect of firm internationalization. It refers to 
organizational arrangements such as exporting, licensing, WOSs, and IJVs. The 
operational mode may also change over time (Benito, Peterson, & Welch, 2009). The 
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major relevant theoretical framework is internalization theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976), 
where the major market failures identified are asset specificity and information content. 
In this section, only the choice between WOSs and IJVs is discussed, which is viewed in 
a spectrum between hierarchy and market (Buckley & Casson, 1996), i.e., WOSs are 
closer to hierarchy and IJVs are closer to market.  
First, for market-seeking FDI, a key driver of its overseas expansion is proprietary 
technology and resources such as brands and trademarks. The main market failure in this 
case is information content or information asymmetry. In the case of proprietary 
technology, due to the difficulty associated with evaluating technology without 
adequately understanding it, an MNE will be more likely to choose in-house operations 
over other modes of operation such as licensing. Empirical evidence shows that R&D 
expenditure that generates proprietary technology is positively associated with both 
licensing practices and direct investment, but the effect is stronger for direct investments 
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). Once an MNE decides to choose in-house operations, it 
has the choice between WOSs and IJVs. Due to concerns over unwanted dissemination 
(Benito et al., 2009) and leakage of know-how to JV partners, it is likely that it will 
choose WOSs over IJVs. Empirical evidence shows that higher R&D expenditure is 
positively associated with WOSs rather than IJVs (Stopford & Wells, 1972).  
Meanwhile, brands and trademarks represent revenue-generating assets in which an MNE 
has incurred a major investment. Due to the reputational nature of brands and trademarks, 
a widely publicized scandal by an outside partner may seriously harm the reputation of a 
well-established brand overnight. As a result, an MNE with brands and trademarks will 
prefer in-house operations over licensing in overseas expansion. When an MNE chooses 
in-house operations and has a choice between a WOS and an IJV, the opportunistic 
behavior of an IJV partner that might tarnish its brand image is a major concern for the 
MNE (Benito, 2015). As a result, a WOS would be the preferred choice over an IJV. 
Thus, we propose a positive association between market-seeking FDI and a preference 
for WOSs over IJVs.  
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Second, in the case of resource-seeking FDI, we differentiate between natural-resource-
seeking and labor-seeking FDI. In natural-resource-seeking FDI, the main market failure 
is asset specificity for the focal MNE, which entails two major risks: hold-up risk and 
under-investment of transaction partners (Benito, 2015). For an MNE operating in 
extractive industries, its heavy investment upfront for specialized machinery and 
infrastructure will subject it to hold-up risks from contracting partners. As a result, it is 
likely to internalize the transaction. However, in reality, national governments often 
control local extractive resources and local partners are often chosen to deal with 
different stakeholders including governments, employees, and local residents (Gil et al., 
2006; Yu et al., 2015). In places with institutional voids and instability, there is an even 
stronger need to find a local partner (Yu et al., 2015). Here, MNEs will prefer to 
internalize the transaction if it is involved in natural-resource-seeking behavior, so WOSs 
will be the preferred operation mode. However, in locations characterized by high 
institutional voids and instability, an IJV will be preferred over a WOS. 
With regard to labor-seeking FDI, due to the abundance of cheap labor worldwide and 
the low switching costs from one labor supplier to another, there is less risk of market 
failure from hold-up behavior by the business partner. As a result, an MNE will prefer to 
have an open transaction with market partners and have multiple suppliers at the same 
time. Further, there is less necessity to internalize the operation, which explains the 
prevalence of global sourcing (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). When an MNE chooses to 
establish a subsidiary in a host country, due to consideration of tariffs and local content 
requirements, an IJV will be chosen over a WOS, as an IJV partner can offer 
complementary resources (Beamish & Banks, 1987) and requires less resource 
commitment from the focal MNE. 
Third, in terms of efficiency-seeking FDI, an MNE may be engaged in rationalizing its 
production network or distribution network. The major market failure is asset specificity. 
In the case of production networks, there are considerable transaction-specific assets 
involved in rationalizing production networks, such as logistics and IT infrastructure, and 
there is a strong need for vertical integration. Here, an MNE will prefer to internalize the 
transaction with a business partner. If an MNE chooses to establish a subsidiary, WOSs 
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will be chosen over IJVs. In the case of distribution networks, in addition to the need for 
vertical integration, there is also a potential risk of free-riding from business partners 
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). As a result, an MNE will prefer to internalize the 
transaction and a WOS will be preferred over an IJV when a subsidiary is established. 
Fourth, in strategic-asset-seeking FDI, an MNE is interested in gaining full access and 
control of such assets as proprietary technology, management know-how, and distribution 
networks (Luo & Tung, 2007, 2018). The major market failure is information content 
mentioned above. Due to the strong need for control, it will opt for internalization, i.e., 
buy a target company instead of undertaking a market transaction. When an MNE 
acquires a firm for strategic-asset-seeking purposes, it is likely to choose WOSs over 
IJVs so that it can have full access and control over strategic assets. 
Fifth, we consider support functions such as trade support (sales offices), financial 
support (financing and currency hedging), and management support (regional 
management centers). These functions are vital to the operations of the MNE and the 
major market failure involved is information content such as business secrets. To avoid 
the risk of opportunistic behavior by business partners and the unwanted dissemination of 
business secrets, an MNE will prefer to internalize the transaction instead of contracting a 
business partner. After a subsidiary is established, a high-control mode such as a WOS 
will likely be preferred over an IJV, due to the need to completely control the subsidiary. 
Hence, we provide the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a:  
Market-seeking FDIs will prefer WOSs over IJVs;  
Resource-seeking FDIs will prefer IJVs over WOSs;  
Efficiency-seeking FDIs will prefer WOSs over IJVs;  
Strategic-asset-seeking FDIs will prefer WOSs over IJVs;  
FDIs with support investment purposes will prefer WOSs over IJVs. 
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2.2.4 Investment Motives and Expatriate Deployment 
Expatriates play multiple roles in a subsidiary, i.e., as a strategist, monitor, ambassador, 
daily manager, and trainer (Peng & Meyer, 2016). The ambassador role is for stakeholder 
management purposes. The roles of strategist, monitor, and daily manager are for control 
purposes and the alignment of the goal of the MNE headquarters and the subsidiary. The 
role of trainer is for knowledge transfer (Delios & Bjorkman, 2000).  
Drawing from the framework of vertical versus horizontal FDI (Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 
2010), we first categorize investment motives into two categories. Market-seeking 
investments are horizontal FDI, while resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking, strategic-
asset-seeking investments and support functions are vertical FDI. Because there is a 
stronger need for the alignment of interests between the MNE and subsidiaries for 
vertical FDI than for horizontal FDI (Paik & Ando, 2011) and local managers have better 
knowledge about the host country than expatriate managers, we propose that there is a 
higher expatriate deployment in vertical FDI than in horizontal FDI. Hence, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3b: Subsidiaries with horizontal investment motives have a lower 
expatriate ratio than those with vertical investment motives. 
2.2.5 Investment Motives and Subsidiary Size 
Existing major theories in management make an implicit assumption that firm size will 
grow. The resource-based view (Penrose, 1995) has argued that the firm will grow until 
management capabilities put a limit on the growth potential of the firm. Meanwhile, 
according to TCE (Coarse, 1937), when the cost of internal coordination is greater than 
the cost of market transactions, the firm will stop growing. There is a limited number of 
studies in IB on subsidiary size, including those focused on firm size and control 
(Johnston & Menguc, 2007; Peng & Beamish, 2014) and firm size and divestment 
(Duhaime & Baird, 1987). 
We draw upon contingency theory (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), especially the 
relationship between strategy and structure (Chandler, 1962), to establish the linkage 
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between investment motives and subsidiary size. As per contingency theory, the structure 
of an organization is contingent upon its external and internal needs. Chandler’s (1962) 
classic study of diversification strategy and divisionalization structure showed that 
changes in strategy required corresponding adjustments in organizational structure. 
Subsequent research confirmed his idea that structure followed strategy. For example, 
Rumelt (1974) showed that the match between strategy and structure has a significant 
impact on performance. Miller (1986, 1996) added that, given the organizational structure 
and business environment, there are limited strategies available to an organization. In 
international business, Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995) argued that the fit between the 
strategy and structure of a subsidiary influences its performance. 
Investment motives can also be classified into major investment motives, i.e., resource 
seeking, market seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic asset seeking, and those in 
support functions, such as sales support, management support, financial support, etc. Due 
to the differences in strategic goals, we argue that those with a support function will have 
a smaller subsidiary size than those with a major function. For example, a sales office can 
be staffed with a handful of employees yet be fully operational, given the nature of the 
business. A regional management office is usually smaller compared with an average-
sized subsidiary, as it only performs one function—to implement tight control between 
the subsidiary and headquarters. However, the size of the subsidiary will be much larger 
if the main purpose is to access local cheap labor, to have access to local markets, or to 
have a team for research and development. Hence, we present the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3c: The size of subsidiaries with support investment motives will be 
smaller than that of subsidiaries with the major investment motives. 
2.2.6 Investment Motives and Performance  
As discussed earlier, organization performance is a multi-dimensional measure (Richard, 
et al., 2009). Different measures have been suggested for different types of investment 
(Benito, 2015). For example, in market-seeking FDI, relevant measures include sales 
growth and market share. For efficiency-seeking FDI, appropriate measures include profit 
margins. For natural-resource-seeking FDI, measures include input costs and the stability 
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of suppliers. For strategic-asset-seeking FDI, new patents for the MNE could be an 
appropriate measure. We limit our discussion to subsidiary-level performance, as 
measured by profitability and sales growth. 
We draw upon the framework of vertical versus horizontal FDI (Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 
2010) to establish a linkage between investment motives and subsidiary-level 
performance. First, in terms of the sales growth of a subsidiary, market-seeking FDI (i.e., 
horizontal FDI) is more likely to outperform other types of investments (vertical FDI 
including natural-resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking, and strategic-asset-seeking FDI), 
as the main objective of market-seeking FDI is revenue growth, while other investments 
are interested in lowering the cost for the MNE as a whole.  
Second, in terms of the profitability of the subsidiary, it is contingent upon the timeframe 
used for gauging the performance (Verbeke et al., 2009). For natural-resource-seeking 
FDI, especially in extractive investments, there is a huge investment upfront and it takes a 
longer time to break even compared with a typical subsidiary such as a manufacturing 
facility. If the investment is for the purpose of accessing low-cost labor, then it is likely to 
be profitable due to its nature as a low-cost production base. For market-seeking FDI, 
investment with the purpose of building new business is likely to underperform versus 
other investments as far as profitability is concerned because of the risks involved. For 
efficiency-seeking FDI, investment is likely to be profitable due to economies of scale 
and scope. For strategic-asset-seeking FDI, especially that invested in R&D development, 
due to the risks involved in new R&D development, it is also unrealistic to expect quick 
profitability. Hence, we present the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: FDIs with horizontal investment motives will perform better than 
those with vertical investment motives. 
2.3 Data and Sample Selection 
2.3.1 Data Source 
The Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran (Japanese Overseas Investment) dataset (Toyo 
Keizai, 2017) was used for subsidiary-level information. It was matched with Nikkei 
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NEEDS data for MNE parent-level information. This matched dataset was selected for 
three reasons. First, the TK dataset is the most comprehensive data source on Japanese 
foreign investment (Sachwald, 1995). Primary data were collected from the managers of 
overseas affiliates through the Japanese parent firms. Information from other sources 
such as press releases, annual reports, and telephone interviews was also included 
(Makino et al., 2004). Second, it is a longitudinal dataset spanning 27 years from 1991 to 
2017, which allows for panel data analysis. Third, it has detailed information on the 
investment purposes of the parent firms of the subsidiaries, which is generally not 
available from sources where country (Brouthers, Gao, & McNicol, 2008) or industry 
(Nachum & Zaheer, 2005) aggregate-level data is used.  
2.3.2 Sample Selection and the Decision Rules 
The 16 categories of investment purposes from the Toyo Keizai dataset (TK dataset) 
were condensed into six types of investment motives defined by Dunning (1993), and 
Dunning and Lundan (2008): (1) natural resource seeking; (2) market seeking; (3) 
efficiency seeking; (4) strategic asset seeking; (5) support investment; and (6) passive 
investment (see Table 2). The logic behind these allocations is as follows. 
First, natural resource seekers are defined as those “seeking physical resources of one 
kind or another” and those “seeking plentiful suppliers of cheap and well-motivated 
unskilled or semi-skilled labor” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 68). As a result, those in 
Categories A (natural resources, materials) and B (labor intensity) were put into the first 
type of investment motive: natural resource seeking. 
Second, market seekers are defined as those “that invest in a particular country or region 
to supply goods or services to markets in these or adjacent countries” (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008: 69). They are treated as “self-contained production units” (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008: 71). Examples here include those that follow their customers, adopt their 
products to local needs, or are attracted by tax breaks from host countries. Following the 
definition and examples, those in Categories C (tax breaks for investment), F (local 
market access), I (alliances with customers in Japan), and M (building new business) 
were put into the second type of investment motive: market seeking. 
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Table 2: Classifications of investment purposes 
Investment motive Definition offered by Dunning (1993) TK Categories 
1. Natural resource 
seeking7 
1. Physical resources, such as minerals, 
agricultural products 
2. Cheap and motivated unskilled or 
semi-skilled labor 
A = natural resources, 
materials 
B = labor intensity 
2. Market seeking Definition: invest in a particular 
country or region to supply goods or 
services to markets in these or adjacent 
countries 
1. Follow customers 
2. Localization needs 
3. Import substituting 
4. Response to competitors’ moves 
5. Local government policy  
C = tax breaks for 
investment 
F = local market access 
I = alliances with 
customers in Japan 
M = building new 
business 
3. Efficiency seeking 1. To rationalize the structure of 
established resource-based or market-
seeking investments  
2. Benefits include economies of scale, 
scope, and risk diversification 
D = building an 
international network of 
production 
E = building an 
international network of 
distribution 
4. Strategic asset 
seeking 
To sustain or advance their global 
competitiveness 
L = research & 
development 
5. Escape investment   
6. Trade-supportive 
investment 
  
7. Finance-
supportive 
investment 
 J = financing, currency 
hedging 
8. Management-
supportive 
investment 
 K = information 
gathering, royalty 
revenue 
N = control business of 
the area 
9. Passive investment 1. Portfolio institutional investment 
2. Real-estate investment 
 
 
7 Although Dunning (1993) also proposed a third type of resource seeking, which is to “acquire 
technological capability, management or marketing expertise and organizational skills” (p. 57), it is not 
included in our table due to the overlap between this type of investment and strategic asset seeking 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015). 
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Third, efficiency seeking is defined as “rationalizing the structure of established resource-
based or market-seeking investment in such a way that the investing company can gain 
from the common governance of geographically dispersed activities. Such benefits are 
essentially those of the economies of scale and scope and of risk diversification” 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 72). Following this definition, investment motives in 
Categories D (building an international network of production) and E (building an 
international network of distribution) were classified as efficiency seekers. 
Fourth, strategic asset seekers are less interested in exploiting existing firm advantages, 
and more interested in augmenting their “global portfolio of physical assets and human 
competence” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 73). Investments in Category L (research and 
development) were classified as strategic asset seeking. 
Fifth, support investment is defined as investments taken “to support the activities of the 
rest of the enterprise of which they are part” and they are “rarely self-contained profit 
centers” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 74). They include trading companies, financial 
support companies, and regional or branch offices. Regional offices sometimes provide 
“financial and marketing information for the parent company” (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008: 75). Following the definition and examples given, Categories J (financing, 
currency hedging), K (information gathering, royalty revenue), and N (control businesses 
of the area) were classified as support investments. 
Sixth, passive investment refers to portfolio investment. The present study follows the 
logic of Dhanaraj and Beamish (2004) and used equity ownership level less than 20% as 
the cut-off point for passive investment, i.e., the first Japanese parent firm’s equity level 
is greater than 0% and less than 20%. 
Seventh, in Dunning’s (1993) typology, there is another type of investment, “escape 
investment,” which is defined as “to escape restrictive legislation or macro-organizational 
policies by home governments” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 74). Examples include 
“round-tripping” investment between China and Hong Kong, which is used to exploit the 
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preferential treatment given to foreign investment (including investment from Hong 
Kong) by the Chinese government. The essence of this type of investment is that 
investors have to leave the home country for a better outcome. The closet category in the 
TK dataset is Category O (trade conflict), where producers have to relocate their 
investment to a third country to avoid steep tariffs imposed on their goods due to trade 
conflicts between home and host countries. However, due to its small proportion in the 
TK dataset (Table 3)—2,887 subsidiary-year observations (1.49%), which only amount 
to around 300 subsidiaries (assuming about 10 years of data per subsidiary)—Category O 
was excluded from our analysis.  
Also excluded from the analysis were Category G (exports to other countries), Category 
H (exports to Japan), and Category P (other purposes) due to difficulty in allocating them 
in a single discrete category. For example, Category G (exports to other countries) can be 
put into both natural resource seeking (Chakravarty et al., 2017) and market seeking 
(Getachew & Beamish, 2017). A Japanese parent can invest in a low-labor-cost country 
in order to save on costs while seeking market access in a third country. All excluded 
observations together represent 48,674 subsidiary-year observations (8.74% of the entire 
sample). Also, due to the fact that multiple investment purposes can be recorded for one 
subsidiary and that those in Categories G, H, P, and O are likely to be recorded as the 
second or third purposes for a particular subsidiary-year, it is very likely that they have 
been included in other categories in our analysis.8.  
Before conducting the analysis of the characteristics and performance of affiliates of six 
types of investment purposes, a preliminary analysis was made on the distribution of the 
six types of investment motives (Table 3). In the 1991–2017 version of the TK dataset, 
there are 557,179 subsidiary-year observations: 8,318 Japanese MNEs investing in 
56,193 subsidiaries in 164 countries. For each of the 557,179 subsidiary-year 
 
8 For example, Category G was recorded as the first investment purpose for only 697 subsidiary-year 
observations; however, 18,129 subsidiary-year observations reported G as one of the investment purposes 
in the TK dataset. This means that Category G could have been recorded as the second, third, or even 
fourth investment purpose. A similar pattern can be found for Categories H (774 versus 17,539), O (278 
versus 2,887), and P (5,568 versus 10,119). 
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observations, a Japanese parent firm can choose multiple answers from the list of 
investment purposes for one subsidiary (Chakravarty et al., 2017). Meanwhile, if a 
subsidiary has multiple Japanese parent firms, duplicate answers are counted once.9 For 
example, if two Japanese parents choose “market access” as the investment purpose, 
market access is recorded once. There is no rank order among the 16 investment 
purposes. In the TK dataset, 194,171 subsidiary-year observations (34.8% of the whole 
dataset) recorded at least one investment purpose and they recorded an average10 of two 
investment purposes. In sum, (1) natural resource seekers represent 45,834 subsidiary-
year observations (23.60%11); (2) market seekers represent 161,844 subsidiary-year 
observations (83.35%); (3) efficiency seekers represent 94,180 subsidiary-year 
observations (48.50%); (4) strategic asset seekers represent 14,244 subsidiary-year 
observations (7.34%); (5) support investment represents 61,695 subsidiary-year 
observations (31.77%); and (6) passive investment represents 17,528 subsidiary-year 
observations (9.03%). 
  
 
9 Toyo Keizai, Overseas Japanese Companies Data Technical Summary, March 2012. 
10 The maximum number of investment purposes was eight, which was recorded for a Thailand subsidiary. 
They cover labor intensity (B), tax breaks for investment (C), building an international production network 
(D), local market access (F), exports to other countries (G), exports to Japan (H), alliances with customers 
(I), and building new business (M). 
11 These percentages are for those investments that reported up to eight investment purposes. As one 
subsidiary can have more than one investment purpose, the sum of all percentages will be greater than one. 
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Table 3: Converting investment purposes in TK dataset into six investment motives 
defined by Dunning & Lundan (2008) 
No. 
Investment 
motive 
Categories in the TK 
dataset 
Observations  
(1 investment purpose) 
Observations (up to 8 
investment purposes) 
Subsidiary-
year 
observations  
 (%) 
Subsidiary-
year 
observations  
 (%) 
1 
Natural 
resource 
seekers 
A = natural resources, 
materials 
2,365 3.37 11,372 5.86 
B = labor intensity 1,654 2.36 34,462 17.75 
subtotal 4,019 5.73 45,834 23.60 
2 
Market 
seekers 
C = tax breaks for 
investment 
1,127 1.61 12,796 6.59 
F = local market 
access 
33,885 48.32 129,233 66.56 
I = alliance with 
customers in Japan 
1,320 1.88 11,104 5.72 
M = building new 
business 
713 1.02 8,711 4.49 
subtotal 37,045 52.82 161,844 83.35 
3 
Efficiency 
seekers 
D = building 
international 
production network 
10,524 15.01 58,868 30.32 
E = building 
international 
distribution network 
4,052 5.78 35,312 18.19 
subtotal 14,576 20.78 94,180 48.50 
4 
Strategic 
asset seekers 
L = research and 
development 
1,516 2.16 14,244 7.34 
subtotal 1,516 2.16 14,244 7.34 
5 
Support 
investment 
J = financing, currency 
hedging 
2,027 2.89 6,671 3.44 
K = information 
gathering, royalty 
collection 
2,569 3.66 47,517 24.47 
N = control business 
of the area 
1,773 2.53 7,507 3.87 
subtotal 6,369 9.08 61,695 31.77 
6 
Passive 
investment 
Equity share of first 
Japanese parent firm 
<20% 
3,046 4.34 17,528 9.03 
    subtotal 3,046 4.34 17,528 9.03 
7 Other 
G = exports to other 
countries 
275 0.39 18,129 9.34 
H = exports to Japan 509 0.73 17,539 9.03 
O = trade conflict 253 0.36 2,887 1.49 
P = other purposes 5,568 7.94 10,119 5.21 
subtotal 6,605 9.42 48,674 25.07 
8   total  70,130   194,171   
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2.3.3 Main Statistical Tools 
In the exploratory analysis, frequency distributions have been run for the general 
distribution of investment purposes and regression tests (OLS linear regression and 
binary logstic regression) have been run to test the relationship between investment 
purposes and subsidiary-level characteristics and performance. 
2.4 Preliminary Analysis Results 
The frequency distribution of the number of investment purposes is shown in Table 4. 
Among those that reported investment purposes, 70,130 subsidiary-year observations 
reported one investment purpose (36.12%), 57,330 reported two investment purposes 
(29.53%), and 37,098 reported three investment purposes (19.11%).  
Table 4: Frequency distribution of subsidiary-year observations by number of 
investment purposes 
Number of 
investment 
purposes 
Frequency Percentage 
(%) 
Cumulative 
percentage 
(%) 
1 70,130 36.12 36.12 
2 57,330 29.53 65.64 
3 37,098 19.11 84.75 
4 17,953 9.25 93.99 
5 11,410 5.88 99.87 
6 226 0.12 99.99 
7 23 0.01 100 
8 1 0 100 
Total 194,171 100   
 
2.4.1 Descriptive Data on Investment Purposes 
2.4.1.1 Frequency Distributions 
Of the 70,130 subsidiary-year observations that reported one investment purpose (Table 
5), the top category is F (local market access, 48.32%), followed by D (building an 
international production network, 15.01%).  
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Table 5: Frequency distribution of subsidiary-year observations with one 
investment purpose 
No. Investment purpose Frequency (%) 
1 F = local market access 33,885 48.32 
2 
D = building an international production 
network 10,524 15.01 
3 P = other purposes 5,568 7.94 
4 
E = building an international distribution 
network 4,052 5.78 
5 
K = information gathering and royalty 
revenue 2,569 3.66 
6 A = natural resources and materials 2,365 3.37 
7 J = financing and currency hedging 2,027 2.89 
8 N = control business of the area 1,773 2.53 
9 B = labor intensity 1,654 2.36 
10 L = research and development 1,516 2.16 
11 I = alliances with customers in Japan 1,320 1.88 
12 C = tax breaks for investment 1,127 1.61 
13 M = building new business 713 1.02 
14 H = exports to Japan 509 0.73 
15 G = exports to other countries 275 0.39 
16 O = trade conflict 253 0.36 
  Total 70,130 100 
Among those 57,330 subsidiary-year observations that reported two investment purposes, 
nine combinations have over 1,000 subsidiary-year observations (Table 6). A closer 
examination shows that eight out of nine categories have F (local market access) as one 
element. The top category is FK (local market access; information gathering, royalty 
revenue), with 12,839 subsidiary-year observations, followed by FD (local market access; 
building international production network), with 9,432 subsidiary-year observations, and 
FE (local market access; building international distribution network), with 6,439 
subsidiary-year observations. 
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Table 6: Frequency distribution of subsidiary-year observations with two 
investment purposes (top nine categories) 
No. Items Frequency 
1 FK = “local market access” and “information gathering and 
royalty revenue” 
12,839 
2 DF = “building an international production network” and “local 
market access” 
9,432 
3 EF = “building an international distribution network” and “local 
market access” 
6,439 
4 BF = “labor intensity” and “local market access” 3,315 
5 BD = “labor intensity” and “building an international production 
network” 
2,192 
6 CF = “tax breaks for investment” and “local market access” 1,705 
7 FG = “local market access” and “exports to other countries” 1,466 
8 FI = “local market access” and “alliances with customers in 
Japan” 
1,267 
9 FP = “local market access” and “other purposes” 1,043 
A similar pattern can be found for those 37,098 subsidiary-year observations that 
reported three12  investment purposes (Table 7). Nine combinations have over 1,000 
subsidiary-year observations. Eight out of nine categories have F (local market access) as 
an element. The top category is FKE (local market access; information gathering, royalty 
revenue; building an international distribution network), with 3,735 subsidiary-year 
observations, followed by FDB (local market access; building international production 
network; labor intensity), with 3,087 subsidiary-year observations, and FED (local 
market access; building international distribution network; building international 
production network), with 2,127 subsidiary-year observations. 
2.4.1.2 Annual Growth Patterns 
This section provides an analysis on the annual growth pattern of investments of different 
purposes for two types of data: (1) subsidiary-year observations that reported only one 
 
12 We have also run the frequency distributions of those that reported four or five investment purposes. 
There are 16 * 15 * 14 * 13 = 43,680 possible combinations of four investment purposes and 16 * 15 * 14 * 
13 * 12 = 524,160 possible combinations of five investment purposes. Most of these combinations have 
zero observations and the top category has no more than 100 subsidiary-year observations. A detailed 
report is available upon request. 
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investment purpose (i.e., 70,130 subsidiary-year observations); (2) subsidiary-year 
observations that reported up to eight investment purposes (i.e., 194,171 subsidiary-year 
observations). For example, one observation could have reported an investment purpose 
of A (natural resources, materials) but it could also have reported other investment 
purposes such as B (labor intensity) or C (tax breaks for investment). 
Table 7: Frequency distribution of subsidiary-year observations with three 
investment purposes (top nine categories) 
No. Items Frequency 
1 EFK = “building an international distribution network,” “local 
market access,” and “information gathering and royalty 
revenue”  
3,735 
2 BDF = “labor intensity,” “building an international production 
network,” and “local market access” 
3,087 
3 DEF = “building an international production network,” 
“building an international distribution network,” and “local 
market access”  
2,127 
4 DFG = “building an international production network,” “local 
market access,” and “exports to other countries”  
1,322 
5 BCF = “labor intensity,” “tax breaks for investment,” and “local 
market access” 
1,200 
6 DFK = “building an international production network,” “local 
market access,” and “information gathering and royalty 
revenue”  
1,093 
7 BFK = “labor intensity,” “local market access,” and 
“information gathering and royalty revenue” 
1,056 
8 BDH = “labor intensity,” “building an international production 
network,” and “exports to Japan”  
1,048 
9 FKL = “local market access,” “information gathering and 
royalty revenue,” and “research and development” 
1,048 
First, for those observations that reported only one investment purpose (70,130 
subsidiary-year observations), the annual growth pattern is shown in Figures 1a to 16a. A 
closer examination shows that three investment purposes show an upward trend between 
1991 and 2017: building an international production network (Figure 4a), building an 
international distribution network (Figure 5a), and controlling the business of the area 
(Figure 14a). Another three investment purposes show a clear downward trend: local 
market access (Figure 6a), information gathering and royalty collection (Figure 11a), and 
trade conflicts (Figure 15a). There is no clear pattern for other investment purposes. 
Meanwhile, subgroups within a category show different growth patterns. For example, 
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within the big category of market access, “alliances with customers in Japan” shows a 
general upward trend, while “local market access” shows a downward trend, and the 
trend for other subcategories is less clear.  
  
68 
 
Figure 1a & 1b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment 
purpose: “natural resources and materials” over all subsidiary-year observations 
with one investment purpose in each year 
  
      
 
Figure 2a & 2b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment 
purpose: “labor intensity” over all subsidiary-year observations with one 
investment purpose in each year  
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Figure 3a & 3b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment 
purpose: “tax breaks for investment” over all subsidiary-year observations with one 
investment purpose in each year  
    
 
Figure 4a & 4b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment 
purpose: “building an international production network” over all subsidiary-year 
observations with one investment purpose in each year 
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Figure 5a & 5b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment 
purpose: “building an international distribution network” over all subsidiary-year 
observations with one investment purpose in each year 
 
    
 
Figure 6a & 6b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment 
purpose: “local market access” over all subsidiary-year observations with one 
investment purpose in each year  
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Figure 7a & 7b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment 
purpose: “exports to other countries” over all subsidiary-year observations with one 
investment purpose in each year 
 
      
   
 
Figure 8a & 8b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment 
purpose: “exports to Japan” over all subsidiary-year observations with one 
investment purpose in each year  
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Figure 9a & 9b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment 
purpose: “alliances with customers in Japan” over all subsidiary-year observations 
with one investment purpose in each year 
 
    
 
Figure 10a & 10b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment 
purpose: “financing and currency hedging” over all subsidiary-year observations 
with one investment purpose in each year 
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Figure 11a & 11b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment 
purpose: “information gathering and royalty revenue” over all subsidiary-year 
observations with one investment purpose in each year 
 
   
   
 
Figure 12a & 12b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment 
purpose: “research and development” over all subsidiary-year observations with 
one investment purpose in each year 
 
    
 
   
  
74 
 
Figure 13a & 13b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment 
purpose: “building new business” over all subsidiary-year observations with one 
investment purpose in each year 
 
     
 
 
Figure 14a & 14b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment 
purpose: “control business of the area” over all subsidiary-year observations with 
one investment purpose in each year   
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Figure 15a & 15b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment 
purpose: “trade conflict” over all subsidiary-year observations with one investment 
purpose in each year 
   
 
Figure 16a & 16b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment 
purpose: “other purposes” over all subsidiary-year observations with one 
investment purpose in each year 
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Second, when those observations that reported up to eight investment purposes are 
examined (Figures 1b to 16b), the general pattern is similar to those with only one 
investment purpose, but the percentages are higher in all categories because one 
subsidiary-year observation can be counted in different categories. 
2.4.2 Characteristics and Performance  
Next, a comparison is presented of the characteristics and performance among investment 
according to the different types of investment purposes.  
2.4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics for selected variables at affiliate level13 
Variable Subsidiary-
year 
observations 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max 
Revenue 
(‘000 USD) 38,218 63,466 7,695 811,127 0 106,000,000 
Number of 
employees  62,643 187 30 881 0 79,003 
Revenue per 
employee  
(‘000 USD) 34,667 1,460 189.14 19,199 0 1,507,406 
Number of 
expats 59,459 3 2 6 0 33814 
Ratio of 
expats to total 
employees  53,831 0.10 0.04 0.14 0.00 1.00 
First Japanese 
parent’s 
ownership 
level (%) 70,078 69.76 90 35.14 0.00 100.00 
Subjective 
performance 
(3 = gain, 2 = 
breakeven, 1 
= loss) 26,572 2.42 3 0.77 1.00 3.00 
 
 
13 Because all the variables have highly skewed distributions, the median is also included for descriptive 
purposes. 
14 The subsidiary is Canon USA. It had 4,980 local employees in 1991, with 338 expats. 
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Descriptive statistics were calculated for affiliate-level characteristics (revenue, 
employee, revenue per employee, number of expats, ratio of expats to local employees, 
the first Japanese parent’s ownership level) and performance, which is measured by a 
subjective evaluation of subsidiary profitability by the MNE headquarters. Performance 
has three categories: gain, breakeven, and loss.  
The descriptive statistics for a few selected variables of interest at the affiliate level are 
shown in Table 8, which covers revenue, number of employees, revenue per employee, 
number of expatriates, ratio of expatriates to local employees, the first Japanese parent’s 
ownership level, and a subjective measure of performance (i.e., 3 = gain, 2 = breakeven, 
1 = loss). It shows that the median revenue is US$7.69 million and the median number of 
local employees is 30. The median revenue per employee is US$189,000. The average 
number of expatriates is three and the ratio of expatriates to local employees is 0.14. The 
average ownership level of the first Japanese parent is 70%. In terms of performance, 
most affiliate managers rate their performance as half-way between gain and breakeven. 
These variables show different levels of missing values, with the ownership level having 
the least missing data and the subjective performance having the most missing data.  
2.4.2.2 Differences in Characteristics and Performance 
Table 9 indicates that affiliates with various investment purposes differ significantly 
across the five dimensions of revenue, number of employees, revenue per employee, 
number of expats, and ratio of expats to local employees. First, the highest three 
categories in terms of revenue are O (trade conflict, US$345.7 million), G (exports to 
other countries, US$162.2 million), and A (natural resources and materials, US$132.8 
million), and the lowest three categories are M (building new business, US$10.1 million), 
H (exports to Japan, US$14.8 million), and B (labor intensity, US$18.3 million). One 
possible explanation for the above result is that exports to other countries are used for 
market seeking (or revenue-generating purposes), while affiliates engaged in natural 
resources and materials are usually mining companies, which can generate a huge amount 
of revenue. Those with the lowest revenue may be part of the vertical value chain of the 
parent MNEs, such as “exports to Japan” and “labor intensity,” where transfer pricing is  
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Table 9: Affiliate-level characteristics 
No. Investment 
motive 
Category in 
TK dataset 
Revenue 
(‘000 USD) 
No. of 
employees 
Revenue 
per 
employee 
(‘000 USD) 
No. of 
expats 
Expats 
Ratio 
Coefficient of 
OLS 
regression15  
1 
Natural resource 
seekers 
A = natural 
resources, 
materials 
132,810 182 2,525 2.88 0.13 0.03*** 
B = labor 
intensity 
18,381 281 145 3.20 0.04 –0.07*** 
2 Market seekers 
C = tax breaks 
for investment 
28,293 281 415 2.70 0.07 –0.03*** 
F = local 
market access 
59,190 151 1,335 3.18 0.09 –0.01*** 
I = alliances 
with customers 
in Japan 
26,230 151 625 2.85 0.10 –0.002 
M = building 
new business 
10,150 242 610 1.66 0.12 0.02** 
3 
Efficiency 
seekers 
D = building an 
international 
production 
network 
77,385 408 308 4.06 0.03 –0.08*** 
E = building an 
international 
distribution 
network 
69,121 76 2,072 2.21 0.11 0.01*** 
4 
Strategic asset 
seekers 
L = research 
and 
development 
22,874 81 2,165 2.38 0.15 0.05*** 
5 
Support 
investment 
J = financing, 
currency 
hedging 
62,146 15 10,663 1.12 0.31 0.21*** 
K = information 
gathering, 
royalty 
collection 
64,225 107 746 2.66 0.21 0.11*** 
N = control 
business of the 
area 
90,996 84 14,419 3.06 0.28 0.18*** 
6 
Passive 
investment 
Equity share of 
the first 
Japanese parent 
firm < 20% 
   174,339 477 559 1.33 0.03  
7 Other 
G = exports to 
other countries 
162,221 84 5,689 3.56 0.20 0.09*** 
H = exports to 
Japan 
14,853 168 1,593 1.67 0.07 –0.04*** 
O = trade 
conflict 
345,761 686 326 11.71 0.09 –0.02 
P = other 
purposes 
54,818 172 1,348 3.07 0.18 0.05*** 
8   Sample average 63,634 187 1,460 3.00 0.10  
 
15 Results are based on the bivariate OLS regression of the ratio of expats to total employees on investment 
purposes, sample size = 53,832. 
79 
 
 
quite likely. As there is a risk associated with building new business (Category M), the 
lowest revenue is found in that category. 
Second, regarding the number of employees, the highest three categories are O (trade 
conflict, 686), D (building an international production network, 408), and B (labor 
intensity, 281). The lowest three categories are J (financing, currency hedging, 15), E 
(building an international distribution network, 76), and L (research and development, 
81). N (control business of the area, 84) and G (exports to other countries, 84) are also at 
the low end in terms of the number of employees. Apparently, those with production 
functions have a higher number of employees, while those in finance, sales, R&D, and 
regional management centers have fewer staff. 
Third, in terms of revenue per employee, the top three categories are N (control business 
of the area), J (financing, currency hedging), and G (exports to other countries), which 
benefit from their small employee sizes. Meanwhile, those with more employees have the 
lowest rates of revenue per employee, such as O (trade conflict), D (building an 
international production network), and B (labor intensity). 
Fourth, expatriate staffing is measured by the number of expats and its ratio to total 
employees (Peng & Beamish, 2014). The top three categories for the number of expats 
are O (trade conflict, 12), D (building an international production network, 4), and G 
(exports to other countries, 3.5). The lowest three categories for the number of expats are 
J (financing and currency hedging, 1.12), M (building new business, 1.66), and H 
(exports to Japan, 1.67). When the expats to total employee ratio is considered, the top 
three categories are J (financing and currency hedging, 0.31), N (control business of the 
area, 0.28), and K (information gathering, royalty revenue, 0.21). The lowest three 
categories are D (building an international production network, 0.03), B (labor intensity, 
0.04), and H (exports to Japan, 0.07).  
Table 10 shows the ownership modes by affiliates of different investment purposes. The 
general pattern is that WOS has the highest percentage, followed by minority, majority, 
and then even equity share. In terms of the percentage of WOS among various 
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investments, the top three categories are N (control business of the area, 92.6%), J 
(financing and currency hedging, 87.2%), and G (exports to other countries, 77.5%), 
while the lowest three categories are H (exports to Japan, 41.3%), A (natural resources 
and materials, 42.8%), and C (tax breaks for investment, 48.3%). Here, vertical and 
horizonal investment cannot explain the result, because categories N, H, and A are all 
vertical investments, but they have strikingly different WOS percentages. 
The result in Table 11 shows the subjective performance evaluation by affiliate 
managers. Among those that have reported gains, the top three categories are B (labor 
intensity, 64%), J (financing and currency hedging, 63.2%), and F (local market access, 
62.6%), while the lowest three categories are M (building new business, 35.4%), H 
(exports to Japan, 40.4%), and N (control business of the area, 35.4%). Although both B 
(labor intensity) and H (exports to Japan) are vertical investments, they have very 
different levels of “gain” outcome—64% versus 40%. Meanwhile, those categories with 
greater risks involved in the business such as M (building new business) and N (control 
business of the area) have a lower percentage of “gain.” 
In sum, the data show quite a nuanced picture of investment according to different 
purposes. Neither the horizontal versus vertical investment framework (Slangen & 
Beugelsdijk, 2010) nor the main investment categories proposed by Dunning (1993) can 
explain them all. Thus, further extension is warranted.  
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Table 10: Ownership modes (%) 
No. 
Investment 
motive 
Category in TK 
dataset 
WOS Majority Even Minority 
 
Coefficient 
for logistic 
regression16  
1 
Natural 
resource 
seekers 
A = natural 
resources, 
materials 
42.8 16.1 6.5 34.6 −0.80*** 
B = labor intensity 52.1 15.1 7.6 25.2 −0.40*** 
2 
Market 
seekers 
C = tax breaks for 
investment 
48.3 11.9 6.1 33.7 −0.56*** 
F = local market 
access 
62.7 12.3 5.1 19.9 0.07*** 
I = alliances with 
customers in Japan 
50.3 16.6 4.8 28.4 −0.48*** 
M = building new 
business 
57.8 9.5 3.7 29 −0.16*** 
3 
Efficiency 
seekers 
D = building an 
international 
production network 
51.3 20 6.6 22 −0.51*** 
E = building an 
international 
distribution 
network 
65.1 12.9 4.3 17.7 0.14*** 
4 
Strategic 
asset seekers 
L = research and 
development 
71.9 12.5 5 10.6 0.46*** 
5 
Support 
investment 
J = financing, 
currency hedging 
87.2 4.7 2.3 5.8 1.46*** 
K = information 
gathering, royalty 
collection 
71.7 8.5 5.8 14 0.45*** 
N = control 
business of the area 
92.6 1.9 2 3.5 2.07*** 
6 other 
G = exports to 
other countries 
77.5 7.2 4.4 10.8 0.75*** 
H = exports to 
Japan 
41.3 23.7 2.8 32.3 −0.84*** 
O = trade conflict 58.3 22.4 6.6 12.7 −0.14 
P = other purposes 65.2 8.4 6.1 20.3 0.15*** 
7   Sample average 61.9 12.9 5.3 19.9  
 
16 The co-efficients are drawn from the results of bivariate logistic regression of ownership modes (1 = 
WOS and 0= otherwise) on investment purposes (sample: those reported only one investment purpose; size: 
61,613 subsidiary-year observations). 
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Table 11: Affiliate-level performance (%) 
No. Investment 
motive 
Category in TK dataset Gain Breakeven Loss Coefficients17 of 
logistic 
regression (gain 
= 1; breakeven 
or loss = 0) 
1 
Natural 
resource 
seekers 
A = natural resources, 
materials 
61.0 20.4 18.6 0.08 
B = labor intensity 64.0 24.3 11.7 0.21* 
2 
Market 
seekers 
C = tax breaks for 
investment 
54.0 31.5 14.5 −0.22* 
F = local market access 62.6 21.1 16.3 0.28*** 
I = alliance with customers 
in Japan 
57.1 18.3 24.6 −0.09 
M = building new business 35.4 27.0 37.6 −0.99*** 
3 
Efficiency 
seekers 
D = building an 
international production 
network 
61.2 19.6 19.2 0.09* 
E = building an 
international distribution 
network 
61.3 24.6 14.1 0.09 
4 
Strategic 
asset seekers 
L = research and 
development 
43.7 25.2 31.2 −0.64*** 
5 
Support 
investment 
J = financing, currency 
hedging 
63.1 25.3 11.6 0.17* 
K = information gathering, 
royalty collection 
49.3 33.9 16.8 −0.42*** 
N = control business of the 
area 
40.9 34.0 25.2 −0.76*** 
6 
Passive 
investment 
Equity share of the first 
Japanese parent firm  
< 20% 
67.0 17.8 15.2  
7 Other 
G = exports to other 
countries 
45.1 44.3 10.6 −0.57** 
H = exports to Japan 40.4 43.6 16.0 −0.77*** 
O = trade conflict 55.3 14.6 30.1 -0.16 
P = other purposes 51.9 28.4 19.6 -0.32*** 
8   Sample average 59.2 23.2 17.6  
 
17 The result is based upon bivariate logistic regression of performance on investment purposes; sample 
size = 26,572. 
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2.5 Preliminary Discussion 
This chapter reintroduced the centrality of investment purposes to IB research (Dunning 
& Lundan, 2008) and proposed a theoretical framework with antecedents and 
consequences for different investment motives. It integrates theoretical arguments on the 
joint efforts of ownership advantages and home- and host-country location advantages on 
investment motives (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015; Narula, 2012; Meyer et al., 2011) 
and the systematic differences in affiliate-level characteristics (such as size, mode choice, 
and expatriate deployment) and performance associated with each type of investment 
motive (Benito, 2015). We tested our hypotheses using the TK dataset. The preliminary 
results largely supported Hypotheses 3 and 4. The details are as follows.   
2.5.1 Size 
The size of the affiliates is measured by the number of local employees. The sample 
average is 187, while those in manufacturing functions such as those with the purposes of 
“labor intensity” (281), “tax breaks for investment” (281), and “building an international 
production network” (408) consistently have a higher-than-average number of 
employees. Meanwhile, those with a finance (“financing and currency hedging”: 15), 
sales (“building an international distribution network”: 76), and regional management 
(“control business of the area”: 84) function have a consistently lower-than-average 
subsidiary size. The results are consistent with our hypothesis that those in support 
functions have a smaller size compared with those with major functions. 
These results provide additional support to Beamish and Inkpen’s (1998) decision to 
exclude subsidiaries with fewer than 20 employees from analysis due to concerns over 
non-viable subsidiary organizations that were just agencies or sales offices with a few 
employees. Those subsidiaries with financing and hedging functions are also small, with 
an average of 15 employees. 
2.5.2 Mode Choice 
We hypothesized in Hypothesis 3a that those subsidiaries with market-seeking, natural-
resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking, strategic-seeking, and support functions are likely 
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to choose WOSs over IJVs, while those subsidiaries with labor-seeking purposes are 
likely to choose IJVs over WOSs. The results generally support our hypothesis. 
The main theory linking investment purposes and mode choices is internalization, where 
the major market failures are asset specificity and information content. MNEs may prefer 
WOSs over IJVs due to concerns over information content, i.e., protection of their 
proprietary knowledge and know-how. Another perspective on asset specificity and 
vertical integration also argues for a preference of WOSs over IJVs because coordination 
among affiliates and tighter control is needed if a subsidiary is part of the vertical value 
chain (Kim & Hwang, 1992). However, an IJV will be the preferential ownership mode if 
local partners are able to provide complementary assets (Beamish & Banks, 1987) and 
ownership is used as an incentive to local partners (Gil et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2015). 
Our data show that those in the resource-seeking categories (A, “natural resources and 
materials,” and B, “labor intensity”) preferred IJVs over WOSs, which is consistent with 
the literature (Gil et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2015) in that local partners provided 
complementary assets to focal MNEs (Beamish & Banks, 1987), although they were part 
of the vertical value chain of the MNE network. However, other subsidiaries that were 
also part of the vertical value chain showed a different preference in terms of ownership 
modes. For example, those subsidiaries in the support functions such as “financing and 
currency hedging” (J), “information gathering and royalty collection” (K), and “control 
business of the area” (N) all showed a preference for WOSs over IJVs. One possible 
explanation is that these functions are vital to the operations of the focal MNE, and local 
partners can offer few complementary assets. 
As no previous research investigated the relationship between efficiency seeking and 
mode choice, the present study addressed this gap by showing that those subsidiaries 
established with the purpose of building an international production network showed a 
preference for IJVs over WOSs, while those with the purpose of building an international 
distribution network showed a preference for WOSs over IJVs. Although both of these 
two investments are aimed at improving the efficiency of the MNE network and both are 
part of the vertical value chain of the MNE, those in the downstream sector, such as sales, 
85 
 
are far more valued than those in the upstream (production) sector. Consistent with prior 
research (Cui & Jiang, 2009), those in the category of “research and development” (I) 
showed a preference for WOSs over IJVs because strategic assets such as brands, 
distribution channels, and technology cannot be fully accessed via an IJV (Rui & Yip, 
2008). 
Among market seekers, those with the purpose of “local market access” showed a 
preference for WOSs over IJVs due to concerns with protecting their proprietary 
knowledge and know-how (Brothers & Hennart, 2007; Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). 
However, other subgroups in the market-seeking category preferred IJVs over WOSs. For 
example, those with the purpose of “alliancess with customers in Japan” (I) preferred 
IJVs over WOSs, which is different from the mode choice of U.S. service MNEs 
expanding abroad by following their clients (Erramilli & Rao, 1990). Erramilli and Rao 
(1990) suggested that local knowledge was not highly valued in the service industry 
when MNEs followed their clients in international expansion. In our sample, those in the 
service industry only accounted for 25% of those following the clients. Local knowledge 
and complementary assets offered by local partners are indeed valued by MNEs even 
when they follow their clients abroad when they operate in industries other than the 
service industry. 
With regard to the other two categories of market seekers, both “tax breaks for 
investment” (C) and “building new business” (M) showed a preference for IJVs over 
WOSs. For those in the category of “tax breaks for investment,” they invested in the host 
country due to favorable investment policies offered by the host government. In many 
cases, governments required investors to establish IJVs in hopes of a positive technology 
spillover from the focal MNE. Meanwhile, in the case of “building new business” (M) in 
a non-home-country context, an IJV is also preferred over a WOS. One possible 
explanation is that there is considerable risk involved in building up a new business in a 
non-home-country context, and a local partner can share risks and uncertainty associated 
with a new business. 
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In sum, TCE arguments still hold in cases when technology, brand, sales, and distribution 
channels are at stake. Here, WOSs are still preferred over IJVs. However, in cases where 
local partners can offer supplementary assets and the affiliates are involved in resource- 
and labor-seeking FDI, IJVs are preferred over WOSs. The findings are consistent with 
the arguments of the smile of value creation (Mudambi, 2007) and smile-dynamic 
analysis (Mudambi, 2008), where advanced economies are in control of the two ends of 
the smile, i.e., R&D, marketing, distribution, and specialized services, while emerging 
economies are mainly stuck in the manufacturing sector. Our findings show that MNEs 
operating at the two ends of the smile curve, i.e., R&D, marketing, and distribution, are 
more likely to prefer WOSs over IJVs, while those in the middle of the curve, i.e., 
manufacturing, are more likely to choose IJVs over WOSs. 
2.5.3 Expatriate Control 
With regard to expatriate control, we hypothesized in Hypothesis 3b that there is a 
positive association with vertical FDI and expatriate deployment. This received empirical 
support. As noted in the literature, expatriates play two primary roles in a subsidiary, i.e., 
control and knowledge management (Delios & Bjiorkman, 2000). Our results are 
consistent with the literature in that when there is a stronger need for control and 
coordination, either due to concerns over vertical integration (as in the categories of 
“natural resources and materials” and “building an international distribution network”) or 
due to risks involved (as in the category “building new business”), the expat ratio is 
higher. Meanwhile, those subsidiaries in support functions also showed a greater desire 
for control (i.e., financing and currency hedging, information gathering and royalty 
collection, control business of the area). When there is a need for knowledge transfer, the 
expat ratio is higher than average, i.e., as in the category of research and development.  
Moreover, for investments with the purpose of exploiting cheap local labor (i.e., labor 
intensity and building an international production network), the expat ratio is much lower 
compared with the group average, although they are also part of the vertical supply chain. 
In other words, the coordination and control needs among subsidiaries established for 
vertical integration purposes are different due to the divergent functions they play. 
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Meanwhile, there is a different need for expats among market seekers. For example, 
“local market access” has a negative impact on the expat ratio, which is consistent with 
the literature in that local managers have better knowledge about the local market and it 
makes good business sense to hire locals instead of sending expats (Beamish & Inkpen, 
1998). However, those in the category of “tax breaks for investment” had a lower-than-
average expat ratio. One possible explanation is that these are manufacturing subsidiaries. 
For those that follow their customers in international expansion, this has no effect on the 
expat ratio, which means that they have an average expat ratio. This suggests that those 
who venture abroad by following their clients have an average need for control and 
coordination. 
2.5.4 Performance  
We hypothesized in Hypothesis 4 that the profitability of the subsidiary is contingent 
upon the timeframe used to evaluate performance and that those investments with the 
motive of strategic asset seeking are likely to underperform compared with other types of 
investments due to the longer time horizon innate in this type of FDI project. This 
hypothesis received empirical support. 
Our results are consistent with Verbeke et al.’s (2009) argument that FDI with different 
investment purposes is likely to have different performance objectives and different time 
horizons to achieve those objectives. FDI established for vertical integration purposes 
such as natural resource seeking (i.e., labor intensity) or efficiency seeking (building an 
international production network) had a positive effect on the performance evaluation of 
gain. FDI established for strategic-asset-seeking purposes had a negative effect on 
performance evaluation. In contrast, FDI in the category of market seeking has a mixed 
picture. For example, that in the category of “local market access” had a positive effect 
on performance evaluation, while that in the categories of “tax breaks for investment” 
and “building new business” had a negative effect. One possible explanation of the 
negative effect of “building new business” on performance outcome is the risks involved 
in building new business. 
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Meanwhile, FDI in the support function had a mixed effect on the performance outcome. 
FDI in the category of “financing and hedging” had a positive effect, while FDI in 
regional management functions such as “information gathering” and “control business of 
area” had a negative effect on performance. 
2.6 Limitations and Directions for Future Studies 
This chapter has limitations. First, it only covered four characteristics and performance 
measures for each type of investment motive. Future studies can further explore how 
affiliates differ by other characteristics and performance outcomes such as industry, 
location, and exit rate, etc. Meanwhile, this chapter only examined the direct relationship 
between investment purposes and performance outcomes. Future studies can examine 
whether investment purposes moderate the existing relationships in IB studies and what 
types of relationships are likely to be moderated by investment purposes. For example, 
Dhanaraj and Beamish (2004) found that there is a downward curve relationship between 
ownership level and subsidiary exit rate. It would be interesting to see whether and how 
this curve differs by each investment purpose.  
Second, this analysis is based on FDI that originated in Japan. Future studies can test 
Dunning’s typology on FDI from other developed countries and emerging economies. 
Third, future studies can further explore the theme of heterogeneity among subsidiaries 
by examining other special categories such as small-employment subsidiaries, i.e., those 
with fewer than 20 employees. Some of these small-employment subsidiaries have 
billions of dollars in revenue, which makes it worthwhile to examine how they generate 
such a large amount of revenue and how they are managed by the headquarters. This 
question will be considered in Chapter 3.  
2.7 Preliminary Conclusion 
The present study is the first empirical attempt to systematically test Dunning’s (1993) 
typology on investment motives, using the largest sample ever employed to date. 
Dunning’s original typology offered definitions and examples for each type of investment 
motive. This study suggests that Dunning’s typology does have predictive power for key 
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characteristics (such as size, ownership control, and expatriate control) and performance 
outcomes. It extends Dunning’s typology by offering theoretical explanations to account 
for the differences among FDI with divergent investment purposes. It also makes an 
empirical contribution in that it includes all categories specified in Dunning’s (1993) 
typology, whereas most previous empirical studies examined only one or two investment 
purposes in a single study, sometimes in a piecemeal fashion. 
Second, this study provides a nuanced picture of FDI in functions such as “financing and 
hedging,” “information gathering and royalty revenue,” and “building new business,” 
which have been neglected in most empirical analyses of investment motives (Cuervo-
Cazurra & Narula, 2015). These investment motives are not only important in a strategic 
sense, but also in investment dollars. FDI with these motives is substantially different 
from other types of FDI and collectively exemplifies the central theme of this 
dissertation—that there is huge heterogeneity (Birkinshaw & Hood, 2008) among 
subsidiaries. Hence, there is a need to disaggregate data and treat investments with 
different investment motives separately. We also argue that where data is available, 
investment motives should be routinely included in an IB analysis looking at foreign 
investment. 
Third, our results also show that there is a huge difference among subcategories of major 
investment motives. For example, under the big umbrella of “market-seeking” FDI, there 
are four subcategories such as “local market access,” “tax breaks for investment,” 
“alliances with customers in Japan,” and “building new business.” The latter three 
subcategories are substantially different from the first subcategory in all the four 
characteristics and performance measures tested in the present research. This suggests 
that future IB studies should consider investment motives at the subcategory level. 
In summary, Dunning’s (1993) typology on investment motives does have predictive 
power. Due to significant heterogeneity among subsidiaries, special attention should be 
given to FDI in special categories such as “financing and currency hedging,” 
“information gathering and royalty collection,” and “building new business” and 
subcategories of major investment motivations. 
90 
 
References 
 
Akbar, Y. H., & McBride, J. B. (2004). Multinational enterprise strategy, foreign direct 
investment and economic development: The case of the Hungarian banking 
industry. Journal of World Business, 39(1): 89–105. 
 
Anderson, E., & Gatignon, H. (1986). Modes of foreign entry: A transaction cost analysis 
and propositions. Journal of International Business Studies, 17(3): 1–26. 
 
Aulakh, P. S., & Kotabe, M. (1997). Antecedents and performance implications of 
channel integration in foreign markets. Journal of International Business Studies, 
28(1): 145–175. 
 
Awate, S., Larsen, M. M., & Mudambi, R. (2012). EMNE catch‐up strategies in the wind 
turbine industry: Is there a trade‐off between output and innovation capabilities? 
Global Strategy Journal, 2(3): 205–223. 
 
Barnard, H., & Luiz, J. M. (2018). Escape FDI and the dynamics of a cumulative process 
of institutional misalignment and contestation: Stress, strain and failure. Journal 
of World Business, 53(5): 605–619. 
 
Beamish, P. W., & Banks, J. C. (1987). Equity joint ventures and the theory of the 
multinational enterprise. Journal of International Business Studies, 18(2): 1–16. 
 
Beamish, P. W., & Inkpen, A. C. (1998). Japanese firms and the decline of the Japanese 
expatriate. Journal of World Business, 33(1): 35–50. 
 
Beamish, P. W., & Lupton, N. C. (2016). Cooperative strategies in international business 
and management: Reflections on the past 50 years and future directions. Journal 
of World Business, 51(1): 163–175. 
 
Behrman, J. N. (1972). The role of international companies in Latin America: Autos and 
petrochemicals. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
 
Benito, G. R. (2015). Why and how motives (still) matter. Multinational Business 
Review, 23(1): 15–24. 
 
Benito, G. R., Petersen, B., & Welch, L. S. (2009). Towards more realistic 
conceptualisations of  foreign operation modes. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 40(9): 1455–1470. 
 
Beugelsdijk, S., & Mudambi, R. (2013). MNEs as border-crossing multi-location 
enterprises: The role of discontinuities in geographic space. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 44(5): 413–426. 
 
91 
 
Birkinshaw, J., & Hood, N. (1998). Multinational subsidiary evolution: Capability and 
charter change in foreign-owned subsidiary companies. Academy of Management 
Review, 23(4): 773–795. 
 
Birkinshaw, J. M., & Morrison, A. J. (1995). Configurations of strategy and structure in 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 26(4): 729–753. 
 
Boisot, M., & Meyer, M. W. (2008). Which way through the open door? Reflections on 
the internationalization of Chinese firms. Management and Organization Review, 
4(3): 349–365. 
 
Bouquet, C., Hebert, L., & Delios, A. (2004). Foreign expansion in service industries: 
Separability and human capital intensity. Journal of Business Research, 57(1): 
35–46. 
 
Brouthers, L. E., Gao, Y., & McNicol, J. P. (2008). Corruption and market attractiveness 
influences on different types of FDI. Strategic Management Journal, 29(6): 673–
680. 
 
Brouthers, K. D., & Hennart, J.-F. (2007). Boundaries of the firm: Insights from 
international entry mode research. Journal of Management, 33(3): 395–425. 
 
Buckley, P., & Casson, M. (1976). The future of the multinational enterprise. London: 
Macmillan. 
 
Buckley, P. J., Clegg, L. J., Cross, A. R., Liu, X., Voss, H., & Zheng, P. (2007). The 
determinants of Chinese outward foreign direct investment. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 38(4): 499–518. 
 
Buckley, P. J., & Hashai, N. (2004). A global system view of firm boundaries. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 35(1): 33–45. 
 
Cantwell, J., & Mudambi, R. (2005). MNE competence‐creating subsidiary mandates. 
Strategic Management Journal, 26(12): 1109–1128. 
 
Cantwell, J. A., & Mudambi, R. (2011). Physical attraction and the geography of 
knowledge sourcing in multinational enterprises. Global Strategy Journal, 1(3–4): 
206–232. 
 
Caves, R. E. (1971). International corporations: The industrial economics of foreign 
investment. Economica, 38(149): 1–27. 
 
Chakravarty, D., Hsieh, Y. Y., Schotter, A. P., & Beamish, P. W. (2017). Multinational 
enterprise regional management centres: Characteristics and performance. Journal 
of World Business, 52(2): 296–311. 
92 
 
 
Chandler, A. (1962). Strategy and structure. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16): 386–405. 
 
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1999). Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on 
learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1): 128–152. 
 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., Inkpen, A., Musacchio, A., & Ramaswamy, K. (2014). Governments 
as owners: State-owned multinational companies. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 45(8): 919–942. 
 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., Luo, Y., Ramamurti, R., & Ang, S. H. (2018). The impact of the 
home country on internationalization. Journal of World Business,  53(5): 593–
604. 
 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., & Narula, R. (2015). A set of motives to unite them all? Revisiting 
the principles and typology of internationalization motives. Multinational 
Business Review, 23(1): 2–14. 
 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., Narula, R., & Un, C. A. (2015). Internationalization motives: Sell 
more, buy better, upgrade and escape. Multinational Business Review, 23(1): 25–
35. 
 
Cui, L., & Jiang, F. (2009). FDI entry mode choice of Chinese firms: A strategic behavior 
perspective. Journal of World Business, 44(4): 434–444. 
 
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall Simon.  
 
Delios, A., & Bjorkman, I. (2000). Expatriate staffing in foreign subsidiaries of Japanese 
multinational corporations in the PRC and the United States. International 
Journal of Human Resource Management, 11(2): 278–293. 
 
Dhanaraj, C., & Beamish, P. W. (2004). Effect of equity ownership on the survival of 
international joint ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 25(3): 295–305. 
 
Doz, Y. L., & Prahalad, C. K. (1991). Managing DMNCs: A search for a new paradigm. 
Strategic Management Journal, 12(S1): 145–164. 
 
Duhaime, I. M., & Baird, I. S. (1987). Divestment decision-making: The role of business 
unit size. Journal of Management, 13(3): 483–498. 
 
Dunning, J. H. (1988). The eclectic paradigm of international production: A restatement 
and some possible extensions. Journal of International Business Studies, 19(1): 
1–31. 
93 
 
 
Dunning, J. H. (1993). Multinational enterprises and the global economy. Wokingham, 
England: Addison-Wesley.  
 
Dunning, J. H. (1998). Location and the multinational enterprise: A neglected factor? 
Journal of International Business Studies, 29(1): 45–66. 
 
Dunning, J. H., & Lundan, S. M. (2008). Multinational enterprises and the global 
economy. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Erramilli, M. K., & Rao, C. P. (1990). Choice of foreign market entry modes by service 
firms:  Role of market knowledge. Management International Review, 30 (2): 
135–150. 
 
FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board). (1999). Reporting Interests in Joint 
Ventures and Other Similar Arrangements, Special Report. Norwalk, CT: 
Financial Accounting Foundation. 
 
Fathallah, R., Branzei, O., & Schaan, J. L. (2018). No place like home? How EMNCs 
from hyper turbulent contexts internationalize by sequentially arbitraging rents, 
values, and scales abroad. Journal of World Business, 53(5): 620–631. 
 
Galan, J. I., Gonzalez-Benito, J., & Zuñiga-Vincente, J. A. (2007). Factors determining 
the location decisions of Spanish MNEs: An analysis based on the investment 
development path. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(6): 975–997. 
 
Gaur, A. S., Delios, A., & Singh, K. (2007). Institutional environments, staffing 
strategies, and  subsidiary performance. Journal of Management, 33(4): 611–636. 
 
Getachew, Y. S., & Beamish, P. W. (2017). Foreign subsidiary exit from Africa: The 
effects of investment purpose diversity and orientation. Global Strategy Journal, 
7(1): 58–82. 
 
Gil, A., Nakos, G., Brouthers, L. E., & Brouthers, K. D. (2006). Country-specific strategy 
and new venture formation in Central and East Europe. International Business 
Review, 15(1): 1–13. 
 
Goerzen, A., Asmussen, C. G., & Nielsen, B. B. (2013). Global cities and multinational 
enterprise location strategy. Journal of International Business Studies, 44(5): 
427–450. 
 
Gordon, R. A. (2015). Regression analysis for the social sciences. New York: Routledge. 
 
Hansen, M. W., & Gwozdz, W. (2015). What makes MNCs succeed in developing 
countries? An  empirical analysis of subsidiary performance. Multinational 
Business Review, 23(3): 224–247. 
94 
 
 
He, X., Zhang, J., & Wang, J. (2015). Market seeking orientation and performance in 
China: The impact of institutional environment, subsidiary ownership structure 
and experience. Management International Review, 55(3): 389–419. 
 
Henisz, W. J., & Delios, A. (2000). Learning about the institutional environment, in P. 
Ingram & B. S. Silverman (Eds.), The new institutionalism in strategic 
management: 339–372. Bingley, England: Emerald Group Publishing. 
 
Hennart, J.-F. (1982). A theory of multinational enterprise. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press. 
 
Hobdari, B., Gammeltoft, P., Li, J., & Meyer, K. (2017). The home country of the MNE: 
The case of emerging economy firms. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 
34(1): 1–17. 
 
Hollander, S. C. (1970). Multinational retailing. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State 
University Press. 
 
Hymer, S. H. (1976). The international operations of national firms: A study of foreign 
direct investment. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Jiang, G. F., Holburn, G. L., & Beamish, P. W. (2018). Repeat market entries in the 
internationalization process: The impact of investment motives and corporate 
 capabilities. Global Strategy Journal: 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1002/gsj.1206. 
 
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J. E. (1977). The internationalization process of the firm—A 
model of knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 8(1): 23–32. 
 
Johnston, S., & Menguc, B. (2007). Subsidiary size and the level of subsidiary autonomy 
in multinational corporations: A quadratic model investigation of Australian 
subsidiaries. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(5): 787–801. 
 
Kacker, M. (1985). Transatlantic trends in retailing: Takeovers and flow of know-how. 
London, England: Quorum. 
 
Kalnins, A., & Chung, W. (2004). Resource‐seeking agglomeration: A study of market 
entry in the lodging industry. Strategic Management Journal, 25(7): 689–699. 
 
Kim, J. U., & Aguilera, R. V. (2016). Foreign location choice: Review and extensions. 
International Journal of Management Reviews, 18(2): 133–159. 
 
Kim, W. C., & Hwang, P. (1992). Global strategy and multinationals’ entry mode choice. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 23(1): 29–53. 
 
95 
 
Kobrak, C., Oesterle, M. J., & Röber, B. (2018). Escape FDI and the varieties of 
capitalism:Why history matters in international business. Management 
International Review, 58(3): 449–464. 
 
Kogut, B., & Singh, H. (1988). The effect of national culture on the choice of entry 
mode. Journal of International Business Studies, 19(3): 411–432. 
 
Kostova, T. (1999). Transnational transfer of strategic organizational practices: A 
contextual perspective. Academy of Management Review, 24(2): 308–324. 
 
Lawrence, P. R., & Lorsch, J. W. (1967). Organization and environment: Managing 
differentiation and integration. Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.  
 
Lei, H. S., & Chen, Y. S. (2011). The right tree for the right bird: Location choice 
decision of Taiwanese firms’ FDI in China and Vietnam. International Business 
Review, 20(3): 338–352. 
 
Li, C. C. (1975). Path analysis: A primer. California: Boxwood Press. 
 
Li, J., Xia, J., Shapiro, D., & Lin, Z. (2018). Institutional compatibility and the 
internationalization of Chinese SOEs: The moderating role of home subnational 
institutions. Journal of World Business, 55(5): 641–652. 
 
Luo, Y. (2003). Market-seeking MNEs in an emerging market: How parent–subsidiary 
links shape overseas success. Journal of International Business Studies, 34(3): 
290–309. 
 
Luo, Y. and Tung, R. L. (2007). International expansion of emerging market enterprises: 
A springboard perspective, Journal of International Business Studies, 38(4): 481–
498. 
 
Luo, Y., & Bu, J. (2018). Contextualizing international strategy by emerging market 
firms: A composition-based approach. Journal of World Business, 53(3): 337–
355.   
 
Luo, Y., & Tung, R. L. (2018). A general theory of springboard MNEs. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 49(2): 129–152. 
 
Madhok, A., & Keyhani, M. (2012). Acquisitions as entrepreneurship: Asymmetries, 
opportunities, and the internationalization of multinationals from emerging 
economies. Global Strategy Journal, 2(1): 26–40. 
 
Makino, S., Beamish, P. W., & Zhao, N. B. (2004). The characteristics and performance 
of Japanese FDI in less developed and developed countries. Journal of World 
Business, 39(4): 377–392. 
 
96 
 
Makino, S., Chan, C. M., Isobe, T., & Beamish, P. W. (2007). Intended and unintended 
termination of international joint ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 
28(11): 1113– 1132. 
 
Makino, S., Lau, C. M., & Yeh, R. S. (2002). Asset-exploitation versus asset-seeking: 
Implications for location choice of foreign direct investment from newly 
industrialized  economies. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(3): 403–
421. 
 
Mesquita, L. F. (2016). Location and the global advantage of firms. Global Strategy 
Journal, 6(1): 3–12. 
 
Meyer, K. E. (2015). What is “strategic asset seeking FDI”? Multinational Business 
Review, 23(1): 57–66. 
 
Meyer, K. E., Mudambi, R., & Narula, R. (2011). Multinational enterprises and local 
contexts: The opportunities and challenges of multiple embeddedness. Journal of 
Management Studies, 48(2): 235–252. 
 
Miller, D. (1986). Configurations of strategy and structure: Towards a synthesis. 
Strategic Management Journal, 7(3): 233–249. 
 
Miller, D. (1996). Configurations revisited. Strategic Management Journal, 17(7): 505–
512. 
 
Moghaddam, K., Sethi, D., Weber, T., & Wu, J. (2014). The smirk of emerging market 
firms: A modification of the Dunning’s typology of internationalization 
motivations. Journal of International Management, 20(3): 359–374. 
 
Morck, R., Yeung, B., & Zhao, M. (2008). Perspectives on China’s outward foreign 
direct investment. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(3): 337–350. 
 
Mudambi, R. (2007). Offshoring: Economic geography and the multinational firm. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 38(1): 206–207. 
 
Mudambi, R. (2008). Location, control and innovation in knowledge-intensive industries. 
Journal of Economic Geography, 8(5): 699–725. 
 
Nachum, L. (2000). Economic geography and the location of TNCs: Financial and 
professional service FDI to the USA. Journal of International Business Studies, 
31(3): 367–385. 
 
Nachum, L., & Zaheer, S. (2005). The persistence of distance? The impact of technology 
on MNE motivations for foreign investment. Strategic Management Journal, 
26(8): 747–767. 
 
97 
 
Narula, R. (2010). Keeping the eclectic paradigm simple. Multinational Business Review, 
18(2):  35–50. 
 
Narula, R. (2012). Do we need different frameworks to explain infant MNEs from 
developing countries? Global Strategy Journal, 2(3): 188–204. 
 
Narula, R., & Dunning, J. H. (2000). Industrial development, globalization and 
multinational enterprises: New realities for developing countries. Oxford 
Development Studies, 28(2): 141–167. 
 
Narula, R., & Santangelo, G. D. (2012). Location and collocation advantages in 
international innovation. Multinational Business Review, 20(1): 6–25. 
 
Pan, Y. (2017). Strategic motives, institutional environments, and firm’s FDI ownership. 
Multinational Business Review, 25(4): 307–327. 
 
Paik, Y., & Ando, N. (2011). MNC’s competitive strategies, experiences, and staffing 
policies for foreign affiliates. International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 22(15): 3003–3019. 
 
Peng, G. Z., & Beamish, P. W. (2014). MNC subsidiary size and expatriate control: 
Resource-dependence and learning perspectives. Journal of World Business, 
49(1): 51–62. 
 
Peng, M. W., & Meyer, K. (2016). International business. Hampshire, England: Cengage 
Learning. 
 
Penrose, E. T. (1995). The theory of the growth of the firm. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Porter, M. E. (1986). Competition in global industries: A conceptual framework, in M. E. 
Porter (Ed.), Competition in global industries: 15–60. Boston, MA: Harvard 
Business School Press.   
  
Qian, L., & Delios, A. (2008). Internalization and experience: Japanese banks’ 
international expansion, 1980–1998. Journal of International Business Studies, 
39(2): 231–248. 
 
Ramamurti, R. (2012). What is really different about emerging market multinationals? 
Global Strategy Journal, 2(1): 41–47. 
 
Richard, P. J., Devinney, T. M., Yip, G. S., & Johnson, G. (2009). Measuring 
organizational  performance: Towards methodological best practice. Journal of 
Management, 35(3): 718–804. 
 
98 
 
Rugman, A. (2006). Inside the multinationals: The economics of internal markets. New 
York: Palgrave-Macmillan. 
 
Rugman, A. M. (2010). Reconciling internalization theory and the eclectic paradigm. 
Multinational Business Review, 18(2): 1–12. 
 
Rui, H., & Yip, G. S. (2008). Foreign acquisitions by Chinese firms: A strategic intent 
perspective. Journal of World Business, 43(2): 213–226. 
 
Rumelt, R. P. (1974). Strategy, structure and economic performance. Division of 
Research, Graduate School of Business Administration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University. 
 
Sachwald, F. (1995). Japanese firms in Europe. Luxembourg: Harwood Academic 
Publishers. 
 
Schotter, A., & Beamish, P. W. (2013). The hassle factor: An explanation for managerial 
location shunning. Journal of International Business Studies, 44(5): 521–544. 
 
Schotter, A., Stallkamp, M., & Pinkham, B. (2017). MNE headquarters disaggregation: 
The formation antecedents of regional management centers. Journal of 
Management Studies,  54(8): 1044–1169. 
 
Shi, W. S., Sun, S. L., Yan, D., & Zhu, Z. (2017). Institutional fragility and outward 
foreign direct investment from China. Journal of International Business Studies, 
48(4): 452–476. 
 
Simon, H. A. (1947). Administrative behavior: A study of decision-making processes in 
administrative organization. London: Macmillan. 
 
Slangen, A. H., & Beugelsdijk, S. (2010). The impact of institutional hazards on foreign 
multinational activity: A contingency perspective. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 41(6): 980–995. 
 
Stopford, J. M., & Wells, L. T. (1972). Managing the multinational enterprise. New 
York: Basic Books. 
 
Treagold, A., & Davies, R. L. (1988). The internationalization of retailing. Harlow, 
England: Longman. 
 
Verbeke, A., & Brugman, P. (2009). Triple-testing the quality of multinationality–
performance  research: An internalization theory perspective. International 
Business Review, 18(3): 265–275. 
 
Verbeke, A., & Forootan, M. Z. (2012). How good are multinationality–performance (M‐
P) empirical studies? Global Strategy Journal, 2(4): 332–344. 
99 
 
 
Verbeke, A., Li, L., & Goerzen, A. (2009). Toward more effective research on the 
multinationality-performance relationship. Management International Review, 
49(2): 149–161. 
 
Weng, D. H., & Peng, M. W. (2018). Home bitter home: How labor protection influences 
firm offshoring. Journal of World Business, 53(5): 632–640. 
 
Widmier, S., Brouthers, L. E., & Beamish, P. W. (2008). Expatriate or local? Predicting 
Japanese subsidiary expatriate staffing strategies. The International Journal of 
Human Resource Management, 19(9): 1607–1621. 
 
Williams, D. E. (1992). Retailer internationalization: An empirical inquiry, European 
Journal of Marketing, 26(8/9): 8–24. 
 
Witt, M. A., & Lewin, A. Y. (2007). Outward foreign direct investment as escape 
response to home country institutional constraints. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 38(4): 579–594. 
 
Yang, Y., Yang, X., & B. W. Doyle (2013). The location strategy and firm value creation 
of Chinese multinationals. Multinational Business Review, 21(3): 232–256. 
 
Yu, J., Lee, S. H., & Han, K. (2015). FDI motives, market governance, and ownership 
choice of MNEs: A study of Malaysia and Thailand from an incomplete 
contracting perspective. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 32(2): 335–362. 
 
Zaheer, S. (1995). Overcoming the liability of foreignness. Academy of Management 
Journal, 38(2): 341–363. 
100 
 
Chapter 3  
3 Subsidiary Size and Survival 
This chapter addresses the following two research questions: (1) What is the main 
relationship between subsidiary size and survival? (2) How is this main effect moderated 
by the special roles of small-employment subsidiaries? Examples of such roles include 
serving as centers of importance and serving as a means of vertical investment. 
The main theoretical/conceptual lenses used in this chapter are the liability of smallness 
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986) and orchestration theory (Pitelis & Teece, 2018). It has been 
argued that there is a high mortality rate for small organizations because they do not have 
access to resources, especially financial resources. Meanwhile, orchestration theory 
argues that “MNE operations are not a set of isolated, separable elements. Instead, each 
MNE is an integrated entity” (Pitelis & Teece, 2018: 532).Thus, subsidiaries are not all 
equally important within the MNE network. Extending this logic, we found that 
subsidiaries that have been assigned special roles (such as being centers of importance) 
within the MNE network have different survival prospects compared with standard 
subsidiaries. 
In our analysis, we examined how a subsidiary’s size influences its exit rate and how this 
relationship is moderated by small-employment subsidiaries with access to resources. 
The main statistical tool used in this chapter is a Cox proportional hazards model for 
survival analysis. 
We make at least two contributions to the literature. First, we quantify the liability of 
smallness by showing the survival likelihood of small-employment subsidiaries. Second, 
we identify four contingency factors that enhance the survival chances of small-
employment subsidiaries. These are the special roles of i) centers of importance, (ii) 
vertical investment, (iii) being in a human capital-intensive industry, and (iv) being 
located in a developed country. 
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3.1 Literature Review 
This section reviews the literature on the concepts of the liability of newness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965) and the liability of smallness (Aldrich & Auster, 1986), followed by 
the literature on the advantages of larger firms (Josefy, Kuban, Ireland, & Hitt, 2015) and 
the “small is beautiful” concept (Schumacher, 1974). Afterwards, the relationship 
between subsidiary size and survival is examined. 
3.1.1 Liability of Newness and Liability of Smallness 
The seminal work of Stinchcombe (1965) on the “liability of newness” identified a few 
key internal and external obstacles for new organizations. Internal constraints include the 
creation of new roles and structures, which might result in temporary inefficiencies. New 
organizations also face issues in attracting qualified employees. External barriers include 
competitive pressure from established organizations, which makes entry into a new 
market or domain prohibitive. The liability of newness might also intersect with the 
liability of smallness, as new organizations are usually small (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; 
Bruderl & Schussler, 1990). In addition to co-existing with the liability of newness, the 
liability of smallness adds additional explanatory power for the high mortality rate of new 
organizations (Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983).  
Moreover, not all new organizations are born small. Aldrich and Auster (1986) formally 
formulated the construct of the “liability of smallness.” They argued that smaller 
organizations face difficulties in raising financial capital, satisfying government tax 
regulations, competing with larger organizations for qualified employees, and so on. This 
chapter focuses on the liability of smallness. 
Early studies on the liability of smallness focused on the disadvantages of smaller firms, 
such as the high mortality rate of smaller firms (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Freeman, Carroll, 
& Hannan, 1983), and the advantages of larger firms, including delivering high-quality 
goods in a reliable manner (Hanan & Freeman, 1977), accessing financial capital 
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986), gaining external legitimacy (Baum & Oliver, 1991), and 
achieving economies of scale (Jovanovic, 1982) and market power (Bain, 1956). 
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3.1.2 Advantages of Larger Firms 
Recent empirical research on firm size has further identified four areas of advantage for 
larger firms: (1) resources, (2) economies of scale and scope, (3) legitimacy, and (4) 
market power (Josefy et al., 2015).  
3.1.2.1 Resources 
Size is closely associated with a firm’s acquired and retained resources. Larger firms 
enjoy an advantage over smaller ones in terms of absolute resource advantage, slack 
resources, and valuable capabilities (Josefy et al., 2015). 
First, larger firms have an absolute resource advantage over smaller ones, including 
access to information (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998) and other resources essential to the 
survival of the organization. As a result, they are more self-reliant and less dependent on 
external sources, such as director interlocks or alliance partners (Lavie, 2006), for 
resources. For example, larger firms have better access to information than smaller ones 
because they have more employees to collect environmental information and have more 
resources to gather information through other means such as hiring consultants and 
attending conferences (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998).  
Second, there are benefits associated with slack resources, which facilitate larger firms to 
survive in changing and turbulent environments by initiating strategic change, such as 
through new product introduction or innovation (Bourgeois, 1981). Due to the 
availability of slack resources, there is less risk associated with experimenting with new 
products and new markets, which reduces the failure rate (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). 
Meanwhile, larger firms are more likely to engage in geographic diversification and enter 
new markets (Fuentelsaz, Gomez, & Polo, 2002). In addition to product and market 
diversification, slack resources also provide an advantage for larger firms in innovation 
because they can recoup R&D expenditures faster due to the greater volume of product 
sales (Cohen & Klepper, 1996).  
Third, in addition to innovation, larger firms are endowed with a number of other 
valuable capabilities, such as political lobbying and the ability to manage a network of 
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relationships (Josefy et al., 2015). In investigating the network evolution and quality of 
knowledge accessed by firms of different sizes in the biotechnology industry, Demirkan, 
Deeds, and Demirkan (2012) found that larger firms are better at growing their network 
size due to existing policies and structures of collaborative networks. Meanwhile, larger 
firms have a greater incentive to engage in political lobbying activities for beneficial 
public policies for their industry, sometimes even for their own firm (Schuler, 1996; 
Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer, 2002). Larger firms benefit disproportionally from the 
preferential public policies in their industry, although smaller firms can free-ride on the 
same polices. 
3.1.2.2 Economies of Scale and Scope 
Larger firms benefit from economies of scale in production and achieve greater efficiency 
because their unit cost is lower due to the large volume, which constitutes a major 
competitive advantage for large firms in a single business (Barney, 2002). Dobrev and 
Carroll (2003) proposed a mechanism for a firm to translate a large production volume 
into cost efficiencies and suggested that a firm should have the following abilities: “(1) to 
purchase and make use of specialized manufacturing equipment; (2) to derive savings 
from operational expansions and quicker pay-back on investments in production facilities 
and capacity expansion; (3) to promote in-depth employee specialization based on an 
intricate division of labor; (4) to extract rents from experiential learning and the benefits 
of high frequency with which the same tasks are carried out; and (5) to reduce per unit 
overhead costs” (p. 542). Investigating the mortality rates of large organizations in the 
automobile industry in four major countries, Dobrev and Carroll (2003) found that the 
largest organizations had lower rates of mortality. 
In addition to economies of scale, large organizations also benefit from economies of 
scope through related diversification and exploiting the synergy between their “strategic 
assets” (Josefy et al., 2015; Markides & Williamson, 1994). Through related 
diversification, a firm can expand and create new strategic assets more rapidly and at a 
lower cost than rivals who are not diversified across related businesses, which also 
constitutes a competitive advantage of large organizations (Markides & Williamson, 
1994).  
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3.1.2.3 Legitimacy and Status 
Having a large size may assist the focal organization in establishing legitimacy among 
external stakeholders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). However, the result may be confounded 
by age because size is highly correlated with age (Baum & Oliver, 1991). Meanwhile, as 
firms age, they may have more opportunities to take actions that help to establish 
legitimacy among external stakeholders. 
Moreover, large firms may enjoy an advantage in technical legitimacy (Ruef & Scott, 
1998) and reputation (Staw & Epstein, 2000). Investigating the antecedents of the 
technical legitimacy of 143 hospital organizations over a 46-year period, Ruef and Scott 
(1998) found that a larger size is positively associated with technical legitimacy. Size was 
treated by the latter as a proxy for the ability of an organization to acquire the latest 
diagnostic and medical resources to achieve technical supremacy.  
In addition, larger firms are more visible than their smaller counterparts. As a result, they 
may receive more attention from external stakeholders such as media and non-
governmental organizations (Waddock & Graves, 1997). Nonetheless, they may receive 
more media scrutiny and lower levels of media support (Deephouse, 1996).  
3.1.2.4 Market Power 
Compared with smaller firms, larger firms may have greater market power (Josefy et al., 
2015). They also tend to possess more market share and can force their suppliers and 
customers to become price takers (Dobrev & Carroll, 2003).  
Larger firms enjoy advantages in terms of resources, economies of scale and scope, 
legitimacy, and market power. Nonetheless, there are also liabilities associated with 
largeness, such as increased bureaucracy, inertia/instability, and scrutiny (Josefy et al., 
2015). Meanwhile, smaller firms also enjoy certain advantages, as described by 
Schumacher (1974): “small is beautiful.”  
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3.1.3 Small Is Beautiful 
Small firms have resources and capabilities that differ from those of larger firms. Unlike 
their larger counterparts, which may face constraints from bureaucracy and 
organizational inertia, small firms are nimbler and more flexible. They may be better 
positioned to exploit certain opportunities, such as a growing industry niche (Dean, 
Brown, & Bamford, 1998).  
Meanwhile, small firms may also possess resources for innovation that differ from those 
of larger firms (King, Covin, & Hegarty, 2003). Although larger firms possess slack 
resources that are conducive to innovation, smaller firms are less constrained by 
organizational bureaucracy and may earn greater returns on their R&D investment 
(Josefy et al., 2015). Individuals are often more creative in small firms, as they exercise 
greater control over their situational factors (Glynn, 1996). Small firms are also more 
likely to introduce radical innovation, as they are less constrained by the status quo. 
Although small firms are more flexible and innovative, they often lack resources to 
effectively commercialize innovation and frequently seek partnership with larger firms 
(Josefy et al., 2015).  
Moreover, compared to their larger counterparts, who are constrained by structural 
inertia, small firms are more likely to quickly engage in competitive behavior and execute 
strategic changes (Chen & Hambrick, 1995).  
In addition, larger firms are generally more influential than their smaller counterparts. For 
instance, larger firms have a greater ability to diffuse innovation (Josefy et al., 2015). 
However, in certain circumstances, smaller firms can exert a disproportionate influence. 
For example, when the value of adopting certain organizational practices, such as 
ISO9000 quality management standards, increases with organizational size, smaller 
adopters have a greater influence than their larger counterparts over subsequent adoption 
by other organizations (Terlaak & King, 2007). 
Finally, with the advancement of new technology, it is easier for a small firm to raise 
capital through crowdfunding (Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 2013) because 
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traditional sources of funding give preference to larger firms (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). 
Meanwhile, new technology has also made it easier for small firms to establish 
legitimacy through social media. For example, small firms can post campaigns, videos, 
and promotions on social media platforms such as Instagram or Facebook, which can go 
viral and help the firms obtain support from celebrities or customers (Josefy et al., 2015). 
3.1.4 Subsidiary Size and Exit 
This section first reviews the literature on size and survival, then examines the literature 
on subsidiary size and survival in international business.  
3.1.4.1 Size and Exit 
As explained in previous sections, larger firms enjoy several advantages over small firms 
in terms of access to resources and economies of scale and scope, which helps them 
survive longer than their smaller counterparts. Larger firms in their initial years survive 
longer than their smaller counterparts and this effect is almost permanent, as 
demonstrated by Geroski, Mata, and Portugal (2010) in a large sample of 118,070 new 
start-up firms from 1983–1993 in Portugal. Meanwhile, larger firms often receive 
favorable regulatory treatment due to their importance to a national economy, i.e., “too 
big to fail” (Dobrev & Carroll, 2003), as evidenced by the government bailouts of large 
financial institutions and large manufacturers by the U.S. government in the 2008 
financial crisis (Lien & Klein, 2013). 
Meanwhile, small firms also have a survival advantage in industry segments where they 
are too small to be profitably exploited by large organizations (Dobrev, 2000). Dobrev 
and Carroll (2003), in studying automobile manufacturers in Britain, France, Germany, 
and the United States from 1885 to 1981, found that firms at both ends of the relative size 
spectrum enjoyed a survival advantage. The results on small firms are also supported by 
separate studies. Agarwal and Audretsch (2001) found that the likelihood of survival for 
small firms was generally lower than for their larger counterparts. However, the same 
relationship does not hold for mature stages of the product lifecycle (Agarwal, Sarkar, & 
Echambadi, 2002) or technology-intensive products because small players can 
successfully fill a strategic niche.  
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3.1.4.2 Subsidiary Size and Exit 
The size of a subsidiary is a proxy for the tangible and intangible resources available to it 
(Penrose, 1995; Johnston & Menguc, 2007). There are few empirical studies using 
subsidiary size as the main predictor. One of the few exceptions is Johnston and Menguc 
(2007), who examined the relationship between subsidiary size and the level of 
subsidiary autonomy and found a quadratic inverted U-shaped relationship. 
There is even less empirical research on the relationship between subsidiary size and exit. 
Delios and Ensign (2000) investigated Japanese investment in Canada, and subsidiary 
size was one of the main predictors. Subsidiary size measured by the log of capital 
invested was negatively associated with the likelihood of exit. In most empirical studies 
on subsidiary exit, subsidiary size was added as a control variable (e.g., Getachew & 
Beamish, 2017). Our study addresses this empirical gap by systematically investigating 
the relationship between subsidiary size and survival, with a particular focus on small 
subsidiaries. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
3.2.1 Main Effect of Subsidiary Size 
MNEs have access to and use resources such as financial capital, managerial talent, and 
knowledge (Johnston & Menguc, 2007). Hedlund (1981) suggested that a large 
subsidiary has greater resources than a small subsidiary, which was supported empirically 
(Prahalad & Doz, 1981). Because there is a negative association between resources and 
rate of exit (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Baum & Oliver, 1991; Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 
1983), size is thought to have a negative effect on mortality. Hence, we have the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Smaller subsidiaries have a higher exit rate than larger ones. 
In the following section, four contingency factors are proposed to moderate the main 
effect. The first contingency factor is the type of resource (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
owned by small subsidiaries, where “centers of importance” command higher status in 
the MNE network. The second factor is vertical versus horizontal FDI (Slangen & 
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Beugelsdijk, 2010). The third factor is being in a human capital-intensive industry (Silk 
& Berndt, 1993), where larger firms do not necessarily enjoy the cost-saving advantages 
of economies of scale and scope. The fourth factor is environmental factors at the 
national level that attenuate the liability of smallness (Stinchcombe, 1965). 
3.2.2 Centers of Importance 
There are four main types of MNE activity, i.e., natural resource seekers, market seekers, 
efficiency seekers, and strategic asset or capability seekers (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
In addition, there are other motives for MNE activity, such as escape investments, 
support investments, and passive investments. This chapter focuses on support 
investments, where the very purpose of subsidiaries is to support the MNE network of 
which they are part (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  
Subsidiaries that are set up for support investments are often cost centers instead of being 
self-contained profit centers. They incur costs and create benefits for the rest of the MNE 
network. Most of these support investments are trade- and finance-related investments of 
MNEs, and aim to facilitate the export of goods and the purchase of raw materials from 
other companies. These activities are often the first step in setting up market- or resource-
seeking production facilities (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Others are regional 
headquarters with various functions, such as coordinating the activities of operating units 
and collecting marketing and financial information for the parent firm. They often act as 
a “listening and monitoring arm” of the parent firm (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
Borrowing from the concept of “centers of excellence” (Frost, Birkinshaw, & Ensign, 
2002), we coin the term “centers of importance” to describe these support investments. 
We define a “center of importance” as a non-regular organizational unit with a set of 
resources and capabilities serving the functioning of the MNE network as a whole. These 
“centers of importance” include subsidiaries for support investments, new business 
development, and strategic asset-seeking activities. As argued by orchestration theory, 
not all subsidiaries are equally important within an MNE network (Pitelis & Teece, 
2018). Because centers of importance own resources that are strategically important to 
the MNE network, they are likely to command a higher status compared with regular 
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subsidiaries (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). As a result, the MNE parent firms are likely to 
devote more attention and resources (Hedlund, 1981) to these subsidiaries. Meanwhile, as 
these centers are designed as cost centers, their profitability may not be relevant to their 
survival.  
Small subsidiaries established for support function purposes own resources critical to the 
MNE network. MNE parent firms are likely to devote more attention to these affiliates 
and incur more costs for their survival. As a result, they have a lower mortality rate than 
small affiliates without such functions because they have these extra resources and 
attention from MNE parent firms. Hence, we put forward the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Small subsidiaries designed as “centers of importance” have a 
lower exit rate compared with subsidiaries established for other purposes. 
3.2.3 Vertical versus Horizontal FDI 
Exploratory studies on the divestment decisions of big firms suggest that small units that 
do not enjoy synergy with other units are more likely to be divested (Duhaime & Baird, 
1987). In addition to classifying FDI along the main typologies of investment purposes, 
these investments can also be categorized along two other dimensions: vertical 
investment and horizontal investment (Beugelsdijk, Smeets, & Zwinkels, 2008; Caves, 
2007; Kobrin, 1976; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010; Zaheer, 1995). Horizontal 
investments are standalone affiliates with the main purpose of local market seeking. They 
often sell products to unaffiliated customers and perform all value chain activities starting 
from raw material procurement to production and sales (Caves, 2007; Zaheer, 1995). 
They may operate rather independently of their parent firms and sister subsidiaries and 
are well embedded in their local environment (Kobrin, 1976; Prahalad & Doz, 1987).  
On the other hand, vertical investments often perform part of the value chain activity and 
sell their output to affiliated subsidiaries for further processing or final sales (Caves, 
2007; Zaheer, 1995). They are part of the interlinked MNE network and seek to take 
advantage of inter-country differences in terms of natural resources and inexpensive labor 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Kobrin, 1991; Nachum & Zaheer, 2005). Because vertical 
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affiliates are often supplied by sister subsidiaries instead of local suppliers and because 
they sell their output to affiliated rather than unaffiliated customers, they are more tightly 
integrated with the rest of the MNE network than horizontal affiliates (Prahalad & Doz, 
1987).  
Because small subsidiaries that are set up for the purpose of vertical FDI are more tightly 
integrated with the MNE network than standalone horizontal FDI, we expect that small 
vertical subsidiaries have greater synergy with the rest of the MNE network and are less 
likely to be divested. Hence, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Small vertical subsidiaries have a lower exit rate than small 
horizontal subsidiaries. 
3.2.4 Human Capital-Intensive Industry 
As discussed earlier, larger firms enjoy economies of scale and scope over smaller firms, 
thus entailing a cost advantage in traditional labor-intensive industries such as 
manufacturing (Josefy et al., 2015). In traditional industries, small firms partially 
overcome the liability of smallness (and the frequently high exit rate) by occupying a 
strategic niche (Agarwal & Audretsch, 2001; Agarwal et al., 2002). However, in human 
capital-intensive industries where clients receive professional services, such as law, 
consulting, advertising, and accounting, both very large and very small firms persist (von 
Nordenflycht, 2011). The following discussion is limited to why very small firms exist 
and persist in human capital-intensive industries.  
First, small firms in those industries do not necessarily suffer a cost disadvantage because 
there is a very low threshold for scale economies. For example, in the advertising 
industry, $3 million or $4 million in annual revenue is enough to achieve economies of 
scale (Silk & Berndt, 1993). Second, even if operating at 50% below that threshold, the 
cost disadvantage incurred is less than 5% (Silk & Berndt, 1995). Third, most firms in 
those industries operate across a wide scope, which has made economies of scope an 
industry norm, rather than an exception enjoyed only by large firms (Silk & Berndt, 
1995).  
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As a result, there is less of a liability of smallness (hence, a lower exit rate) in human 
capital-intensive industries compared with small firms in traditional industries. Hence, we 
hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 4: Small subsidiaries in human capital-intensive industries have a 
lower exit rate compared with small subsidiaries in other industries. 
3.2.5 Developed versus Developing Countries  
The FDI literature suggests that developed countries and developing countries differ 
significantly in terms of both institutional environments and macroeconomic conditions 
(Beamish, 1985; 1993; Getachew & Beamish, 2017). In general, developed countries 
have better institutional support and mature market infrastructure, while developing 
countries are characterized by weak institutional support and high market growth 
potential.  
First, in terms of the institutional environment, developed countries provide stronger 
property rights protection and law enforcement, high levels of general literacy, and a 
mature market economy infrastructure (Makino et al., 2004). In contrast, developing 
countries are characterized by “institutional voids” (Santangelo & Meyer, 2011) where 
market-supporting institutions are weak (Mair & Marti, 2009) or absent. Developing 
countries also suffer from “institutional instability” due to sudden changes of government 
(Zoogah, Peng, & Woldu, 2015) or war and conflict (Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013; 
2017). Empirical studies suggest that foreign subsidiaries have a higher exit rate from 
developing countries such as African nations than their counterparts in developed 
countries such as OECD nations (e.g., Getachew & Beamish, 2017). 
Second, macroeconomic conditions affect the likelihood of firm survival for several 
reasons (Geroski et al., 2010). First, under unfavorable macroeconomic conditions, firms 
have pessimistic perceptions of future economic development and are more likely to exit 
than during economic booms. Second, during economic recessions, many firms face cash 
constraints and struggle to secure financial resources even if they intend to stay in 
business. Using the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate as a proxy for a favorable 
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macroeconomic environment, Geroski et al. (2010) found a negative association between 
GDP growth rate and firm exit. 
Moreover, during economic recessions, new and small firms are more likely to exit than 
their larger counterparts because the problem of cash constraints is more severe for them 
than for established firms (Cabral & Mata, 2003). New and small firms have less time to 
establish legitimacy and secure financial resources (Diamond, 1989). 
Although developing countries have higher economic growth potential, general 
macroeconomic conditions are better in developed countries than in developing countries. 
In addition, developed countries have better fiscal policies than developing ones. As a 
result, small subsidiaries are less likely to go out of business, because it is also much 
easier for them to access financial resources due to favorable fiscal policies. As a result, 
MNE parent firms are less likely to divest small subsidiaries in developed countries than 
in developing countries. Thus, we put forward the next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Small subsidiaries in developed countries have a lower exit rate than 
their counterparts in developing countries. 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Data and Sample 
We used the Toyo Keizai dataset, which covers Japanese investment from 1991 to 2017. 
The Toyo Keizai annually surveys general managers of all Japanese subsidiaries in which 
a parent firm is listed on a major stock exchange in Japan. Although the survey is 
exhaustive of all overseas investment of Japanese parent firms that respond to the annual 
survey, it is estimated that the Toyo Keizai dataset’s coverage is close to only 40% of all 
Japanese FDI (Delios & Ensign, 2000). The Toyo Keizai dataset has been used in more 
than 120 high-quality journal publications. It covers 56,193 Japanese overseas 
subsidiaries in 164 countries by 8,318 Japanese parent firms. 
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3.3.2 Measures 
3.3.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the exit rate of an overseas subsidiary. A dummy variable is 
used to indicate the exit status of a subsidiary in each year. This variable is coded as 1 if a 
subsidiary exited from the database and 0 otherwise. 
3.3.2.2 Independent Variables 
The main independent variable is a subsidiary’s size. It is measured by the number of 
employees in each subsidiary. Unlike previous studies that log transform the number to 
achieve a normal distribution of the variable (e.g., Getachew & Beamish, 2017), we 
categorize this variable so that those subsidiaries with zero employees can still be 
included in our analysis. A preliminary descriptive analysis shows that 40 is the median 
number of employees, while 234 is the mean number of employees. Moreover, 20 has 
been used as the cut-off point for firms with a small number of employees, a group that 
has been routinely excluded from data analysis in the IB literature (Beamish & Inkpen, 
1998). In addition, we intend to gain a nuanced understanding of small subsidiaries with 
fewer than 20 employees, and thus we further divided subsidiaries in this category. 
Taking all these factors into consideration, we divided the subsidiaries into seven 
categories, i.e., (1) zero employees; (2) between 1 and 5 employees; (3) between 6 and 10 
employees; (4) between 11 and 19 employees; (5) between 20 and 40 employees; (6) 
between 41 and 234 employees; and (7) 235 or more employees. As shown in Table 12, 
the largest category belongs to those with between 41 and 234 employees (31%), while 
around 10% subsidiaries have zero employees; 20% of subsidiaries have between 1 and 5 
employees; 16% of subsidiaries have between 6 and 10 employees; another 16% of 
subsidiaries have between 11 and 19 employees; 20% of subsidiaries have between 20 
and 40 employees; and 17% of subsidiaries have 235 or more employees.18.   
 
18 As the number of employees of a particular subsidiary changes, the subsidiary can fall into multiple 
categories. As a result, the percentages of the numbers of subsidiaries add up to more than 100%. 
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Four contingency factors were also identified in hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5. The first factor 
is a subsidiary’s status of “center of importance.” As discussed previously, “centers of 
importance” include support investments, new business development, and strategic asset 
seeking. Those subsidiaries with support investment motives such as “financing and 
currency hedging,” “information gathering,” and “control business of the area” are coded 
as 1. Meanwhile, those with the investment motive of “new business development” or 
“research and development” are also coded as 1. If a subsidiary has none of the 
abovementioned investment motives, it is coded as 0.  
Table 12: Number of subsidiary-years and subsidiaries in each cell 
Category No. of 
subsidiary-years 
(%) No. of 
subsidiaries 
(%)19 
Zero employees 22,261 4.00 5,790 10.30 
1–5 employees 52,315 9.39 10,946 19.48 
6–10 employees 37,721 6.77 9,144 16.27 
11–19 employees 38,526 6.91 9,087 16.17 
20–40 employees 54,930 9.86 11,389 20.27 
41–234 employees 123,283 22.13 17,176 30.57 
235 or more 
employees 
77,246 13.86 9,276 16.51 
Missing 150,897 27.08 30,844 54.89 
Total 557,179 100.00 56,193 100.00 
 
Second, those subsidiaries with the investment purpose of “natural resources and 
materials” are coded as 1 for “vertical investment” and 0 otherwise.  
Third, “human capital-intensive industry” is indicated by the industry sector of the 
subsidiary. Those in the industry sectors of “finance, insurance and real estate,” 
 
19 As the number of employees of a particular subsidiary changes, the subsidiary can fall into multiple 
categories. As a result, the percentages of the numbers of subsidiaries add up to more than 100%. The 
number of subsidiaries entries add up to more than 56,193. 
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“investment company,” “retail,” “services,” or “wholesale trade” are coded as 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
Fourth, we defined developed countries versus developing countries using the country 
classification of the United Nations (Makino et al., 2004). This broadly defined countries 
as falling under three categories: developed economies, developing economies, and least 
developed countries. Because the sample size of the least developed countries is 
conspicuously small (only accounting for 0.5% of all subsidiaries), we combined the 
categories of developing economies and least developed countries. A country is coded as 
1 if it is a developed country and 0 otherwise. 
3.3.2.3 Control Variables 
To rule out other potential explanations, we controlled for several variables at the 
subsidiary, parent firm, and country levels. First, at the subsidiary level, we controlled for 
two variables that have been found to be theoretically related to subsidiary exit. We 
controlled for subsidiary age, as younger firms have a higher exit rate than their older 
counterparts (Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Carroll & Delacroix, 1982). We also 
controlled for the ownership level of the parent firm, as a higher ownership level is 
associated with a lower exit rate (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004; Getachew & Beamish, 
2017). This is operationalized by the first Japanese parent firm’s ownership level. 
Second, at the parent firm level, we controlled for the number of Japanese parents. As 
multiple parent firm companies will lead to managerial complexity, which improves exit 
(Makino & Beamish, 1998). We also controlled for parent firm size, by the log 
transformation of its net sales.  
 Third, at the country level, we controlled for the GDP growth rates of the host countries. 
Higher GDP growth in a host society is negatively correlated with subsidiary survival 
rates (Thomas, Eden, Hitt, & Miller, 2007). We obtained these data from the World 
Development Indicators. We also controlled for the cultural distance between the host 
country and home country, as previous studies have found that it positively affects 
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subsidiary mortality (Barkema et al., 1997; Zeng et al., 2013). This variable is measured 
by the cultural distance index developed by Kogut and Singh (1988).  
3.3.3 Model Specifications 
With regard to the statistical model, we used event history analysis (EHA) to examine the 
hazard of the exit of a subsidiary. A Cox proportional hazards model was applied with 
time-varying variables (Cox & Oakes, 1984). “Robust” and “cluster” STATA procedures 
were used to estimate a robust coefficient covariance matrix and control for possible 
dependence among FDI initiated by the same MNE. 
3.4  Analysis and Results 
The descriptive statistics and correlations among all variables are provided in Table 13. 
On average, the exit rate is 5%. About 12% of all subsidiaries command the status of 
“center of importance.” Between 1.5 and 2% of all subsidiaries are engaged in vertical 
investment. About 50% of subsidiaries are in a human capital-intensive industry, and 
37% of subsidiaries are limited to developed countries.  
Tables 14 to 18 present the results of our analysis. First, Table 14 shows the result of the 
main hypothesis, i.e., the effect of subsidiary size on exit. The detailed results are as 
follows. Compared with the reference category, i.e., 235 employees or more, those 
subsidiaries with zero employees are 7.6 times more likely to exit. Those with between 1 
and 5 employees are 5.0 times more likely to exit. Those with between 6 and 10 
employees are 3.3 times more likely to exit. Those with between 10 and 19 employees 
are 2.4 times more likely to exit. Those with between 20 and 40 employees are 2.2 times 
more likely to exit. Those with between 41 and 234 employees are 1.5 times more likely 
to exit. Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported.   
Our second hypothesis presents a moderating effect of “centers of importance” on the 
relationship between subsidiary size and subsidiary exit. Table 15 provides useful 
estimates in testing this prediction. We find that those small subsidiaries with a number 
of employees between 6 and 40 have a significantly lower exit rate if they have been 
assigned the role of “center of importance.” Thus, hypothesis 2 is supported.  
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Table 16 presents the results for a test of H3, which predicts a negative moderating effect 
of vertical investment on the relationship between subsidiary size and exit. The signs of 
moderating coefficients are all negative when the investment motive of natural resource 
seeking is used as a proxy for vertical investment. Those small subsidiaries with between 
1 and 5 employees have a significantly lower hazard ratio—that is, 2.2 versus 5.0.  
Hypothesis 4 suggests that small subsidiaries in human capital-intensive industries have a 
lower exit rate. Table 17 presents the results. The signs of all moderating coefficients are 
negative and significant. Small subsidiaries in all size categories have a lower exit rate if 
they are in a human capital-intensive industry. Thus, hypothesis 4 is fully supported.  
Finally, Table 18 shows the moderating effect of being a developed country versus a 
developing country. In general, the signs of the coefficients of the interaction terms are 
positive and not significant, which means that there is no significant difference in terms 
of the exit rate for small subsidiaries. However, only those subsidiaries with zero 
employees have a significantly lower exit rate when they are located in a developed 
country (5.8 versus 10.2). Thus, hypothesis 5 is marginally supported.  
Last, all control variables are significant predictors of subsidiary mortality, except for 
GDP growth rate. As expected, subsidiary age and the first Japanese parent firm’s 
ownership level have a significantly negative impact on the subsidiary exit rate. 
However, the number of Japanese parent firms lowers the exit rate and the size of the 
MNE improves the exit rate. With regard to the variable of cultural distance, it is negative 
and significant. MNEs tend to exercise greater ownership control when there is more 
cultural distance between the host and home countries (Anand & Delois, 1997), which 
lowers the exit rate of subsidiaries.  
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Table 13: Mean and correlation matrix 
 Mean 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Exit 0.05 1.00           
2 Center of 
importance 
0.12 −0.01 1.00          
3 Vertical 
investments  
0.02 0.00 0.08 1.00         
4 Human 
capital-
intensive 
industry 
0.50 0.03 0.11 −0.07 1.00        
5 Developed 
country 
0.37 0.04 0.08 −0.01 0.23 1.00       
6 Subsidiary 
age 
14.00 −0.02 −0.04 −0.00 0.03 0.14 1.00      
7 First 
Japanese 
parent 
ownership 
level 
60.10 −0.05 0.16 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.01 1.00     
8 Number of 
Japanese 
parents 
1.25 −0.01 0.02 0.05 −0.15 −0.12 −0.05 −0.13 1.00    
9 Parent firm 
size 
12.94 0.06 −0.16 −0.02 0.05 0.07 0.10 −0.19 0.05 1.00   
10 Cultural 
distance 
3.32 −0.01 0.02 −0.00 −0.01 −0.19 −0.04 0.07 0.02 −0.03 1.00  
11 GDP 
growth rate 
4.46 −0.02 −0.05 0.01 −0.19 −0.48 −0.21 0.01 0.06 −0.06 0.19 1.00 
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Table 14: Main effect of subsidiary size on survival 
 
Hazard ratio  
Zero employees 7.6*** 
1–5 employees 5.0*** 
6–10 employees 3.3*** 
11–19 employees  2.4*** 
20–40 employees 2.2*** 
41–234 employees  1.5*** 
Reference category: 235 or more employees 
 
Control variable  
Subsidiary age 0.8*** 
First Japanese parent ownership level 1.0*** 
Number of Japanese parents 0.9*** 
Parent firm size 1.2*** 
Cultural distance 1.0** 
GDP growth rate 1.0 
Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Table 15: Moderating effect of “center of importance” on subsidiary survival 
Subsidiary size 
Hazard ratio 
(center of 
importance 
sample) 
Hazard ratio 
(non-center of 
importance 
sample) 
Coefficient of 
interaction 
term 
Zero employees 6.3 7.3 −0.17 
1–5 employees 3.4 4.9 −0.31 
6–10 employees 1.9 3.4 −0.49* 
11–19 employees 1.3 2.4 −0.58** 
20–40 employees 1.2 2.2 −0.54** 
41–234 employees 1.1 1.5 −0.27 
Reference category: 235 or more 
employees 
1 1  
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05; control variables included 
 
 
Table 16: Moderating effect of vertical investment on subsidiary survival 
Subsidiary size 
Hazard ratio 
(vertical 
investment 
sample) 
Hazard ratio 
(non-vertical 
investment 
sample) 
Coefficient 
of 
interaction 
term 
Zero employees 5.3 7.6 −0.29 
1–5 employees 2.2 5.0 −0.72* 
6–10 employees 2.4 3.3 −0.21 
11–19 employees 1.0 2.4 −0.75 
20–40 employees 1.9 2.1 −0.14 
41–234 employees 1.5 1.4  0.09 
Reference category: 235 or more 
employees 
1 1  
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05; control variables included 
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Table 17: Moderating effect of human capital-intensive industry on subsidiary 
survival 
Subsidiary size 
Hazard ratio 
(human capital-
intensive 
industry sample) 
Hazard ratio 
(non-human-
capital-intensive 
industry sample) 
Coefficient 
of 
interaction 
term 
Zero employees 5.6 9.4 −0.40* 
1–5 employees 3.7 5.9 −0.32* 
6–10 employees 2.4 4.3 −0.42** 
11–19 employees 1.7 3.2 −0.51** 
20–40 employees 1.5 2.8 −0.51** 
41–234 employees 1.1 1.6 −0.30* 
Reference category: 235 or 
more employees 
1 1  
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05; control variables included 
 
Table 18: Moderating effect of country development stage on subsidiary survival 
Subsidiary size 
Hazard ratio 
(developed 
country sample) 
Hazard ratio 
(developing 
country sample) 
Coefficient of 
interaction 
term 
Zero employees 5.8 10.2 −0.44** 
1–5 employees 4.2 5.4 −0.07 
6–10 employees 3.1 3.3  0.06 
11–19 employees 2.5 2.2  0.22 
20–40 employees 2.2 2.1  0.15 
41–234 employees 1.6 1.3  0.10 
Reference category: 235 or 
more employees 
1 1  
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05; control variables included 
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3.5 Discussion  
 This study was motivated by our intention to contribute to understanding the conditions 
under which small-employment subsidiaries may have a better survival outcome. 
Extending the literature on the liability of smallness (Aldrich & Auster, 1986), we 
examined the effect of subsidiary size on survival. Using a sample of Japanese overseas 
FDI, we offer a nuanced picture of the effect, i.e., smaller subsidiaries have a higher exit 
rate than larger ones. We also quantified the effect.  
Furthermore, we found that the liability of smallness is conditional upon the specific roles 
of the subsidiary, industry features, and country-level characteristics. Specifically, we 
found that subsidiaries that have been assigned the role of center of importance have a 
lower exit rate than their counterparts of a similar size without such a role. This provides 
additional empirical support to orchestration theory’s argument that an MNE operates 
like an integrated entity, instead of being a set of isolated and separable elements (Pitelis 
& Teere, 2018).  
Moreover, we found that small subsidiaries with the function of vertical investment have 
a lower exit rate than their counterparts without such a function, especially when the 
subsidiary is extremely small (0–5 employees). Being tightly integrated within the MNE 
network improves the survival chances of small subsidiaries. This result differs from 
Getachew and Beamish’s (2017) study on the moderating effect of horizontal investment 
on the relationship between entry into Africa and exit. They found that market-seeking 
FDI has a better survival outcome than horizontal FDI because it is more tightly 
integrated with the local environment, including suppliers and customers. This study 
offers a new perspective on the conditions under which vertical investment has a better 
chance of survival.   
In addition, we identified the third contingency factor of human capital-intensive 
industries. This study provides additional empirical evidence that being small is not much 
of a liability when the subsidiary is in such human capital-intensive industries as 
“finance, insurance and real estate,” “retail,” “service,” “wholesale,” or “investment 
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companies.” As these industries have a low threshold for scale economies (Silk & Berndt, 
1993; 1995), small subsidiaries in them have a lower exit rate compared with their 
counterparts of a similar size in other industries.  
Finally, this study provides marginal support to the notion that being located in a 
developed country lowers the exit rate, which is different from Getachew and Beamish’s 
(2017) argument that being located in Africa increases the exit rate. Only those 
subsidiaries with zero employees have a significantly lower exit rate in developed 
countries. One explanation is that some subsidiaries are set up as financial instruments, 
serving special purposes. Other than that, there is no significant difference in terms of 
exit rate for subsidiaries of similar sizes.  
3.6 Limitations and Directions for Future Studies  
This study is not without limitations. First, because of data constraints, the results are 
based on Japanese FDI. Investment from other countries may differ. Second, results are 
based on a quantitative survey of subsidiary managers. Additional qualitative studies 
from the MNE parent firm level may provide insights on contingency patterns.  
Future directions of study include investigating other contingency factors for the survival 
of small-employment subsidiaries. Meanwhile, researchers should investigate 
subsidiaries with zero employees. The finance literature has firmly established that there 
are special purpose vehicles (SPVs) that are “essentially robot firms that have no 
employees, make no substantive economic decisions, have no physical location, cannot 
go bankrupt” (Gorton & Souleles, 2007: 550). As a result, there is a category of zero-
employee subsidiaries. In the analysis of zero-employee subsidiaries in the TK dataset, 
we included all observations with the record of zero in a particular year as a proxy of 
zero-employee subsidiaries. However, this practice may accidentally include missing 
values for this variable in the dataset. Future analysis can mitigate this problem by jointly 
considering the number of employees over the life cycle of the subsidiary, the investment 
motive as well as the industry of the subsidiary so as to cross-check whether it is a 
missing value. 
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Finally, those subsidiaries with extremely large sizes are lumped together with other 
subsidiaries of 235 or more employees. It might be worthwhile to treat those extremely 
large subsidiaries as a special category and investigate their key features.  
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Chapter 4  
4 Crisis Response by MNEs: The 2008 Consumer 
Confidence Crisis in China 
4.1 Introduction 
How do multinational enterprises react when one of their overseas markets is affected by 
a domestic consumer confidence crisis? Theoretically, three considerations should affect 
their response. First, foreign-owned companies and foreign brands may be better able to 
disassociate themselves from the sources of the consumer confidence crisis, and hence 
they face opportunities to increase their market share vis-à-vis domestic competitors. 
Second, foreign owners may become more concerned about the standards of operations 
within their own operations: the confidence crisis will lead to greater scrutiny of what 
firms actually do in their operations. To this challenge, they are likely to respond with a 
stronger focus on organizational control and compliance with the MNE’s quality 
assurance processes. Third, MNEs may be concerned that an association with the industry 
and country of the crisis may affect their global reputation. In consequence, they may 
want to exit the country, especially if they are unable to ensure compliance with their 
quality assurance processes.  
Based on these three considerations, we explore the impact of a consumer confidence 
crisis on the strategies of foreign investors with respect to entry, exit, and ownership 
change. Specifically, we investigate how a consumer confidence crisis influences a) 
foreign entry, b) foreign exit, and c) equity stakes held by foreign investors, with a 
special focus on different responses in manufacturing and services. Moreover, we 
investigate how changes in equity stakes vary across ownership categories (i.e., WOS, 
majority equity, and minority equity).  
In developing our hypotheses and empirical tests, we apply and extend several lines of 
theory in international business. First, we draw on the theoretical lens of transaction cost 
economics (TCE) (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Hennart, 1982), especially literature 
concerned with the governance of MNEs (e.g., Chen, Paik, & Park, 2010; Yan & Gray, 
2001). Second, we draw on institutional theory, especially the concepts of legitimacy and 
132 
 
reputation (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Rao, 1994), to explain the relative advantages of 
foreign and local firms facing a crisis. In doing so, we also draw on the concept of 
country of origin, which stipulates that an investor’s national origin affects their 
perception by consumers (e.g., Knight, Holdsworth, & Mather, 2007; Usunier, 2006; 
Verlegh, 2007; Zhou & Hui, 2003). Contrary to other recent studies in China (e.g., Zhang 
& Luo, 2013; Zhao, Park, & Zhou, 2014), we argue that foreign firms may actually face 
enhanced legitimacy as a result of the crisis.  
We empirically test hypotheses about the impact of a consumer confidence crisis on the 
food sector—an industry that is highly culturally embedded and therefore tends to lead to 
consumer preferences for domestically sourced products (Usunier, 2006; Yasuda, 2015). 
At the same time, consumers have concerns about violations of health and safety 
standards in food products because any such violations can directly impact their personal 
health. Such health concerns can compensate for consumer ethnocentrism and provide 
opportunities for foreign investors. Our hypotheses focus on the differences in responses 
at the time of a consumer confidence crisis with respect to the difference between 
investors in the food sector and foreign investors in general, with an emphasis on the 
manufacturing and service segments.  
For the empirical context, we chose the baby formula milk scandal that hit China in 2008. 
This scandal triggered increasing awareness among Chinese consumers that despite 
impressive economic growth and other achievements, product safety—and food safety in 
particular—was still a major concern in China (Beamish & Bapuji, 2008; Luo, 2008; Wu 
& Chen, 2013). We chose a single-host, single-home study design to eliminate country-
level variations affecting our results.  
Using a large sample of Japanese MNEs in China with 79,528 subsidiary-year 
observations, our results show that the crisis triggered more foreign entries in the crisis 
sector compared to non-crisis sectors, especially in the service segment. At the same 
time, the crisis also triggered fewer foreign exits, especially in the manufacturing 
segment. With regard to existing operations, MNEs lowered their equity control to reduce 
their exposure to risk. Moreover, MNEs of different equity positions (i.e., WOS, 
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majority, and minority) were under varying levels of partner opportunism and 
reputational risk. As a result, majority owners were more likely to increase their 
ownership level to ensure quality control than minority owners. Majority owners were 
also more likely to disassociate from the reputational risk through divestment, compared 
with WOS and minority owners.   
The present research makes at least three contributions to the literature. First, it 
contributes to TCE by extending the theoretical argument about the relationship between 
external uncertainty and organization control. It empirically shows that MNEs are likely 
to lower their equity control to reduce their exposure to risk in a post-entry crisis setting. 
Moreover, it introduces the concepts of reputational risk and an MNE’s equity position in 
examining the relationship between behavioral uncertainty (i.e., partner opportunism) and 
organizational control. We argue that majority owners, compared with WOS and 
minority owners, are at high levels of both operational and reputational risk. As a result, 
they are more likely to increase their equity control or divest. To our knowledge, this is 
the first study to introduce the concept of an MNE’s equity position in examining 
behavioral uncertainty.  
Second, our study extends Kostova and Zaheer’s (1999) argument that the illegitimacy of 
local firms provides non-local firms with an initial level of legitimacy in their entry and 
exit decisions. Integrating the country-of-origin literature, which highlights the trade-offs 
between symbolic value (Zhou & Hui, 2003) and perceived quality (Knight, Holdsworth, 
& Mather, 2007) in consumer decisions, we argue and show empirically that MNEs are 
more likely to enter and less likely to exit in the crisis sector.  
Third, we contribute to the crisis management literature (Bondy, Pfarrer, Short, & 
Coombs, 2016) as applied in international management (Hasse, 2016; Naidoo, 2010; 
Zhao et al. 2014) by showing that MNEs have a repertoire of strategies to cope with 
industry-wide crises, including entry, exit, lowering equity control, increasing equity 
control, and remaining unchanged.  
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4.2 Research Background   
4.2.1 Consumer Confidence Crisis: Food Safety in China 
Product-harm crises or well-publicized events involving dangerous or defective products 
often lead to the loss of consumer trust and damage to product or brand evaluations (Lei, 
Dawar, & Gurhan-Canli, 2012). In particular, a food safety crisis can go beyond a single 
product or brand and spill over to the entire food industry. Here, we define “consumer 
confidence crisis” as a situation where consumers become more concerned about the 
quality of products, in particular their health, safety and/or environmental features, which 
reduces their preference for buying the product affected by the crisis. Such a crisis arises 
from actual or perceived changes in product features that are of concern to consumers. 
For example, consumers in North America experienced a major confidence crisis with 
respect to toys made in China after reports suggested that these products contained high 
levels of lead. This impacted brands such as Mattel that imported from China, even 
though the primary cause of the problem was design flaws originating with the U.S. 
parent firm (Beamish & Bapuji, 2008).  
The food sector is particular sensitive to consumer confidence. In China, concerns about 
domestic food safety standards were elevated in 2008 after the baby milk scandal broke. 
The melamine-contaminated baby formula scandal was the major event that made 
Chinese consumers think twice before purchasing domestically produced food products. 
In a survey conducted by the Chinese government in 2012, 41% of respondents reported 
that food safety was a “serious problem.” Food safety concerns, inequality, and 
corruption represented three top governance concerns of the Chinese population (Yasuda, 
2015). 
Melamine is a nitrogen-rich chemical compound that was used illegally in milk products 
to create a false appearance of protein content. This food incident led to six infant deaths 
and 52,000 hospitalizations of young children. A further 250,000 children were estimated 
to have suffered mild kidney problems due to intake of melamine-contaminated milk 
products (Wu & Chen, 2013). Moreover, all major producers of milk products were 
involved in the melamine scandal, including local brands such as Sanlu (a China–New 
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Zealand joint venture), Mengniu, Yili, and Yashili and foreign brands such as Nestlé and 
Cadbury (Pei et al., 2011). A survey among Chinese residents in 2011 showed that over 
70% of respondents decided not to purchase milk products produced in China.20 In practice, 
mainland Chinese flocked to Hong Kong to buy baby formula and other milk products, 
which created scarcity among Hong Kong residents. In March 2013, the Hong Kong 
Customs and Excise Department issued a special clause on imports and exports with regard 
to the quantity of baby formula for those departing from Hong Kong.21   The limit was 1.8 
kg in total weight (2 cans). Otherwise, a person would be liable for a fine of up to 
HK$500,00022 and imprisonment of two years.  
In addition to melamine-contaminated milk products, there were also media reports on 
banned cooking oil (Wu & Chen, 2013), pork contaminated with chemicals, and other 
unhealthy ingredients in food products. As a result, Chinese consumers purchased food 
products made in other countries through e-commerce sites such as Taobao.com and 
JD.com.23  
4.2.2 Country of Origin and the Food Business 
“Country of origin” as a theoretical concept was first demonstrated by an experiment 
(Schooler & Wildt, 1968) where two products were exactly the same except for the 
country labels (made in U.S.A. vs. made in Japan). Participants used these country-of-
origin labels as cues for the perceived quality in their evaluation, and they favored 
products made in the United States. Subsequent research has shown that product 
categories also matter when a country-of-origin effect is present. For example, consumers 
 
20 “Domestic Tests Indicate Chinese and Imported Milk Powder Have No Significant Differences,” Sina 
News, February 28, 2011, accessed August 2, 2017, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-02-
28/023022023966.shtml. 
21 “Import and Export (General)(Amendment) Regulation 2013 (with effect from 1 March 2013) - Quantity 
of Powdered Formula for Persons Departing from Hong Kong,” Government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, accessed August 3, 2017, www.customs.gov.hk/en/whats_new/API/index.html. 
22 The exchange rate was C$1 = HK$7.5 in 2013. 
23 Xinhuanet, accessed August 3, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fashion/2015-03/06/c_127543826.html. 
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preferred cars made in Germany, but preferred shoes from Italy and perfume from France 
(Roth & Romeo, 1992). Moreover, most studies find home-country biases in product 
evaluations due to ethnocentrism and national identification, as exemplified by the 
psychological need for self-enhancement (Verlegh, 2007). Studies among consumers in 
the Netherlands and the United States showed that both ethnocentrism and national 
identification positively influenced consumers’ purchasing decisions for domestically 
produced products over foreign-produced products. This relationship was mediated by 
the perceived quality of domestic and foreign products.    
Country of origin has also been shown to be important in China (Bi et al., 2012). In 
particular, with regard to products made in developed Western countries, country of 
origin carries symbolic value as consumers tend to associate Western products with 
status, modernity, and lifestyle (Zhou & Hui, 2003). A survey among Chinese consumers 
on inconspicuous consumption of pork sausages made in Canada found that the symbolic 
value of Canadian food was positively associated with purchasing intention, while the 
perceived quality and utilitarian value had no impact (Zhou & Hui, 2003).  
Why do consumers use country of origin as a cue or signal for perceived quality? There 
are two mechanisms involved, that is, the halo effect and the summary effect (Knight, 
Holdsworth, & Mather, 2007). First, the halo effect originates from a vague concept or 
image of a country that consumers incorporate in their evaluation of products from that 
country. For example, consumers who imagine New Zealand as having clear skies, clean 
water, and pleasant pastures might favorably judge New Zealand fruit and believe New 
Zealand kiwi to compare in quality to Mercedes-Benz cars from Germany (Knight, 
Holdsworth, & Mather, 2007). Second, the summary effect is a phenomenon in which 
consumers make judgements about products based on their perception of quality control 
standards, taste, appearance, and packaging quality. In a qualitative study of professional 
buyers in the food industry, Knight, Holdsworth, and Mather (2007) found that 
professional buyers were risk-averse and that their evaluation of the quality of food 
products was based on their “trust” in the integrity of regulators and suppliers from the 
country of origin. 
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We extend these two lines of argument by analyzing the effects of a consumer confidence 
crisis on enhanced legitimacy for MNEs. A consumer confidence crisis is likely to 
change consumers’ relative preferences for domestically produced food products over 
foreign products. We argue that consumers were less likely to be influenced by home-
country bias due to their lost trust in the integrity of Chinese regulators and suppliers 
after the food crisis. First, Chinese consumers had low confidence in Chinese regulators 
of the food industry. Regulatory interventions by 14 different government agencies 
created major challenges for effective communication and coordination (Wu & Chen, 
2013). Regulatory responsibilities were shared among the Ministry of Health, Ministry of 
Agriculture, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine, the Ministry of Commerce, the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce, and other agencies involved in food production and storage. Due to the 
fragmented regulatory authority, there were serious regulatory gaps, conflicting 
standards, and bureaucratic turf wars among different ministries and all levels of 
government (Yasuda, 2015). As a result, their supervision of food producers was 
ineffective (Wu & Chen, 2013).  
Second, unlike in Western developed countries, where food production supervision was 
carried out during the production process, Chinese food was checked only at the final 
product stage (Pei et al., 2011). As a result, the supervision system was reactive, not 
proactive. In the case of contaminated milk products, melamine was added to fresh milk 
when it was collected from individual farmers, who accounted for 80% of the milk 
supply. The remaining 20% was supplied by self-owned dairy farms of big companies 
through vertical integration of the supply chain. However, there was no quality check or 
product control at this stage of production. To make things worse, Sanlu products were 
exempted from quality checks due to its previous track record of quality, because popular 
brands in China enjoyed quality-check exemptions (Pei et al., 2011).  
Third, in terms of the integrity of producers, there arguably was moral degradation 
among Chinese producers (Luo, 2008). It has been argued that during the Chinese 
economy’s transitional period, Chinese producers experienced a state of lawlessness and 
were profit-driven while engaging in illicit and immoral business practices. Because local 
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Chinese producers were involved in unethical and immoral behavior in the food industry 
on such a large scale, the standards in the food industry became problematic. 
Chinese consumers tend to differentiate not only between domestic and imported brands, 
but also to use three categories: domestically made domestic brands, domestically made 
foreign brands (assumed to have foreign quality control), and imported foreign brands. In 
terms of consumer ethnocentrism, domestically made domestic products are preferred, 
ahead of domestically made foreign brands and imported brands (Bi et al., 2012). In 
terms of quality concerns, however, the preferences are reversed, with imported products 
being preferred over domestically made foreign brands and local brands (Chang & Park, 
2012). We suggest that the consumer confidence crisis resulted in a shift from consumer 
ethnocentrism to consumer quality concerns, and hence an increased preference for 
foreign over local products. Below, we analyze how foreign investors responded to such 
a crisis.  
4.3 Hypothesis Development  
4.3.1 FDI in Manufacturing and Services  
In exploring the responses of foreign investors to a consumer confidence crisis, we are 
particularly interested in explaining how such responses vary between the manufacturing 
and service sectors. Previous studies have suggested that firms in the manufacturing and 
service sectors respond differently to TCE attributes, including environmental uncertainty 
(Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003).  
Manufacturing firms are investment-intensive (i.e., with fixed asset investment upfront, 
including plant, equipment, and inventory) (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988). On the other 
hand, service firms are people-intensive (Erramilli & Rao, 1993), and this light-asset 
feature provides service firms with more flexibility. 
4.3.2 Foreign Entry  
In general, MNEs are subject to the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) because the 
host environment has less information about foreign entrants with which to make 
informed judgements and actors in the host environments may adopt a different (higher) 
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legitimacy standard (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). However, when local firms lose their 
legitimacy for some reason, non-local firms are perceived as more legitimate (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999). In the crisis industry, local producers have been reported by the media as 
being involved in unethical behavior. They are perceived by local consumers as 
illegitimate. As a result, this creates more opportunity for non-local firms in the crisis 
sector, especially in terms of entry and exit decisions.  
If a consumer confidence crisis makes consumers more aware of quality concerns with 
respect to a particular set of manufacturers or brands, this creates opportunities for those 
unaffected (or less affected) to gain market share. Specifically, a consumer confidence 
crisis affecting domestically made products creates opportunities for foreign investors 
operating in the industry. Foreign entry is more likely in the crisis sector as a 
consequence of the shift in consumer preferences to foreign and imported brands, which 
is likely to induce more foreign entries in the crisis sector than in the non-crisis sectors. 
This leads to our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1a: The crisis will trigger more foreign entries in the crisis sector. 
The strength of this effect is likely to vary between the manufacturing and service 
sectors. The huge fixed investment upfront poses difficulties for the manufacturing 
segment to take the opportunity to enter. On the other hand, the light-asset nature of 
service firms makes it easier for the service segment to exploit the growing opportunity 
by setting up a business entity.  
In addition, given consumers’ differentiation between foreign brands with local 
production and imported brands, foreign investors will perceive an opportunity 
specifically in importing rather than local manufacturing. Importers setting up a local 
operation would register this operation as a service (such as a wholesale operation). Thus, 
we hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 1b: The crisis will trigger more foreign entries in the service segment 
of the crisis sector.  
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4.3.3 Foreign Exit 
As argued earlier, a consumer confidence crisis will make consumers more aware of 
quality concerns with respect to a particular set of manufacturers or brands, especially 
domestic brands. It therefore creates opportunities for foreign manufacturers and brands. 
As a result, more market opportunities exist for MNEs, which is likely to induce fewer 
exits in the crisis sector.  
Meanwhile, due to different features of the manufacturing and service segments, they are 
expected to respond differently. Foreign investors already manufacturing before the crisis 
need to consider the sunk cost of their existing operations, i.e., fixed upfront investments. 
They will experience increased opportunities to compete with local firms, provided they 
can assure consumers that their local manufacturing operations employ quality standards 
of the parent organization that are higher than those of local firms. Given the sunk cost 
that these firms face, we expect them to persist in the crisis sector to a greater extent than 
firms in the manufacturing segment of a non-crisis sector. In service businesses, sunk 
costs are lower such that we may not see such an effect. Thus, we hypothesize the 
following:  
Hypothesis 2a: The crisis will trigger fewer foreign exits in the crisis sector. 
Hypothesis 2b: The crisis will trigger fewer exits in the manufacturing segment 
of the crisis sector.  
4.3.4 Ownership of Existing Operations 
“Organization control” is a central concept in international business research, especially 
in international joint venture research (e.g., Chen, Paik, & Park, 2010; Yan & Gray, 
2001). Yan and Gray (2001) defined organizational control as “the mechanisms a partner 
employs to ensure that the venture conforms to its interests” (p. 397). In this study, we 
extend the concept of organizational control to subsidiary control exercised by an MNE. 
TCE has been one of the main theoretical lenses to explain organizational control as 
exercised through equity (Brock, Shenkar, Shoham, & Siscovick, 2008; Delios & 
Beamish, 1999; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Sartor & Beamish, 2014). Traditionally, 
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TCE has conceptualized control in terms of discrete governance modes, i.e., the make or 
buy decision (Williamson, 1985). More recently, scholars have argued that firms exercise 
a wider range of control along the make/buy continuum (Parmigiani, 2007). IJVs 
represent a hybrid governance structure that lies between wholly owned subsidiary and 
market transactions (Beamish & Banks, 1987). In IB research, scholars have argued that 
MNEs exercise greater control over overseas subsidiaries through the retention of equity 
(Malhotra & Gaur, 2014; Zhao, Luo, & Suh, 2004) and less control when they delegate 
decision-making power to host-country equity partners (Rangen & Drummond, 2011). 
Uncertainty, asset specificity, and transaction frequency constitute the three main 
attributes of a transaction that increase transaction costs and influence the governance 
structure of a firm (Williamson, 1985). In this study, organizational control means an 
MNE’s control over its overseas subsidiaries. Uncertainty refers to the unpredictability of 
future outcomes (Sartor & Beamish, 2014). Two types of uncertainty exist, i.e., 
environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty (Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & 
Aguinis, 2013). Environmental uncertainty refers to “the extent to which a country’s 
political, legal, cultural, and economic environment threatens the stability of a business 
operation” (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988: 315). Environmental uncertainty has also been 
referred to as external uncertainty (Park, Holtbrügge, & Mohr, 2009), economic 
uncertainty (Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2003), investment risk (Brouthers, 2002), 
and country risk (Kim & Hwang, 1992).  
Demand uncertainty is one type of environmental uncertainty. Demand uncertainty refers 
to uncertainty associated with future host-country demand for an MNE’s products (Kim 
& Hwang, 1992). Whereas demand uncertainty is associated with the external 
environment over which an MNE has no control, behavioral uncertainty is associated 
with a transaction partner’s behavior (Griffith, Harmancioglu, & Droge, 2009: 218). 
Behavioral uncertainty originates from a transaction partner’s opportunistic behavior or 
opportunism. The following discussion focuses on two research questions: (1a) What is 
the impact of demand uncertainty on MNEs’ subsidiary control in the crisis sector? (1b) 
How does the impact vary by industry segments? (2) What is the effect of MNEs’ equity 
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position (i.e., WOS, majority equity, minority equity) on subsidiary control in the crisis 
sector?  
4.3.4.1 Demand Uncertainty  
Extant theory holds that under conditions of environmental uncertainty, including 
demand uncertainty, firms will prefer hybrids over hierarchies (Sartor & Beamish, 2014). 
In studying entry-mode choices (i.e., wholly owned subsidiary versus IJV) under the 
condition of environmental uncertainty, scholars have argued that IJVs are preferred over 
wholly owned subsidiaries for two reasons. First, IJV partners may possess resources and 
knowledge to cope with risk (Puck, Holtbrügge, & Mohr, 2008; Beamish & Banks, 
1987).  
Second, IJV partners can share risks when environment uncertainty risk is high and 
MNEs would prefer to accept a low level of commitment in the host country (Brouthers 
& Brouthers, 2003). Empirical research has provided consistent support to this line of 
argument by showing a positive association of environment uncertainty and preference 
for IJVs over WOSs (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2003; Kim & 
Hwang, 1992). This result was confirmed in a recent study where there was a negative 
association between demand uncertainty and organizational control (Sartor & Beamish, 
2014). Moreover, the same line of logic was applied in studying post-entry-mode change, 
where perceived external uncertainty was negatively associated with the likelihood of 
converting an IJV into a WOS (Puck et al., 2008). In short, when environmental 
uncertainty is high, MNEs prefer IJVs over WOSs, i.e., take less equity control over the 
subsidiary, both at the international entry stage and in post-entry-mode conversion.  
As argued earlier, when the safety crisis hit the food industry, demand uncertainty was 
high because of reverse-ethnocentrism and changed consumer behavior. To cope with the 
risk of an industry-wide crisis, MNEs may assume less organizational control in existing 
operations, i.e., less equity ownership, to reduce their risk exposure. Hence, we 
hypothesize the following: 
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Hypothesis 3a: The crisis will trigger MNEs to take lower equity control in 
existing operations.  
Compared with the people-intensive nature of service firms, manufacturing firms are 
more investment-intensive, i.e., they have greater investments in plant, equipment, and 
inventory (Campbell & Verbeke, 1994; Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Gatignon & Anderson, 
1988). In entry-mode studies, manufacturing firms prefer IJVs over WOSs due to the 
flexibility of IJVs. IJVs allow them to reduce their exposure to potential hazards of 
environmental uncertainty by lowering their resource commitments (Gatignon & 
Anderson, 1988; Kim & Hwang, 1992; Luo, 2001). This line of argument was supported 
by several empirical studies (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003). 
Environmental uncertainty was found to be significantly related to a preference for IJVs 
over WOSs for manufacturing firms.  
As argued earlier, a domestic consumer confidence crisis can trigger reverse consumer 
ethnocentrism and increased demand uncertainty for MNEs operating in the food 
industry. Applying the same line of logic of lowering commitment when environmental 
uncertainty is high, we argue that manufacturing firms in the crisis sector will take a 
lower level of equity control so as to lower their potential risk due to demand uncertainty. 
Hence, we hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 3b: The crisis will trigger MNEs in the manufacturing segment to 
take lower equity control in existing operations.  
Service firms are more people-intensive and lower in fixed assets. Previous studies 
suggest that service firms require greater control when there are changes in the 
environment in order to main flexibility (Bowen & Jones, 1986). When environmental 
uncertainty increases, IJVs may lack the time to renegotiate contractual agreements, 
which may reduce the flexibility of MNEs to cope with the changing environment 
(Erramilli & Rao, 1993). As a result, MNEs may prefer a higher level of control over 
their subsidiary, i.e., WOSs over IJVs, to maintain flexibility (Hennart, 1994; 
Williamson, 1991). This line of logic has received mixed empirical support. For example, 
some studies show that environmental uncertainty is not significantly related to entry-
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mode choice in the service segment (Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Brouthers & Brouthers, 
2003). However, other studies have found that increased environmental uncertainty is 
related to the preference for WOSs over IJVs (Contractor & Kundu, 1998).  
Applying the logic of increased organizational control in environmental uncertainty in the 
service sector, we argue that a crisis will trigger MNEs in the service sector to increase 
their organizational control, i.e., higher levels of equity control, so that they have a higher 
level of flexibility to cope with the changing environment in a timely manner. Hence, we 
put forth the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3c: The crisis will trigger MNEs in the service segment to increase 
their equity control.  
4.3.5 Behavioral Uncertainty, Reputational Risk, and Equity 
Position 
First, behavioral uncertainty is “the degree of difficulty in verifying whether compliance 
with established agreements has occurred” (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006). 
Here, partner opportunism is of particular concern. According to TCE, some economic 
actors may behave opportunistically and act with self-interest and guile (Williamson, 
1985). For an IJV, the local partner’s opportunistic behavior may exert a detrimental 
effect on the quality of products, although they may claim that these practices lower the 
cost of the IJV. Compared with IJVs, WOSs are a favorable form of governance structure 
when partner opportunism is present, as MNEs can exercise fiat over WOSs (Williamson, 
1985).  
Second, reputation originates from the quality of a product. For a reputation to be widely 
known beyond its immediate audience, there must be a legitimacy component, i.e., the 
organization should be regarded as “desirable, proper, and appropriate within a widely 
shared system of norms and values” (Scott, 1987; cited in Rao, 1994: 30). In other words, 
to gain favorable social recognition and legitimacy, the behavior or practice of an 
organization must conform to social norms and expectations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Legitimacy acts as a necessary condition for the positive reputation of an organization. It 
has less to do with the actual quality of a product, and more to do with organizational 
145 
 
practices, i.e., the operational process and standards of making a product must conform to 
social rules and norms in the first place. If an organization violates norms or social 
expectations in the operational process of making a product or delivering a service, the 
organization will gain a bad reputation, which will exert a detrimental impact on its 
performance outcome. Previous research showed that childcare facilities with 
institutional linkages had a better survival rate compared with their counterparts with no 
institutional linkages because they were perceived as more legitimate (Baum & Oliver, 
1991).  
In the case of MNEs and their overseas subsidiaries, due to negative legitimacy spillover 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), the illegitimacy of a subunit will hurt the legitimacy of other 
subunits and the parent firm. In essence, the bad reputation of an overseas subsidiary will 
hurt the reputation of an MNE as a whole. For example, when a subsidiary of Nike in 
Southeast Asia experienced problems with its labor practices, the legitimacy of Nike as 
an organization was called into question (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).  
In the following discussion, we will simultaneously consider the joint impact of 
behavioral uncertainty (i.e., partner opportunism or operational risk), reputational risk, 
and equity position (WOS, majority equity, and minority equity) on an MNE’s strategic 
decision about a focal subsidiary.   
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Figure 17: Exposure to Operational and Reputational Risk 
 
We define “operational risk” as the risk that an employee within the organization is 
engaged in bad practices. It is often associated with limited operational control of the 
organization. Reputation risk refers to the negative legitimacy spillover when the bad 
reputation of a subsidiary impacts the reputation of the MNE as a whole. In practice, 
when an MNE adopts a WOS or majority equity position in a subsidiary, the subsidiary 
will use the brand of the MNE. However, if an MNE adopts a minority position in a 
subsidiary, the subsidiary is more likely to use the brand of a local partner. As shown in 
Figure 17, both majority and minority equity owners face a higher operational risk than a 
WOS owner due to the potential risk of partner opportunism. Meanwhile, both WOSs and 
majority-owned subsidiaries face a higher reputational risk than minority-owned 
subsidiaries due to negative legitimacy spillovers. As shown in Figure 17, majority 
owners are simultaneously exposed to high levels of operational and reputational risk and 
are the most troubled group compared with minority and WOS owners.  
Previous research has shown that MNEs choose WOSs or markets over IJVs in the case 
of increased behavioral uncertainty (Geyskens et al., 2016) because changing IJV 
contracts requires mutual consent, which requires time to build (Williamson, 1991). 
Following the same logic, we argue that, simultaneously challenged by high operational 
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risk and reputational risk, majority owners may reduce their exposure to risk in two 
alternative ways: (1) they may increase their operational control or (2) they may 
disassociate themselves via divestment. The first risk-mitigation strategy is to ensure that 
high operational standards are maintained in their organizations. This requires higher 
levels of equity control or even full equity control. To ensure better quality control, 
majority owners are likely to turn to formal control mechanisms, i.e., equity control, to 
have a stronger voice in the board of directors over the strategic decision making and 
day-to-day operations of the focal subsidiary. Hence, we advance the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4a: Compared with minority owners, majority owners are more likely 
to increase their equity control in the crisis sector.  
The second strategy is to dissociate through divestment, i.e., to eliminate the potential for 
internal negative legitimacy spillover. Because the illegitimacy of a subunit will exert a 
negative impact on the legitimacy of the MNE as an organization and other subunits, and 
given the demand uncertainty in the crisis industry and difficulty in ensuring high 
operational standards, divestment may not be a bad choice. Hence, we hypothesize the 
following:  
Hypothesis 4b: Compared with minority owners, majority owners are more likely 
to divest in the crisis sector.  
Hypothesis 4c: Compared with WOS owners, majority owners are more likely to 
divest in the crisis sector.  
4.4 Method 
4.4.1 Sample and Data Collection 
We used the Toyo Keizai dataset, which covers Japanese overseas investment from 1991 
to 2017. This dataset covers 40% of all Japanese FDI (Delios & Ensign, 2000). Our 
sample is restricted to Japanese subsidiaries in China, as China is the empirical setting for 
the research question. This single-home, single-host study design allows for control over 
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country-specific effects on the outcome variable. For hypotheses 1 to 3, we use the whole 
sample and apply a difference-in-difference methodology (Angrist & Pischke, 2008) that 
allows us to estimate the effects in the focal industry relative to a benchmark of similar 
firms in other industries.  
For hypothesis 4, we are interested in treatment heterogeneity, i.e., how different 
subgroups in the treatment group respond differently to the treatment (the consumer 
confidence crisis in the food industry). Following Chung et al. (2013), we limit our 
analysis to Japanese investment in the Chinese food industry between 2007 and 2017. 
The reason is that the food safety crisis started in 2008 and there were multiple food 
scandals over the next few years. In October 2015, a new food safety law was put into 
practice. Moreover, to ensure that the strategic response of subsidiaries could be 
attributed to a single parent firm, we selected subsidiaries with only one Japanese parent 
(Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013). The final sample consists of 263 Japanese subsidiaries in 
the food industry. We created a cross-sectional database of 263 observations to test 
hypothesis 4.  
4.4.2 Measures 
Dependent variables. There are four dependent variables in the four hypotheses. For 
hypothesis 1a/b, the dependent variable is new entry (entry is coded as 1 and 0 
otherwise). For hypothesis 2a/b, the dependent variable is exit (exit is coded as 1 and 0 
otherwise). For hypothesis 3a/b/c, the dependent variable is equity control and is 
operationalized as the focal MNE’s ownership level in a subsidiary (Sartor & Beamish, 
2014).  
For hypothesis 4a/b/c, the dependent variable is a categorical variable of ownership 
change in a subsidiary, which is defined as the focal Japanese parent’s ownership-level 
change between 2007 and 2017.24 This variable has four categories: (1) increase; (2) 
 
24 Those subsidiaries established in 2017 were excluded from our analysis because ownership-level change 
could not be measured with the one-year data available. 
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decrease; (3) unchanged; and (4) divestment. Divestment includes both the closure and 
selling off of a subsidiary by the MNE (Chung et al., 2013). 
Independent variables. For hypotheses 1 to 3, the crisis industry is operationalized as the 
food industry. It is coded as 1 if a subsidiary is in the food industry and 0 otherwise. For 
hypothesis 4, an MNE’s equity position in a subsidiary is measured by the focal Japanese 
parent firm’s ownership level in the subsidiary and is converted into four categories: (1) 
wholly owned subsidiary (ownership level = 100%); (2) majority-owned subsidiary (50% 
< ownership level < 100%); (3) equity-owned subsidiary (ownership level = 50%); and 
(4) minority-owned subsidiary (0% < ownership level < 50%). 
Regarding the subsidiary’s industry segment, we used the original industry coding of the 
TK dataset. There are three segments in an industry: (1) manufacturing; (2) wholesale; 
and (3) retail. Service was operationalized by both wholesale and retail.  
Treatment effect. To identify the treatment effect, we ran a document count from Factiva 
with the keywords “food safety” and “China.” The result is shown in Figure 18. The 
number of articles on Chinese food safety issues gradually increased after 2000 and there 
was an obvious spike in 2008. We also performed a sensitivity analysis by dividing the 
number of articles on “food safety in China” by the number of articles on “China” to 
counter the argument that there have merely been more articles in Factiva over the years. 
The result also shows that there was a spike in 2008. In the analysis, we use post-2008 as 
the treatment period. 
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Figure 18: Document Counts on Food Safety in China by Factiva (1983-2016) 
 
 
Source: Factiva, accessed March 19th, 2017. 
 
Controls. We also included controls in our analysis. Regarding hypotheses 1 to 3, we 
included MNEs’ experience in China. This represents MNEs’ local embeddedness, which 
may provide a valuable knowledge base (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Li & Meyer, 2007) 
for an MNE to respond to an industry-wide crisis, especially in terms of entry and exit 
decisions. Meanwhile, the literature on the effect of experience in a host country on the 
ownership level is inconclusive (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Li & Meyer, 2009). On the 
one hand, with more experience in the host country, MNEs gain capabilities to operate 
there. As a result, there is less need to share ownership with local partners and MNEs 
tend to increase their ownership level as they accumulate more experience (Delios & 
Beamish, 1999). On the other hand, MNEs may develop the ability to select the right 
partner over time, which reduces their uncertainty and ownership level (Li & Meyer, 
2009). In our study, experience is measured as subsidiary-years by an MNE in China 
(Delios & Beamish, 2001). Due to its skewness, we used the log transformation of 
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subsidiary years in the analysis. Moreover, we controlled for the alternative explanation 
that Chinese consumers turn to foreign-produced food products due to their rising 
income. The rationale is that foreign food products are more affordable because the 
Chinese have more disposable income. We included year-fixed effects in the analysis to 
control for this effect. In addition, we utilized the panel structure of the dataset and 
estimated all the models using clustered standard errors to account for within-firm 
correlations. 
Regarding hypothesis 4, we controlled for MNE-level and subsidiary-level effects. First, 
we considered an MNE’s experience in China. Second, at the subsidiary level, we 
controlled for subsidiary size, as it represents a parent firm’s resource commitment 
(Delios & Beamish, 1999; Zhang & Beamish, 2017). It was measured by the log 
transformation of the number of employees.25 
4.4.3 Analytical Strategy   
For the first three hypotheses, we have three dependent variables, i.e., entry (logistic 
regression), exit (Cox proportional hazards model), and ownership level of the subsidiary 
(OLS regression). The main econometrics method is difference in difference (DD) 
(Angrist & Pischke, 2008), which can take care of both the time trend and the treatment 
effect. The treatment group is the food industry and the treatment period is post-2008. We 
also investigated the sub-group differences (i.e., food manufacturing, food wholesale, and 
food retail) in the food industry. 
The main model is specified as follows: 
Yit=α+βFoodIndustryi+γPeriodt+δFoodIndustryi×Periodt+λXit+εit         (1) 
 where Yit is entry in FoodIndustry i during period t in hypothesis 1, and exit in 
FoodIndustry i during period t in hypothesis 2. Yit is the percentage ownership of the 
 
25 Due to missing information on the number of subsidiary employees, the final sample consists of 202 
observations. 
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Japanese MNE in FoodIndustry i during period t in hypothesis 3. FoodIndustry takes the 
value of 1 if it is in the food industry and 0 otherwise. We have one treatment period in 
our analysis, which takes the value of 1 if it is post-2008 and 0 otherwise. The coefficient 
of interest is δ. Xit is a vector of control variables, including year-fixed effects and other 
control variables.  
For illustration purposes, we plotted the DD trend of ownership level for food versus 
non-food industry (see Figure 19) before our statistical analysis. As shown in Figure 19, 
the general trend before 2008 was almost parallel between the food industry and non-
food industry. We also plotted the trend for sub-groups, i.e., manufacturing segment 
(Figure 20), wholesale segment (Figure 21), and retail segment (Figure 22).  
For hypothesis 4, we used multinomial logistic regression to investigate the effect of an 
MNE’s equity position and the subsidiary’s industry segment on the MNE’s ownership- 
level change in a subsidiary. The principal advantage of multinomial logistic regression is 
that there is no inherent ranking order among the four types of ownership-level change.  
 
  
153 
 
Figure 2: DD Trend for Ownership Level: Food Industry versus Non-Food Industry 
 
Figure 20: DD Trend for Ownership Level: Food Manufacturing versus Non-Food 
Manufacturing 
 
154 
 
Figure 31: DD Trend for Ownership Level: Food Wholesale versus Non-Food 
Wholesale 
 
Figure 42: DD Trend for Ownership Level: Food Service versus Non-Food Retail 
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4.5 Results  
4.5.1 Entry 
With regard to entry, we used logistic regression to test the odds of entry. The coefficient 
for the interaction term is of interest. Results in Table 19 show that there is a higher 
likelihood of entry for the food industry, as the coefficient for the interaction term is 0.21 
and the standard error is 0.1, which is significant at a 0.05 level. Among subgroups, the 
food wholesale sector also shows a higher likelihood of entry, as the coefficient for the 
interaction term is 0.44 and the standard error is 0.26, which is significant at a 0.1 level. 
There is no significant result for food manufacturing or food retail. Hypotheses 1a and 1b 
are supported. 
Table 19: Logistic Regression Result for Entry 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Whole sample Manufacturing Sector Wholesale Sector Retail Sector 
Independent variables entry entry entry entry 
Food industry -0.00 0.02 0.08 -0.46*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.20) (0.17) 
Treatment period -0.98*** -1.03*** -1.07*** -0.70*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.15) 
Food industry* 
treatment period 0.21** -0.04 0.44* 0.38 
  (0.10) (0.13) (0.26) (0.28) 
Constant -1.73*** -1.82*** -1.38*** -1.12*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.10) 
Observations 79,528 61,169 16,561 1,798 
Note: Control variables include MNE experience and year-fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
*p<0.1 
4.5.2 Exit 
We used the Cox proportional hazards model to test subsidiary exit. The result is shown 
in Table 20. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant for both the 
food industry (the coefficient is –0.61, the standard error is 0.09, and it is significant at a 
0.01 level) and food manufacturing (the coefficient is –0.62, the standard error is 0.11, 
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and it is significant at a 0.01 level), which means that the crisis triggered fewer exits in 
the food industry, especially in food manufacturing. Hypotheses 2a and 2b are supported. 
Table 20: Cox Model for Exit 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Whole sample 
Manufacturing 
Sector Wholesale Sector Retail Sector 
Independent variables exit exit exit exit 
Food industry 0.70*** 0.62*** 0.64** 0.26 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.31) (0.21) 
Treatment period 0.52*** 0.44*** 0.48*** 0.35* 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.18) 
Food industry* 
treatment period -0.61*** -0.62*** -0.17 -0.20 
  (0.09) (0.11) (0.33) (0.27) 
Observations 79,528 61,169 16,561 1,798 
Note: Control variables include MNE experience and year-fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
*p<0.1 
4.5.3 Results for Existing Operations 
Table 21 presents the results of the DD analysis. Coefficient estimates and robust 
standard errors are shown in the table. In hypothesis 3, we hypothesized that MNEs will 
exercise less organizational control, i.e., less equity, in order to reduce their exposure to 
risk. Model 1 shows that δ is –3.26, and the standard error is 1.92, which is significant at 
a 0.05 level. This means that the crisis triggered Japanese MNEs to lower their ownership 
by 3.26%.26 Thus, hypothesis 3a is supported.  
Models 2, 3, and 4 show the result of sub-group analysis for MNEs in the manufacturing, 
wholesale, and retail sectors. Consistent with the DD trend, δ is –3.84 for the 
manufacturing sector, the standard error is 2.12, and it is significant at a 0.1 level. This 
means that the crisis triggered MNEs in the food manufacturing sector to lower their 
ownership level by 3.84%. As such, hypothesis 3b is supported. For the service sectors 
 
26 In a separate analysis when WOSs are excluded from the analysis, the coefficient of the interaction term 
is 0.02 and it is also significant at the 0.05 level.  
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(wholesale and retail), neither δs is significant. This means that the crisis did not trigger 
MNEs in the service sector to change their ownership level. Ergo, hypothesis 3c is not 
supported.   
Table 21: OLS Results for Ownership Level 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independent variables Whole sample 
Manufacturing 
Sector 
Wholesale 
Sector Retail Sector 
Food industry 2.44 8.76** -0.23 2.98 
  (-5.25) (-3.84) (-3.02) (-2.82) 
Treatment period 14.69*** 16.64*** -5.38 19.40** 
  (-2.36) (-2.57) (-9.47) (-8.88) 
Food industry* treatment 
period -3.26* -3.84* 5.86 -1.12 
  (-1.92) (-2.12) (-6.95) (-5.41) 
Constant 51.71*** 48.90*** 70.61*** 41.25*** 
  (-1.57) (-1.66) (-7.9) (-4.06) 
Observations 79,522 61,163 16,561 1,798 
Note: Control variables include MNE experience and year-fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
*p<0.1 
4.5.4 Equity Position and Ownership-Level Change 
4.5.4.1 Results of Cross-Tabulation 
Table 22 presents the cross-tabulation of MNEs’ ownership status and MNEs’ 
ownership-level change in subsidiaries. As explained in Section 4.4.1 (Sample and Data 
Collection), we limited our analysis to Japanese investment in the Chinese food industry 
between 2007 and 2017. We used a cross-sectional dataset with 263 observations. 
Overall, 42% of MNEs maintained their original ownership level, while another 43%27 of 
MNEs exited the Chinese market altogether. Only 7.6% increased their ownership level, 
while another 7.6% decreased their ownership level. When an MNE’s ownership status 
was considered, there were four preliminary results: (1) greater proportions of MNEs as 
majority shareholders increased their ownership level; (2) greater proportions of MNEs 
 
27 This exit rate of 43% is based upon the cross-sectional dataset, which is different from the annual exit 
rate (5%) of the entire TK dataset. 
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as minority shareholders decreased their ownership level; (3) greater proportions of 
MNEs as WOS owners maintained their current ownership level; and (4) MNEs as WOS 
owners were much less likely to exit compared with the other three categories. 
 
Table 22: Distribution of MNE’s ownership level change, by MNE’s ownership 
status 
Type of ownership 
status 
Type of ownership level change Total 
Increase Decrease Unchanged Exit   
All 20 20 111 112 263 
7.60% 7.60% 42.21% 42.95% 100% 
WOS 
Not 
applicable 
7 74 42 123 
5.69% 60.16% 34.15% 100% 
Majority 11 3 11 30 55 
20% 5.45% 20.00% 54.55% 100% 
Equity 0 1 5 8 14 
0% 7.14% 35.71% 57.14% 100% 
Minority 9 9 21 32 71 
12.68% 12.68% 29.58% 45.07% 100% 
 
4.5.4.2 Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression  
In Tables 23 to 24, we report the relative risk ratios, which represent the exponential 
values of the coefficients, and the standard errors. The reference group is no change, with 
the relative risk ratio representing the relative risk of increase rather than no change, or 
the relative risk of decrease rather than no change, or the relative risk of exit rather than 
no change.  MNEs’ ownership status, subsidiaries’ industry segment, MNEs’ experience, 
and subsidiary size all lagged for one year. 
Table 23 shows the results of the relative risk ratios when minority was used as the 
reference group. First, majority shareholders were 3.8 times (the standard error is 2.9 and 
it is significant at a 0.1 level) more likely to increase their ownership level than minority 
shareholders, in line with hypothesis 4a. Second, IJVs with a foreign majority 
shareholder were 3 times (the standard error is 1.8, and it is significant at a 0.1 level) 
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more likely to exit than those with a minority foreign shareholder, as suggested in 
hypothesis 4b.  
Table 24 shows the result of the relative risk ratios when WOS was used as a reference 
category. It shows that majority IJV owners were 5.5 times (the standard error is 2.7, and 
it is significant at a 0.01 level) more likely to exit than investors operating a WOS. This is 
in line with hypothesis 4c.  
Table 23: Relative risk ratios from multinomial logistic regression of type of MNE’s 
ownership level change (minority shareholder used as the reference category) 
Characteristics Increase vs. no change 
Decrease vs. no 
change 
Exit vs. no 
change 
Ownership type    
Minority (ref) 1 1 1 
WOS  5.18E-08 0.407 0.544 
(3.64E-05) (0.304) (0.254) 
Majority 3.865* 1.82 2.999* 
(2.968) (1.677) (1.809) 
Equity 9.39E-08 0.692 0.992 
(0.000234) (0.891) (0.75) 
(0.219) (0.175) (0.123) 
Observations 202 202 202 
Note: Control variables include MNE experience, industry segments and subsidiary size, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 24: Relative risk ratios from multinomial logistic regression of type of MNE’s 
ownership level change (WOS used as the reference category) 
Characteristics 
Decrease vs. no 
change 
Exit vs. no change 
Ownership type     
WOS (ref) 1 1 
Majority 
4.474* 5.510*** 
(3.719) (2.756) 
Equity 
1.7 1.822 
(2.154) (1.277) 
Minority 
2.458 1.837 
(1.839) (0.857) 
Observations 202 202 
Note: Control variables include MNE experience, industry segments and subsidiary size, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
4.6 Discussion  
The present research is motivated by the question of whether and how a consumer 
confidence crisis creates opportunities for foreign investors. Our results show that the 
crisis triggered more foreign entries in the crisis sector, especially in the service segment. 
Meanwhile, the crisis also triggered fewer foreign exits, especially in the manufacturing 
segment. With regard to existing operations, MNEs lowered their equity control to reduce 
their exposure to risk. Moreover, MNEs of different equity positions (i.e., WOS, 
majority, and minority) were under varying levels of partner opportunism and 
reputational risk. As a result, majority owners were more likely than minority owners to 
increase their ownership level to ensure quality control. Majority owners were also more 
likely to disassociate from reputational risk through divestment, compared with WOS and 
minority owners.   
4.6.1 Theoretical Contributions  
This study makes at least three contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to TCE 
and extends the theoretical argument on external uncertainty, especially in regard to 
demand uncertainty. Consistent with prior research on entry-mode choice (i.e., IJVs or 
WOSs) (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Sartor & Beamish, 2014) and post-entry mode 
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conversion (i.e., conversion from IJVs to WOSs) (e.g., Puck et al., 2009), our study 
suggests that MNEs lowered equity control, i.e., took a lower level of commitment, to 
cope with environmental uncertainty. This finding goes beyond prior research by 
extending the argument in a post-entry crisis empirical setting.  
In addition to extending the argument on the relationship between environmental 
uncertainty and organizational control, we also examined the relationship between 
behavioral uncertainty (i.e., partner opportunism) and organizational control by 
introducing the concept of reputational risk and an MNE’s equity position. Our results 
show that compared with WOSs and minority owners, majority owners are at high levels 
of both operational and reputational risk. As a result, majority owners will choose to 
either a) increase their ownership level to exert more organizational control in order to 
ensure product quality or b) disassociate themselves from the IJV altogether through 
divestments in order to avoid reputational damage to their global brand and operation. To 
our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the strategic options of MNEs of 
different equity positions in coping with partner opportunism.  
Second, our study extends Kostova and Zaheer’s (1999) argument that the illegitimacy of 
local firms provides non-local firms with an initial level of legitimacy in entry and exit 
decisions. Integrating the country-of-origin literature, which highlights the trade-offs 
between symbolic value (Zhou & Hui, 2003) and perceived quality (Knight, Holdsworth 
& Mather, 2007) in consumer decisions, we argue and show empirically that MNEs are 
more likely to enter and less likely to exit a sector experiencing a local crisis.  
Third, we contribute to the crisis management literature (Bondy, Pfarrer, Short, & 
Coombs, 2016) as applied in international management (Hasse, 2016; Naidoo, 2010; 
Zhao et al., 2014). When facing political risk or an economic crisis, MNEs adopt a 
“fight” or “flight” attitude. Most literature on crisis management and FDI has focused on 
the “flight” scenario and has investigated the determinants of survival (e.g., Chung & 
Beamish, 2005; Chung et al., 2013; Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013; Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 
2017). There have only been a few examples of how MNEs “fight” or adjust their 
operations to survive a crisis (e.g., Chung & Beamish, 2008; Chung et al., 2010; Naidoo, 
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2010; Zhao et al., 2014). For example, Naidoo (2010) suggested that marketing 
innovation helped manufacturing firms survive the global financial crisis after 2009. Our 
research contributes to the second line of literature by demonstrating that MNEs have a 
repertoire of strategies of entry, exit, lowering or increasing their ownership level, or 
simply remaining unchanged, which depends on their equity position and industry 
segment.  
4.6.2 Managerial Implications 
This study shows that the negative impact of a food crisis actually created opportunities 
for MNEs due to the assumption that they abided by high health and safety standards. As 
there are more opportunities in crisis sectors, MNEs can prepare and manage more 
entries—especially in the service segment, due to its light-asset nature and flexibility. 
Meanwhile, our study suggests that being a majority owner in a crisis sector is 
troublesome. Decisions should be made about whether they should exercise more 
organizational control or simply divest.  
Beyond crisis management, this study also has business ethics implications for managers. 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) proposed that legitimacy contributes to access to resources and 
firm survival. It is still applicable for firms even today. The consumer confidence crisis 
faced by all the industry players in the food sector (especially the baby milk sector) 
reminds all managers to abide by rules and regulations in order to ensure quality control.  
4.6.3 Limitations and Directions for Future Research  
This study has a few limitations. First, the data is on MNE subsidiaries from a single 
home country (Japan) in a single host country (China). This controls for country-specific 
effects in the outcome variables. Future studies can further explore whether there are 
more market opportunities for MNEs from other countries, including MNEs from 
advanced economies and emerging economies. As Japanese MNEs had no major food 
scandal in China, the results are generalizable to MNEs from those countries that had no 
food scandals, e.g. the Netherlands. However, the results may be less applicable to MNEs 
from countries that had food scandals in China, e.g. the USA. 
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Second, due to the small sample size in testing hypothesis 4, we only included a limited 
set of control variables. Future research should include additional relevant MNE and 
subsidiary-level control variables to check the robustness of our results, such as 
expatriate control and the revenue of the subsidiary.  
Third, equity control is just one type of organizational control. Future research could be 
useful based on more in-depth qualitative studies to investigate how MNEs manage their 
daily operations to ensure quality standards and the likelihood of vertical integration. In 
addition, other strategies and tactics used by MNEs to disassociate themselves from a 
consumer confidence crisis should be further explored.  
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Chapter 5  
5 Conclusions 
This dissertation focused on non-traditional investment motives within foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The first objective was to reemphasize the “centrality” of investment 
motives to firm internationalization research. Given the particular interest in non-
traditional FDI, it examined the characteristics and performance of non-traditional 
investment motives, the relationship between small-employment subsidiaries and 
survival, and MNEs’ responses to an industry-wide consumer confidence crisis. 
Most previous studies on investment motives have covered the four major motives, i.e., 
market seeking, resource seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic asset seeking 
(Dunning, 1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). However, there are other investment 
motives in Dunning’s (1993) original typology, such as in the case of escape, passive, 
and support investments, including management-supportive, trade-supportive, and 
finance-supportive investments. Although they are important both in a strategic sense and 
in terms of investment dollars, these non-traditional investment motives have been 
regarded as secondary and have received much less attention from scholars in subsequent 
studies (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015). 
Many existing studies on investment motives have used aggregate-level data as a proxy 
for non-traditional investment motives. In addition, small-employment subsidiaries have 
sometimes been excluded from data analysis. This dissertation attempts to address this 
research gap by comparing the characteristics and performance of subsidiaries that have 
non-traditional investment motives with standard subsidiaries. It also investigates the 
relationship between subsidiary size and survival, with a focus on small-employment 
subsidiaries.   
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) emphasizes the centrality of investment motives in international 
business (IB) studies by proposing a theoretical framework for the antecedents and 
consequences of investment motives (see Figure 1). It integrates a) the theoretical 
argument that an MNE’s ownership advantages (O-advantages) interact with the location 
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advantages (L-advantages) of host and home countries to jointly determine the type of 
investment motive(s) of an affiliate (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015; Narula, 2012; 
Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011) and b) a theoretical framework of the effects of 
investment motives on subsidiary-level characteristics and performance (Benito, 2015). 
To achieve that goal, four hypotheses were developed.  
The data analysis looks at the characteristics and performance of subsidiaries according 
to different investment purposes (Chakravarty, Hsieh, Schotter, & Beamish, 2017; 
Makino, Beamish, & Zhao, 2004), with a special emphasis on non-traditional investment 
motives. Although there exist different classification typologies of investment purposes 
(e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, & Un, 2015; Behrman, 1972; Hollander, 1970; Hymer, 
1976; Kacker, 1985; Porter, 1986; Dunning, 1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008), as a 
baseline, we adopt the typology proposed by Dunning (1993). In addition to the four 
main investment motives (Dunning, 1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008), this essay pays 
special attention to two other categories of investment purposes: support investments and 
passive investments. Essay 1 attempts to answer two research questions: (1) What are the 
determinants of investment motives? (2) How do subsidiaries with different investment 
purposes differ in their characteristics and performance?  
The key characteristics examined in Essay 1 include subsidiary-level characteristics such 
as the size of the affiliate (measured by the number of local employees), the ownership 
mode (wholly owned subsidiary, majority-owned subsidiary, equally owned subsidiary, 
and minority-owned subsidiary), expatriate control (expatriate number, expatriate 
percentage), and performance (measured by both revenue and subjective evaluation).  
Essay 1 provides a nuanced picture of FDI in functions such as “financing and hedging,” 
“information gathering and royalty revenue,” and “building new business,” which have 
been neglected in most empirical analyses of investment motives (Cuervo-Cazurra & 
Narula, 2015). These investment motives are not only important in a strategic sense, but 
also in investment dollars. FDI with these motives is substantially different from other 
types of FDI and collectively exemplifies the central theme of this dissertation—that 
there is huge heterogeneity (Birkinshaw & Hood, 2008) among subsidiaries. Hence, there 
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is a need to disaggregate data and treat investments with different investment motives 
separately. We also argue that where data is available, investment motives should be 
routinely included in an IB analysis looking at foreign investment. Moreover, our results 
show that there is a huge difference among subcategories of major investment motives. 
For example, under the big umbrella of “market-seeking” FDI, there are four 
subcategories: “local market access,” “tax breaks for investment,” “alliances with 
customers in Japan,” and “building new business.” The latter three subcategories are 
substantially different from the first subcategory in all four of the characteristics and 
performance measures tested in the present research. This suggests that future IB studies 
should consider investment motives at the subcategory level. 
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) examines the relationship between subsidiary size and survival. It 
addresses the following two research questions: (1) What is the main relationship 
between subsidiary size and survival? (2) How is the main effect moderated by the 
special roles of small-employment subsidiaries? Examples of such roles include those 
serving as centers of importance and vertical investment.  
The main theoretical/conceptual lenses were the liability of smallness (Aldrich & Auster, 
1986) and orchestration theory (Pitelis & Teece, 2018). Using a sample of Japanese 
overseas FDI, we found that smaller subsidiaries have a higher exit rate than larger ones. 
Furthermore, we found that the liability of smallness is conditional upon four factors: (1) 
serving as a center of importance; (2) vertical investment; (3) being in a human-capital-
intensive industry; and (4) being located in a developed country.  
Following the theme of non-traditional FDI, Essay 3 (Chapter 4) was empirically 
motivated by a natural experimental setting where there was an industry-wide consumer 
confidence crisis in the Chinese food industry after the melamine-contaminated baby 
milk scandal in 2008. It also fills a theoretical gap in crisis management in the IB 
literature by going beyond the determinants of survival (e.g., Chung & Beamish, 2005; 
Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013, 2017) and examining the repertoire of strategies that MNEs 
can deploy in a crisis. 
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It addresses four research questions: (1) Does a crisis trigger more foreign entries in the 
crisis sector? (2) Does a crisis trigger fewer foreign exits in the crisis sector? (3) What is 
the impact of demand uncertainty on MNEs’ subsidiary control in the crisis sector? (4) 
What is the effect of MNEs’ equity position (i.e., WOS, majority equity, minority equity) 
on subsidiary control in the crisis sector?  
The main theoretical lens was transaction cost economics (TCE) (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1975; Hennart, 1982) and institutional theory (i.e., legitimacy and 
reputation) (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Rao, 1994). A large sample of Japanese MNEs in 
China with 79,528 subsidiary-year observations was used.  
Our results show that reduced confidence in local products triggered more foreign entries 
in the crisis sector, especially in the service segment. Meanwhile, the crisis also triggered 
fewer foreign exits, especially in the manufacturing segment. With regard to existing 
operations, MNEs lowered their equity control to reduce their exposure to risk. 
Moreover, MNEs of different equity positions (i.e., WOS, majority, and minority) were 
under varying levels of partner opportunism and reputational risk. As a result, majority 
owners were more likely to increase their ownership level to ensure quality control than 
minority owners. Majority owners were also more likely to disassociate from reputational 
risk through divestment, compared with WOS and minority owners.   
5.1 Contributions 
This dissertation makes multiple contributions to the literature, which, taken together, 
collectively challenge existing views of a “typical” subsidiary in a “typical” investment 
setting.  
First, it contributes to Dunning’s (1993) typology on investment motives by establishing 
a research baseline on the effect of investment motives on the characteristics and 
performance of subsidiaries, with special attention given to subsidiaries with non-
traditional investment motives. 
Second, it shows that subsidiaries with non-traditional investment motives are indeed 
quantitatively different from typical manufacturing facilities (Beamish & Inkpen, 1998). 
174 
 
They represent extreme outliers in our data analysis. As a result, this dissertation urges 
scholars to disaggregate data and treat investments with different investment motives 
separately. 
Third, this dissertation extends the literature on the liability of smallness (Aldrich & 
Auster, 1986) and orchestration theory (Pitelis & Teece, 2018). Our results show that 
small subsidiaries playing the role of center of importance command a higher status in the 
MNE network, hence their greater resource endowment. As a result, they have a higher 
survival likelihood compared with their counterparts without such a role. Meanwhile, 
small subsidiaries with the function of vertical investment are more tightly integrated 
within the MNE network and less likely to be divested. In addition, being in a human-
capital-intensive industry and being located in a developed country also enhance the 
survival of small-employment subsidiaries.  
Fourth, the dissertation contributes to TCE and extends the theoretical argument on 
external uncertainty, especially demand uncertainty. Consistent with prior research on 
entry-mode choice (i.e., IJVs or WOSs) (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Sartor & Beamish, 
2014) and post-entry mode conversion (i.e., conversion from IJVs to WOSs) (e.g. Puck et 
al., 2009), our study suggests that MNEs lowered equity control, i.e., took a lower level 
of commitment, to cope with environmental uncertainty. It goes beyond prior research by 
extending the argument in a post-entry crisis empirical setting.  
In addition to extending the argument on the relationship between environmental 
uncertainty and organizational control, we also examined the relationship between 
behavioral uncertainty (i.e., partner opportunism) and organizational control by 
introducing the concepts of reputational risk and an MNE’s equity position. Our results 
show that compared with WOSs and minority owners, majority owners are at high levels 
of both operational and reputational risk. As a consequence, majority owners will choose 
to either a) increase their ownership level to exert more organizational control in order to 
ensure product quality or b) disassociate themselves from the IJV through divestment in 
order to avoid reputational damage to their global brand and operations. To our 
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knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the strategic options of MNEs of 
different equity positions in coping with partner opportunism.  
Fifth, this study extends Kostova and Zaheer’s (1999) argument that the illegitimacy of 
local firms provides non-local firms with an initial level of legitimacy in entry and exit 
decisions. Integrating the country-of-origin literature, which highlights the trade-offs 
between symbolic value (Zhou & Hui, 2003) and perceived quality (Knight, Holdsworth, 
& Mather, 2007) in consumer decisions, we argue and show empirically that MNEs are 
more likely to enter and less likely to exit a crisis sector.  
Sixth, we contribute to the crisis management literature (Bondy, Pfarrer, Short, & 
Coombs, 2016) as it relates to international management (Hasse, 2016; Naidoo, 2010; 
Zhao et al., 2014). When facing political risk or an economic crisis, many MNEs assume 
a “fight” or “flight” attitude. Most literature on crisis management and foreign direct 
investment has focused on the “flight” scenario and investigated the determinants of 
survival (e.g., Chung & Beamish, 2005; Chung et al., 2013; Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013; 
Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2017). There have been few examples of how MNEs “fight” or 
tweak their operations to survive a crisis (e.g., Chung & Beamish, 2008; Chung et al., 
2010; Naidoo, 2010; Zhao et al., 2014). For example, Naidoo (2010) suggested that 
marketing innovation helped manufacturing firms survive the global financial crisis after 
2009. Our research contributes to the second line of literature by showing that MNEs 
have a repertoire of strategies of entry, exit, lowering or increasing their ownership level, 
or simply remaining unchanged, which depends on their equity positions and industry 
segments.  
5.2 Limitations and Directions for Future Research  
This dissertation is not without limitations. First, the empirical analysis is based on FDI 
from a single home country, which may limit the generalizability of the findings. Future 
work may examine whether the results are generalizable from other host countries, 
including those from advanced economies and those from emerging economies.  
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Second, this dissertation proceeds based on the assumption that once an MNE decides to 
establish a subsidiary based on one single investment motive, other attributes of the 
investment (such as affiliate size, mode choice, expatriate control) will follow naturally. 
Yet an MNE may have multiple investment motives in mind for a subsidiary. Also, even 
if a subsidiary is established with a single motivation, it may develop or be tasked with 
meeting other purposes later. Thus, future studies can further analyze the evolution of 
investment purposes. 
Third, although this dissertation proposed a theoretical framework with the inclusion of 
both home- and host-country advantages and how they interact and contribute to firm-
specific advantages (FSAs), due to the limitations of a single home country in the 
database, these hypotheses are not empirically tested. Future research may further explore 
the abovementioned relationship by using data from multiple home countries. 
Fourth, this dissertation shows the vast heterogeneity among subsidiaries by examining 
subsidiaries with a small size, i.e., fewer than 20 employees. Future studies can further 
explore the theme of heterogeneity by examining subsidiaries at both ends of the size 
distribution, i.e., those with zero employees and those with thousands of employees. 
Fifth, the three integrated essays are based upon quantitative data analysis using a well-
established database. Future research can develop further survey questionnaires to collect 
more information based on the same population. Meanwhile, qualitative research using 
field work and interviews can help researchers better understand the mechanisms 
involved in a practical setting and generate new theoretical insights to guide future 
research.    
  
  
177 
 
References 
 
Aldrich, H., & Auster, E. R. (1986). Even dwarfs started small: Liabilities of age and size 
and their strategic implications. Research in Organizational Behavior, 8: 165–
198. 
 
Beamish, P. W., & Inkpen, A. C. (1998). Japanese firms and the decline of the Japanese 
expatriate. Journal of World Business, 33(1): 35–50. 
 
Behrman, J. N. (1972). The role of international companies in Latin America: Autos and 
petrochemicals. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
 
Benito, G. R. (2015). Why and how motives (still) matter. Multinational Business 
Review, 23(1): 15–24. 
 
Bondy, J., Pfarrer, M. D., Short C. E. & Coombs, W. T. (2016). Crises and crisis 
management: Integration, interpretation, and research development. Journal of 
Management, 43(6): 1661–1692. 
 
Chakravarty, D., Hsieh, Y. Y., Schotter, A. P., & Beamish, P. W. (2017). Multinational 
enterprise regional management centers: Characteristics and performance. Journal 
of World Business, 52(2): 296–311. 
 
Chung, C. C., & Beamish, P. W. (2005). Investment mode strategy and expatriate 
strategy during times of economic crisis. Journal of International Management, 
11(3): 331–355. 
 
Chung, C. C., Lee, S. H., Beamish, P. W., & Isobe, T. (2010). Subsidiary 
expansion/contraction during times of economic crisis. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 41(3): 500–516. 
 
Chung, C. C., Lu, J. W., & Beamish, P. W. (2008). Multinational networks during times 
of economic crisis versus stability. Management International Review, 48(3): 
279–296. 
 
Chung, C. C., Lee, S. H., Beamish, P. W., Southam, C., & Nam, D. D. (2013). Pitting real 
options theory against risk diversification theory: International diversification and 
joint ownership control in economic crisis. Journal of World Business, 48(1): 
122–136. 
 
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16): 386–405. 
 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., & Narula, R. (2015). A set of motives to unite them all? Revisiting 
the principles and typology of internationalization motives. Multinational 
Business Review, 23(1): 2–14. 
 
178 
 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., Narula, R., & Un, C. A. (2015). Internationalization motives: Sell 
more, buy better, upgrade and escape. Multinational Business Review, 23(1): 25–
35. 
 
Dai, L., Eden, L., & Beamish, P. W. (2013). Place, space, and geographical exposure: 
Foreign subsidiary survival in conflict zones. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 44(6): 554–578. 
 
Dai, L., Eden, L., & Beamish, P. W. (2017). Caught in the crossfire: Dimensions of 
vulnerability and foreign multinationals’ exit from war‐afflicted countries. 
Strategic Management Journal, 38(7): 1478–1498. 
 
Dunning, J. H. (1993). Multinational enterprises and the global economy. Wokingham, 
England: Addison-Wesley.    
 
Dunning, J. H., & Lundan, S. M. (2008). Multinational enterprises and the global 
economy. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Gatignon, H., & Anderson, E. (1988). The multinational corporation’s degree of control 
over foreign subsidiaries: An empirical test of a transaction cost explanation. 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 4(2): 305–336. 
 
Hasse, V. C. (2016).  Responses to subpar performance in foreign subsidiaries, 
unpublished PhD thesis, Western University, https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/3888.  
 
Hollander, S. C. (1970). Multinational retailing. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State 
University Press.  
 
Hymer, S. H. (1976). The international operations of national firms: A study of foreign 
direct investment. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Kacker, M. (1985). Transatlantic trends in retailing: Takeovers and flow of know-how. 
London, England: Quorum. 
 
Knight, J. G., Holdsworth, D. K., & Mather, D. W. (2007). Country-of-origin and choice 
of food imports: An in-depth study of European distribution channel gatekeepers. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 38(1): 107–125. 
 
Kostova, T., & Zaheer, S. (1999). Organizational legitimacy under conditions of 
complexity: The case of the multinational enterprise. Academy of Management 
Review, 24(1): 64–81. 
 
Makino, S., Beamish, P. W., & Zhao, N. B. (2004). The characteristics and performance 
of Japanese FDI in less developed and developed countries. Journal of World 
Business, 39(4): 377–392. 
 
179 
 
Meyer, K. E., Mudambi, R., & Narula, R. (2011). Multinational enterprises and local 
contexts: The opportunities and challenges of multiple embeddedness. Journal of 
Management Studies, 48(2): 235–252. 
 
Naidoo, V. (2010). Firm survival through a crisis: The influence of market orientation, 
marketing innovation and business strategy, Industrial Marketing Management, 
39(8): 1311–1320. 
 
Narula, R. (2012). Do we need different frameworks to explain infant MNEs from 
developing countries? Global Strategy Journal, 2(3): 188–204. 
 
Pitelis, C. N., & Teece, D. J. (2018). The new MNE: “Orchestration” theory as envelope 
of “internalization” theory. Management International Review, 58(4): 523–539. 
 
Porter, M. E. (1986). Competition in global industries: A conceptual framework, in M. E. 
Porter (Ed.), Competition in global industries: 15–60. Boston, MA: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
 
Puck, J. F., Holtbrügge, D., & Mohr, A. T. (2009). Beyond entry mode choice: 
Explaining the conversion of joint ventures into wholly owned subsidiaries in the 
People’s Republic of China. Journal of International Business Studies, 40(3): 
388–404. 
 
Rao, H. (1994). The social construction of reputation: Certification contests, legitimation, 
and the survival of organizations in the American automobile industry: 1895–
1912. Strategic Management Journal, 15(S1): 29–44. 
 
Sartor, M. A., & Beamish, P. W. (2014). Offshoring innovation to emerging markets: 
Organizational control and informal institutional distance. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 45(9): 1072–1095. 
 
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies. New York: The Free Press.  
 
Zhou, L., & Hui, M. K. (2003). Symbolic value of foreign products in the People’s 
Republic of China. Journal of International Marketing, 11(2): 36–58. 
 
  
180 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
EDUCATION 
Ph.D., Ivey Business School, Western University (2019) 
LLM, East China University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai (2010) 
MA, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh (2003) 
BA, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing (1998) 
 
MANUSCRIPTS IN PREPARATION 
- Crisis Response by MNEs: The 2008 Consumer Confidence Crisis in China  
- Subsidiary Size and Survival 
 
REFEREED CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS 
Zhu, J. 2019. “Investment Motives and Affiliate-Level Characteristics and Performance”.  
Presented at the Academy of International Business (AIB) annual conference, 
Copenhagen, Denmark, June 2019 
Zhu, J. 2018. “Food Safety Crisis and Ownership Control of Japanese MNEs in China”. 
    Presented at the AIB annual Conference, Minneapolis, USA, June 2018. 
Zhu, J. 2017. “Cultural Differences, MNE Learning Abilities, and the Effect of 
Experience on Subsidiary Mortality in a Dissimilar Culture: Evidence from Japanese 
MNEs”. Presented at the AIB annual Conference, Dubai, UAE, June 2017. 
 
PUBLISHED CASES WITH TEACHING NOTES 
Daniel Han Min Chng, Jianhua Zhu and Liman Zhao (2018), “Branded Lifestyle 
Holdings Limited: Strategic Transformation in China”, Ivey Case No. 9B18M114.  
Klaus E. Meyer and Jianhua Zhu (2015), “Dürr AG: From Premium to Mid-Market in 
China”, Ivey Case No. 9B15M071. 
Klaus E. Meyer, Daniel Han Min Chng and Jianhua Zhu (2015), “ShangGong Group: 
Chinese Challenger Acquirers German Premium Brands”, Ivey Case No. 9B15M095. 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
Fall 2018 Instructor, Law and the Multinational Firm  
2017-2018 Teaching Assistant for Competing in and with China, Global  
Strategy and International Joint Ventures and Alliances  
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
2011-2015 Research Associate, China Europe International Business School  
2004-2011 Officer, International Participants Department, Shanghai Expo Bureau  
 
HONORS AND AWARDS 
Recipient, 2015-2019, Plan for Excellence Doctoral Fellowship, Ivey Business School 
Recipient, 2013, EFMD Best Case Award  
 
 
